

















• * 









^ ^ 
a v ^ 
** ^ 



« » 









▼ .A. 



4 o 






a 
6* ^ 



lira * «? ^, o ' 














$ * • 










. i 



i0 



w 



_ f • o _ V '^"S. 




^^ 









Vv s • « 














^k ^ ^> -• v 

a>*^ ^^K3^« ,^^^ «^ 



*J^m& * V ^» *»^ 






^ %. * • . • 



* * 




V ^ *< 



<r. 






sT 1 



4>^ 










• > 1 • 



v 



* * 


















« * 






tf / 1 









0* J? 






«4q, 







% 








The Disclosures from Germany 



\HU<4 tvV\ V vVW 3k yf *wXjUvw*A\ feVsA u^u\ \ JKm. » 0* 



The Disclosures from Germany 

i 

THE LICHNOWSKY MEMORANDUM 

THE REPLY OF HERR VON JAGOW 

Translation, Introduction and Notes 
By Munroe. Smith 

II 

MEMORANDA AND LETTERS OF DR. MUEHLON 

Translation, Introduction and Notes 
By Munroe Smith 

III 

THE DAWN IN GERMANY? 
The Lichnowsky and Other Disclosures 
By James Brown Scott 



NEW YORK 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 

I918 






-£& 






It is the aim of the Association for International Con- 
ciliation to awaken interest and to seek cooperation in 
the movement to promote international good will. This 
movement depends for its ultimate success upon in- 
creased international understanding, appreciation, and 
sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and 
widely circulated, giving information as to the progress 
of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, 
in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, 
and organizations of various kinds may have accurate 
information on these subjects readily available. 

The Association endeavors to avoid, as far as pos- 
sible, contentious questions, and in particular questions 
relating to the domestic policy of any given nation. 
Attention is to be fixed rather upon those underlying 
principles of international law, international conduct, 
and international organization, which must be agreed 
upon and enforced by all nations if peaceful civiliza- 
tion is to continue and to be advanced. A list of pub- 
lications will be found on pages 255 to 264. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. The Disclosures from Germany 

i. The Lichnowsky Memorandum 24 

2. The Reply of Herr von Jagow 130 

II. Memoranda and Letters of Dr. Muehlon 

1. The Viennese Ultimatum to Serbia .... 190 

2. Ultimatum to Serbia and Russia's Mobiliza- 
tion: Reply to the Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung 200 

3. Germany and Belgium 206 

4. Letter to Bethmann-Hollweg 218 

III. The Dawn in Germany? The Lichnowsky and 

Other Disclosures, by James Brown Scott . . 231 



I 

The Lichnowsky Memorandum 
The Reply of Herr von Jagow 



Reprint of International Conciliation No. 127, June, 191 8 



INTRODUCTION 

The Lichnowskys are a family of Upper Bur- 
gundian origin, a branch of the house of Granson. 
They have held estates both in Austrian and in 
Prussian Silesia since the 17th century. In the 
Almanack de Gotha for 1849 they were described as 
"possessing" one town and forty-five villages with 
21,620 inhabitants. The title of prince was first 
conferred by the King of Prussia toward the close 
of the 1 8th century. Early in the 19th century the 
Lichnowskys became princes in Austria also. 

I 

Karl Maximilian, sixth Prince Lichnowsky, was 
born in i860. He served for a time in the Prussian 
army, in which he holds the rank of major, and then 
entered the diplomatic service. In 1885 he was attach- 
ed to the German embassy in London; later he held 
diplomatic positions in Constantinople, in Bucharest, 
and in Vienna. During the latter part of his residence 
at Vienna he was first secretary of the embassy. 
Transferred in 1899 to the Berlin Foreign Office, 
he served there, as he tells us in his memorandum, 
for several years (1899- 1904). After eight years of 
retirement from the diplomatic service, he was sent 
to London in 1 912 as German ambassador. 

As his memorandum shows, Prince Lichnowsky is 
in many respects a diplomat of the older school. He 
is not of that oldest school, described as men sent 
abroad to lie for their country's good, for he is obvi- 

(51 



ously a truthful man; nor is he of the Frederician 
school, cynically described by the Great Frederick 
himself as spies, for he is clearly an honorable gentle- 
man. He tells us, in fact, that he had no espionage 
fund. That fund was expended in England by other 
agents, with whom he had no relations. The Prince 
is old-school in his belief that the relations between 
states, and even the great issues of peace and of war, 
are mainly determined by the relations established 
between their diplomatic representatives and the 
persons who play leading r61es, in society as well as 
in politics, in the countries to which the represen- 
tatives are accredited. He is, on the other hand, a 
modern diplomat in his recognition of the importance 
of keeping in touch with the leading men in commerce, 
industry, and finance, and of influencing general opin- 
ion, at least so far as this can be done by public 
speeches reported in the daily press. 

In his general view of German foreign policy, 
Lichnowsky is distinctly of the Bismarckian school. 
He declares indeed that Bismarck made a mistake 
in allying Germany with Austria and with Italy; 
but, given the situation created by those alliances, 
the policy which Lichnowsky steadily advocated and 
still defends is that which Bismarck consistently fol- 
lowed in the later years of his chancellorship and 
insistently recommended, after his retirement from 
office, in public speeches, in the press and in his 
posthumous memoirs. Germany's duty to Austria- 
Hungary, according to Bismarck, was limited to de- 
fending the integrity of the Dual Empire. Germany 
had not undertaken and should not undertake to 
support Austrian schemes of expansion in the Near 
East, for Germany had no interests in the Balkans. 

[6] 



In all collisions of interests and of ambitions between 
Austria and Italy, Germany's role was that of the 
disinterested friend, and therefore of a possible umpire. 
Similarly, in all collisions of interests and ambitions 
between either of its allies and Russia, Germany 
was impartial. So only could Germany maintain 
its traditional friendship with Russia, which seemed 
to Bismarck, as to Lichnowsky, of the highest im- 
portance. 

Bismarckian again is Lichnowsky 's conviction, 
clearly implied although not definitely stated, that 
the German Empire should have been satisfied with 
the position it held in Europe before the present war. 
He also believed, with Bismarck, that Germany's 
colonial expansion should be limited to such gains 
as could be secured without war, particularly without 
conflict with Great Britain. His chief efforts, during 
his two years in London, were directed to this end, 
and were attended by a degree of success which he 
does not overstate. 

In his acceptance of these Bismarckian traditions, 
Lichnowsky was, at least from the point of view of 
Berlin, distinctly old-school. Ever since the retire- 
ment of Prince Bismarck there had been a growing 
conviction at Berlin that Germany had interests not 
only in the Balkans but also in Asia, and that these 
interests were to be realized by putting the whole 
force of the German Empire behind the wedge that 
Austria was driving into the Balkans and by acquir- 
ing for Germany a dominant influence in Constanti- 
nople and thus throughout the Turkish Empire. 
That this would mean war with Russia was fully 
understood, but such a war was not feared. The 
"Slav peril," so far as Germany was concerned, was 

l7l 



a bugbear that might advantageously be employed 
in domestic politics, but it was not taken seriously 
by the German General Staff or by the German 
Foreign Office. 

In his belief that Germany should regard its posi- 
tion in Europe and in the world as substantially 
satisfactory, Lichnowsky was again, from the point 
of view of Berlin, hopelessly old-school. He was not 
in touch with the Pan-German movement. He did 
not understand that Germany must obtain an abso- 
lutely dominant position in Europe, in order later 
to oust Great Britain from its leading position in 
the world. 

Given this complete antithesis between Lichnow- 
sky's antiquated views and the "new course" which 
the German imperial authorities had followed since 
1890, the Prince may well wonder why, in 1912, 
he was exhumed from his Silesian estates and sent 
to London. Quite characteristically he seeks the 
explanation in his personal relations with the Emperor, 
the chancellor, and the foreign secretary; and quite' 
frankly he tells us that he cannot find it there. An 
explanation, however, does not seem difficult. Pend- 
ing the outbreak of the long planned war for German 
hegemony on the continent, it was desirable that 
British suspicions of Germany's intentions should be 
quieted. When the war should come, it would be 
highly desirable that Great Britain should not inter- 
vene, at least not at the outset. British intervention, 
it was thought, would come more rapidly if Great 
Britain were already in a state of acute suspicion, 
less rapidly, and probably too late to be of value to 
France or to Russia, if Great Britain were taken by 
surprise. For this reason it was obviously politic 

[81 



that Germany should be represented in London by 
an ambassador who was not aware of Germany's 
real purposes, who was peacefully minded and friendly 
to Great Britain, and whose efforts to concentrate 
British attention on colonial negotiations and a rap- 
prochement between the Triple Alliance and the 
Entente Powers might be successful precisely because 
they were sincere. It was to secure these advantages 
that the Prince was, as he complains, kept uninformed 
of the most important matters. In the meantime, 
as has been intimated both in France and in England 
by persons familiar with German diplomacy and its 
methods, the Berlin government had in Great Britain 
agents who were in sympathy with its real designs and 
who were kept fully informed of all relevant facts 
and events. These agents controlled the spy system 
and discharged all the obscure and devious duties 
which could not be entrusted to a diplomat of Lich- 
nowsky's rank, traditions, and character. It has been 
suggested that the representative of Germany's real 
policy was Herr von Kuhlmann, then chief coun- 
selor of the London embassy, and now (191 8) imperial 
foreign secretary.* If this were the case, von Kuhl- 
mann was clever enough to play his part without 
exciting any suspicion in the mind of his chief; for 
Lichnowsky speaks of him always with the highest 
appreciation. 

II 
The chief value of Prince Lichnowsky's memo- 
randum lies in the fact that he rejects and helps to 
disprove every plea in justification of Germany's con- 
duct that has been advanced since the outbreak of 
the World War by Germany's official apologists. His 

* Journal des Debats, edition hebdomadaire, March 29, 191 8. 

[9] 



testimony is of especial value in refuting the German 
assertion that, for a long period before the war, 
France, Russia, and Great Britain had been united 
in efforts to check German commercial expansion 
and to deny to Germany, a newcomer among the 
Great Powers, its just share in the exploitation of 
the world's undeveloped resources. By their intrigues 
Germany was hemmed in or, as the Germans put it, 
"encircled." In this conspiracy of encirclement Great 
Britain, as the nation most seriously menaced in its 
economic interests by German competition, was the 
arch-conspirator. For its selfish purposes it supported 
the French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine and the 
Russian desire to gain access to the Mediterranean — 
desires described as French lust for revenge and Rus- 
sian lust for conquest. 

We see today that the encirclement theory was 
one of the most valued drugs in Berlin's political 
medicine closet. It was at once an anodyne, by which 
the German people were made to bear more quietly 
the growing burden of armaments, and a stimulant 
adapted to fire them with a sense of wrong and a 
conviction that by war alone could they obtain satis- 
faction. Germany's encirclement could also be repre- 
sented, and was represented, as a prelude to aggres- 
sive action by the encircling Powers. Failing to 
stifle German competition by diplomatic wiles, these 
Powers would sooner or later seek to crush Germany 
in war. Thus the German people were prepared to 
look upon a European war either as necessary, in 
order to gain a free field for their industry and trade, 
or as inevitable for the defense of the Fatherland. 
And, since these different notions were simultane- 
ously presented to them, and were not disassociated 

[iol 



in their minds, the German people were adroitly 
prepared to regard an aggressive war, whenever it 
should please Berlin to start it, either as a "preventive" 
war — that is, a war to anticipate attack — or„ as a 
war of defense. 

When war should come, the encirclement plea could 
of course be used, as in fact it was used, to influence 
neutral opinion. The theory was primarily con- 
structed, however, for domestic use. 

Lichnowsky attacks the encirclement theory on 
two sides. He asserts, in the first place, and adduces 
new evidence to prove, that the rapprochement between 
Great Britain and France and, later, between Great 
Britain and Russia was no offensive conspiracy, but 
a defensive entente. The provocative policy pursued 
by Germany during the years preceding the World 
War had awakened general distrust of Germany's 
intentions. It was this distrust, more than anything 
else, that brought Great Britain into closer touch with 
France and with Russia. Germany was not isolated 
by the wiles of its neighbors; it isolated itself by 
its own conduct.* 

* In his preface to an edition of Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum 
printed in Zurich, the Swiss Professor Nippold puts this point very 
clearly and very neatly: "Public opinion is regarded in Germany as 
a thing that is made from above; and since the press and the people 
consciously or unconsciously accept this situation as a matter of 
course, it is precisely those views which are regarded as desirable by 
the powers that be that are dominant in Germany in all questions 
of foreign policy. Under these circumstances it was of course not 
difficult to divert the attention of the German public from the 
mistakes which its own statesmen had made in the last decades. 
This of course was most easily done by rolling off these mistakes 
upon others. Thus the self-encirclement of Germany, for which 
German policy was responsible, was artfully converted into an 
encirclement (so wurde aus der Selbstauskreisung Deutschlands die eine 
Schuld der deutschen Politik war, kiinstlich eine Einkreisung gemacht) ." 

[II] 



Lichnowsky shows, in the second place — and here 
his testimony is of the greatest value because of the 
position he held in London during the two years 
immediately preceding the war — that English jealousy 
of Germany's commercial and industrial development 
had come to be outweighed, in the minds of English 
manufacturers and merchants, by their recognition 
that Germany had become England's best customer. 
He testifies that Sir Edward Grey's policy, supported 
by the English premier, did not aim to exclude Ger- 
many from competition in the world's markets or 
even to arrest Germany's colonial development. On 
the contrary, Grey was anxious to adjust all disputes 
between Great Britain and Germany in the field of 
world politics, as he had previously adjusted all such 
disputes between Great Britain and France and, later, 
between Great Britain and Russia. He was ready 
to accord to Germany spheres of economic influence 
and of eventual political control in those parts of 
the world in which the competition of the Great 
Powers was keenest. Not only was he willing to 
meet Germany half way, but he was even disposed 
to accord to Germany, notably as regards the Congo, 
opportunities and expectancies which, to the German 
ambassador's surprise, Berlin hesitated to grasp. 

The African and the Bagdad treaties which Lich- 
nowsky negotiated gave substantial advantages, as he 
points out, to German commerce, industry, and finance. 
They also gave the German Empire important colonial 
expectations. Why were these treaties not welcomed 
in Berlin? Why was the Bagdad treaty not concluded? 
Why was the African treaty accepted only after long 
delay, and only on the eve of war, when its ratifica- 
tion was no longer possible? Lichnowsky 's explana- 

[12] 



tion, that his rivals in German governmental circles 
grudged him successes so conspicuous, is equally 
characteristic and unconvincing. 

The chief point in controversy, he tells us, was 
(at least as regards the African treaty) that of pub- 
lication. Sir Edward Grey insisted that the treaty 
should be published; Berlin insisted that it should 
be kept secret. The most plausible argument for 
secrecy advanced by Berlin, namely, that the par- 
tition of the Portuguese colonies into spheres of 
influence and of pre-emption would so offend Por- 
tuguese feeling that German entrepreneurs would be 
unable to obtain concessions, is rightly characterized 
by Lichnowsky as a pretext. England, as he points 
out, held Portugal in the hollow of its hand. He 
might have added that, under the circumstances, 
any Portuguese resentment would probably direct 
itself primarily against Great Britain, and that, if 
Great Britain could take the risk, Germany surely 
could. Even more absurd (although von Jagow still 
endorses it) is the pretext that, if the German people 
had learned that Great Britain was conceding rights 
of pre-emption in the colonies of Portugal, there would 
have been an outcry against British "perfidy" which 
would have embarrassed the German government and 
(as von Jagow now suggests) would have vitiated 
the "good atmosphere" which the Berlin Foreign 
Office desired to create in Anglo-German relations. 
It is, however, not easy to believe that in the Germany 
of the 20th century there would have been a general 
ethical revolt against any British action that was 
advantageous to Germany. 

The probable explanation — the probable reason why 
Berlin was willing to ratify the treaty but unwilling 

1 13] 



to publish it — was that its publication would have 
shaken, and might even have destroyed, the fiction 
of encirclement. If the German people had been 
permitted, in 1913 or in 19x4, to read treaties by 
which Great Britain accorded to Germany the eco- 
nomic control of Mesopotamia and of important parts 
of Africa, the belief in Germany's encirclement which 
the German government had created, and which it 
needed for the coming war, would have been seriously 
undermined. 

Von Jagow's reply to Lichnowsky shows that the 
opposition on which the African and Bagdad treaties 
were wrecked was neither made nor supported in 
the Berlin Foreign Office. The Berlin foreign sec- 
retary also desired a rapprochement with Great Britain 
and favored the ratification of the Grey-Lichnowsky 
treaties. This leaves but one possible conclusion. 
The opposition was higher up, in the militarist- 
Junker entourage of the Emperor. That in these 
circles there could be little enthusiasm for arrange- 
ments which would primarily subserve the interests 
of German commerce is quite intelligible. For decades 
the Junkers had witnessed with growing distaste and 
apprehension the rapidly increasing wealth of the 
middle classes. This new wealth was lessening the 
relative power and the prestige of their own order. 
Least of all were they disposed to welcome arrange- 
ments which would further enrich German merchants, 
manufacturers, and bankers, if these arrangements 
tended to avert or even to postpone war; for it was 
to war they looked to re-establish their threatened 
prestige and to assure their dominant influence in 
Prussia and in the Empire. 

[14] 



When Lichnowsky reviews the fateful events of 
July, 1914, he rejects with the same candor the con- 
struction which his government has given to these 
events and which the German people have, for the 
most part, blindly accepted. 

For the official German theory that Serbia had 
inflicted upon Austria's honor a stain that could 
be washed out only by blood, he substitutes the 
statement that Serbia had to be "massacred" because 
it stood in the way of Austria's ambitions. 

The official German statement that Russian mobili- 
zation was an act of war he dismisses with contempt. 
He does not attempt to disprove it, because it is a 
purely military theory that has never had the least 
recognition in the diplomatic world. He reminds us 
only that the Czar had pledged his word that no 
Russian soldier should march so long as negotiations 
continued.* 

Against the theory formally advanced by Chancel- 
lor von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech of December 
2, 1914, before the Reichstag, that Great Britain was 
responsible for the war because it assured France, 
and therefore Russia also, of unconditional support 
against Germany — a theory fully disproved by the 
documents — Lichnowsky insists upon Grey's earnest 
desire and persistent efforts to prevent the outbreak 
of a European war. He expresses his own conviction 
that Grey's proposed conference with the German, 
Italian, and French ambassadors in London, for the 
purpose of devising an adjustment of the issue raised 

* Telegram of the Czar to King George August 1, 1914: "I have 
given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my 
troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued." 
Collected Diplomatic Documents (London, 191 5), part ix, no. 2, page 
537- 

1 15] 



between Austria and Russia, would undoubtedly have 
averted the war, had Germany wished to avert it. 

To justify Germany's refusal to take part in such 
a conference, von Jagow now argues that "Italy was 
Serbophil and, with its Balkan interests, stood rather 
opposed to Austria." Has Herr von Jagow forgotten 
that, when he first heard of the proposed conference, 
he told the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, that 
he was "disposed to join in," and that it was only 
when he was instructed, from above, that the con- 
ference would be "a court of arbitration," that he 
changed his attitude? If the conference were to have 
been a court, Germany might properly have chal- 
lenged Italy's participation on the ground now first 
suggested by von Jagow. In fact, however, it was 
not proposed that the conference should attempt to 
decide anything; it was simply to suggest a settle- 
ment; and Bethmann-Hollweg's deliberate miscon- 
struction of Grey's proposal was simply a link in the 
chain of lies with which Berlin dragged Europe into 
war. Von Jagow's record is so much better than that 
of his superiors that it is painful to find him still coun- 
tenancing a misrepresentation for which he was not 
primarily responsible. 

On the more important question of Great Britain's 
alleged responsibility for the war, von Jagow supports 
Lichnowsky's view. Britain did not contrive the 
war; "on the contrary," von Jagow writes, "I believe 
in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest 
wish to arrive at an agreement with us." 

Perhaps the most valuable feature of Lichnowsky's 
memorandum for the future historian, certainly its 
most interesting feature for us today, is his character- 
ization of Sir Edward Grey. After two years' close 

[16] 



association, Lichnowsky was assuredly in a position 
to form a just estimate of the man as well as of the 
statesman. Not only is he thoroughly convinced of 
Grey's love of peace, he is also profoundly impressed 
by Grey's complete honesty and unmistakable 
sincerity. Seldom, if ever, in the history of the world 
has a diplomat of one nation paid such a tribute to 
a colleague of another nation as Lichnowsky pays to 
Grey. Never has such a tribute been paid at a moment 
when the two nations concerned were locked in a 
desperate struggle. 

In the light of subsequent events, many Englishmen 
have found that Grey was too peaceful. They have 
criticized him for his readiness to make concessions 
to a rival power which, as we now see, was unlikely 
to be satisfied with any concessions, because its 
appetite was insatiable. Grey has also been criticized 
because in his negotiations with predatory Balkan 
principalities, after the outbreak of the war, he was 
too scrupulous to be successful, There remains, how- 
ever, to his credit one achievement that far out- 
weighs any errors or failures, an achievement that 
was due to his love of peace, his honesty, and his 
scrupulous honor. He carried Great Britain into the 
greatest of all its wars with spotlessly clean hands. 

Ill 

The value of such evidence as Prince Lichnowsky 
gives us depends of course not alone on the witness's 
knowledge of men and of events, but also on his per- 
sonal characteristics. 

It would be an exaggeration to describe the Prince 
as a subtle man or even as a very acute man. He is 
possessed, however, of good sound understanding. 

[17] 



His description of the public men with whom he came 
in contact in England shows discernment. His anal- 
ysis of the relations between society and government 
in England, as England was before this war, is sub- 
stantially correct. His truthfulness is apparently 
beyond question; he is too much of a grand seigneur 
to say anything that he does not believe. 

His chief foible is that to which the grand seigneur 
is most liable, an exaggerated sense of his own impor- 
tance. It is because he is so self-centered that he is 
inclined to ascribe to the envy of rivals all opposition 
to his policies. This illusion finds an extreme expres- 
sion in his belief that one reason, at least, why the 
authorities in Berlin clung to a policy that must lead 
to war was their disinclination to give to him and to 
Grey the credit of keeping the peace. 

It is on this weakest point that the German press, 
taking its cue as always from the German govern- 
ment, dwells with especial insistence. It should be 
noted, however, that Lichnowsky's vanity appears 
to mislead him only in the explanation of facts. It 
does not anywhere appear that it has led him to 
misstate the facts themselves. He is very proud of 
his African and Bagdad treaties, but his summary 
of their provisions is confirmed by other testimony. 
In general, so far as his assertions can be controlled 
by other evidence — and most of them can — that evi- 
dence is confirmatory. 

If we accept the statement which Lichnowsky made 
to the imperial chancellor, in his letter of March 15, 
19 1 8, that he wrote his memorandum "with regard 
to the future" and for the sake of "noting the details 
of my experiences and impressions before they van- 

[18] 



ished from my memory" — that is, that he wrote for 
his family archives and for history — the trustworthi- 
ness of the document is enhanced. There is, appa- 
rently, no reason to doubt the sincerity of this state- 
ment. The Prince had, indeed, urgent motives to 
desire that the living world as well as the future his- 
torian should appreciate his diplomatic activity. 
Even a more modest and more judicious man might 
well have found it unendurable to be made, as Lich- 
nowsky was made from the moment Great Britain 
entered the war, the chief scapegoat for the disastrous 
results of a policy which he had consistently opposed. 
Even such a man would probably have defended 
himself with equal energy and frankness in private 
conversation with his friends. Such a man, however, 
would hardly have put his defense into writing, much 
less have put several typewritten copies into circula- 
tion, as Lichnowsky did, while the war was still raging. 
A less self-centered and more judicious man would 
have seen clearly that a document of such interest, 
thus made current, could hardly be kept secret; and 
he would not have characterized as "unprecedented" 
the breach of confidence through which it became pub- 
lic. That Lichnowsky foresaw such an outcome and 
was not unwilling that his defense should be published, 
provided this happened without his sanction, is con- 
ceivable indeed but highly improbable. Such a hy- 
pothesis is improbable, not only because so underhand 
a way of attaining an object would have been repug- 
nant to a man of his rank and character, but also be- 
cause the inconveniences which even an unauthor- 
ized publication would draw upon the writer would 
have been fully realized. 

[19] 



IV 

Lichnowsky's memorandum was written in the sum- 
mer of 1916. According to German statements which 
have reached neutral and allied countries, and which, 
in spite of minor variations, are in the main accordant, 
a copy of the memorandum was lent by Privy Coun- 
cillor Witting, a brother-in-law of Maximilian Harden, 
to Captain von Beerfelde, who was employed in the 
political section of the General Staff. Von Beerfelde 
is described as an idealist and a pacifist. A man who 
was neither might well desire, in the interest of Ger- 
many itself, an early conclusion of peace. Such a man 
might well have thought, as Captain von Beerfelde is 
said to have thought, that one great obstacle to peace 
was the conviction prevailing in Germany that Great 
Britain was responsible for the war, and might well 
have believed that the publication of Lichnowsky's 
memorandum would tend to remove this misconcep- 
tion and lessen the resulting hatred. Since the pub- 
lication of the memorandum a similar view has been 
expressed by Captain Persius, military expert of the 
Berlin Tageblatt, who is apparently neither an idealist 
nor a pacifist. Captain von Beerfelde, without the au- 
thorization of Prince Lichnowsky, had a number of 
copies made and sent them to some of his friends and 
acquaintances. Early in February, 19 18, the New 
Fatherland Alliance (a society formed in the autumn 
of 1914, which is neither socialist nor pacifist but is 
opposed to autocracy and has protested eloquently 
against annexations) had 2,000 copies printed in South 
Germany and sent to Berlin, where they were seized by 
the police. Such a seizure, of course, is seldom com- 
plete : there are usually copies, or at least proof sheets, 

[20] 



which the police do not find. About the middle of 
March, 191 8, a portion of the memorandum appeared 
at Stockholm in Politiken, the leading organ of the 
Swedish socialists. Publication of further instalments 
was temporarily arrested by the Swedish government ; 
but on March 21, 191 8, the complete text of the mem- 
orandum was published in the Berlin B or sen-Courier. 
After this, the German government ceased to oppose 
further publication in Germany. Efforts were still 
made, however, to prevent printed copies from pass- 
ing the frontier, and not until May was any copy of 
the German text available in this country. 

Captain von Beerfelde was placed under arrest and, 
according to the Bernese Freie Zeitung, which usually 
is well informed, he has been confined in an insane 
asylum. No such measures have been taken against 
the author of the memorandum. At a meeting of 
the main committee of the Reichstag, on March 16, 
Vice-Chancellor von Payer read to the deputies Lich- 
nowsky's letter of explanation, already cited, and 
stated that as the Prince had been guilty of impru- 
dence only and had resigned his diplomatic rank, no 
further steps would be taken against him. Since that 
time many German writers have demanded that he 
be placed on trial and be sent either to prison or to 
a sanatorium; and a movement was started in the 
Prussian Upper House to expel him from member- 
ship in that body. The most vehement demands for 
Lichnowsky's punishment very naturally came from 
leading militarists and annexationists who knew that 
his statements were substantially true. The imperial 
and Prussian governments, however, evidently wish 
to leave the matter where von Payer left it. Under 

[21] 



governmental suggestion the German press has almost 
unanimously treated the memorandum as unimportant. 
Not only is the Prince described as a discredited 
diplomat, but his narrative and his conclusions are 
alleged to be so colored by his extreme vanity as to 
be valueless. 

As far as the German people are concerned, this 
view seems to be generally accepted. Upon some 
intelligent German readers the memorandum has 
undoubtedly made a strong impression; but most of 
these were already fully aware that the official expla- 
nations of the causes of the war were false. The effect 
of the memorandum was doubtless sensibly lessened 
by the absorbing anxiety with which all Germans were 
following their great offensive movement on the west- 
ern front. This, it will be remembered, was started at 
the very moment when the memorandum began to 
circulate freely in Germany. 

In a Germany sobered by defeat, the Lichnowsky 
memorandum, with the Miihlon letters and many 
other pieces of evidence that demonstrate the guilt 
of Berlin, will doubtless attract increasing attention, 
and it may be anticipated that the truth will slowly 
filter into the German mind, as it seems already to 
be filtering into the minds of many Americans of 
German descent who have heretofore accepted the 
German official legends. In the social-political strug- 
gles that will follow the conclusion of peace, all this 
mass of evidence will be re-examined, if only because 
it will be valuable campaign material. 

Among the peoples of the allied countries and 
among neutrals the importance of the memorandum 
was promptly appreciated. Its revelations did not 
surprise them nor change their views, for they had 

[22] 



long known the truth. Nearly all Intelligent Americans 
had understood the events of July, 1914, before the end 
of that year, as soon as the evidence then accessible 
was laid before them. We and our allies, however, 
welcome every new piece of corroborative testimony, 
and we rightly attach the highest importance to evi- 
dence that comes from Germany itself. Especial value 
attaches, of course, to the testimony given by men of 
political standing, like Lichnowsky, or of prominence 
in the industrial world, like Muhlon. From a lawyer's 
point of view, perhaps the greatest importance is to be 
attached to the admissions of the chief witness called 
by the German government for its defense, its former 
foreign secretary, von Jagow. 

The German text that follows is that published in 
the Berlin B or sen- Courier, March 21, 1918, with no 
changes except corrections of typographical errors. 
Every such change is indicated. For control of the 
accuracy of the Berlin text, the editor has had at his 
disposal a text published in Germany in pamphlet 
form and reproduced in photographic facsimile in 
London, and a text published in Zurich, also in pam- 
phlet form. These three texts are identical, except for 
typographical errors. As no one of the errors occurs in 
all three texts, it has been easy, with the aid of an 
excellent French translation published in the Paris 
Journal des Debats, to establish in every case the cor- 
rect reading. The French translation, which is faith- 
ful as well as felicitous, is of value for this purpose, 
because it is based on a fourth German text, published 
in the Munchner Post. 

Columbia University Munroe Smith 

June, iqi8 

[23] 



True translation filed with the Postmaster at New York, 
N, Y., on June 26, 191 8, as required by the Act of 
October 6, 1917. 

MEINE LONDONER MISSION 
1912-1914 

Von 

FtJRST LlCHNOWSKY 

ehemaliger deutscher Botschafter in England l 



Meine Berufung 

Im September 1912 starb Baron Marschall, der nur 
wenige Monate auf dem Londoner Posten gewesen 
war. Seine Ernennung, die wohl hauptsachlich wegen 
seines Alters und der nach London gerichteten 
Wunsche seines jungeren Beamten erfolgte, gehorte 2 
zu den vielen Missgriffen unserer Politik. 

Trotz eindrucksvoller Personlichkeit und grossem 
Ansehen zu alt und zu mude, um sich noch in die ihm 
vollig fremde angelsachsische Welt einzuleben, war er 
mehr Beamter und Jurist als Diplomat und Staats- 
mann. Er war sofort eifrig bestrebt, die Englander 
von der Harmlosigkeit unserer Flotte zu tiberzeugen, 
wodurch natiirlich nur der gegenteilige Eindruck 
erstarkte. 

Zu meiner grossen Uberraschung wurde mir im 
Oktober der Posten angeboten. Ich hatte mich nach 
mehrjahriger Tatigkeit als Personalreferent auf das 
Land zuriickgezogen, da auch ein geeigneter Posten 
nicht zu meiner Verfiigung war, und die Zeit zwischen 

1 B or sen-Courier heading reads: "Die Aufzeichnungen des Fiirsten 
Lichnowsky : Die vollstandige Denkschrift." 

2 B.-C. has "gehoren." 

[24] 



MY LONDON MISSION 

1912-1914 

By 
Prince Lichnowsky 

Former German Ambassador in England 



My Nomination 

Baron Marschall, who had held his post in London 
for a few months only, died in September, 1912. His 
appointment, which was due, probably, mainly to his 
age and the desire of a younger subordinate to get 
to London, was one of the many mistakes made in 
our foreign policy. 

In spite of his impressive personality and great 
reputation, he was too old and too tired to adapt him- 
self to the Anglo-Saxon world, with which he was 
wholly unfamiliar. He was rather an official and 
lawyer than a diplomat and statesman. He made 
prompt and earnest efforts to convince the English of 
the harmless character of our fleet — efforts which 
naturally had no result except to strengthen the oppo- 
site impression. * 

To my great surprise the post was offered me in 
October. After several years' service in draughting 
despatches [in the Foreign Office], I had withdrawn to 
the country, as no suitable post had been found for 
me; and I spent my time between flax and beets, or 
on horseback in the fields, reading much also, and 
occasionally publishing political articles. 

[25] 



Flachs und Riiben und auf Pferden und Wiesen ver- 
bracht, dabei auch manches gelesen und gelegentlich 
politische Aufsatze veroffentlicht. 

So waren acht Jahre vergangen und dreizehn, 
seitdem ich Wien als Gesandter verliess. Meine letzte 
politische Wirksamkeit war eigentlich dort gewesen, 
da man damals im Amte zu keiner Betatigung 3 ge- 
langen konnte, ohne nach den Weisungen eines Man- 
nes, der an Wahnvorstellungen litt, schrullenhafte 
Erlasse mit krausen Instruktionen zu verfassen. 

Auf wen eigentlich meine Berufung nach London 
zuruckzufiihren war, weiss ich nicht. Auf S. M. allein 
keinesfalls, denn ich gehdrte nicht zu seinen Intimen, 
wenn er mir auch stets mit Wohlwollen begegnete. 
Aus Erfahrung weiss ich auch, dass seine Kandidaten 
meist mit Erfolg bekampft werden. Herr von Kiderlen 
wollte eigentlich He'rrn von Stumm nach London 
schicken! Er begegnete mir sofort mit unverkenn- 
barem Ubelwollen und suchte mich durch Unhoflich- 
keit einzuschiichtern. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg 
brachte mir damals freundschaftliche Gesinnungen 
entgegen und hatte mich kurz vorher in Gratz besucht. 
So glaube ich, dass man sich auf mich einigte, weil kein 
anderer Kandidat augenblicklich zur Verfiigung 
stand. Ware nicht Baron Marschall unerwartet 
gestorben, so ware ich damals ebensowenig hervorge- 
holt worden, wie in den vielen vergangenen Jahren. 

Marokkopolitik 

Der Augenblick war zweifellos giinstig fur einen 
neuen Versuch, um mit England auf besseren Fuss zu 
gelangen. Unsere ratselhafte Marokkopolitik hatte 
wiederholt das Vertrauen in unsere friedlichen Gesin- 

3 B.-C: "Bestatigung." 

[261 



Thus eight years passed — thirteen since I had left 
Vienna with the title of envoy. That was my last 
really political employment, for in the [Foreign] Office 
there was at that time no chance to do anything, unless 
one drew up crotchety orders with crabbed instruc- 
tions, in accordance with the directions of a man who 
was subject to insane delusions. 1 

To whom my appointment in London was really 
due, I do not know. Certainly not to His Majesty 
alone, for I was not one of his intimate associates, 
although he always gave me a cordial reception. I 
know, too, by experience that in most instances his 
candidates were successfully opposed. Herr von 
Kiderlen's real desire was to send Herr von Stumm to 
London! He met me at once with unmistakable ill- 
will, and tried to intimidate me by rudeness. Herr 
von Bethmann Hollweg was at that time on friendly 
terms with me; he had visited me shortly before at 
Gratz. I am therefore inclined to think that they 
settled on me because, at the moment, no other candi- 
date was available. Had Baron Marschall not died 
unexpectedly, I should have been left where I had lain 
for many years, on the shelf. 



The Morocco Question 

The moment was undoubtedly favorable for a new 
effort to establish better relations with England. Our 
enigmatic policy in Morocco 2 had repeatedly shaken 
confidence in our peaceful intentions; it had at least 



1 See Appendix, note i. 

2 Ibid., note vii. 



[2 7 ] 



nungen erschiittert, zum mindesten aber den Verdacht 
J erregt, dass wir nicht recht wussten, was wir wollten, 
oder dass wir beabsichtigten, Europa in Atem zu 
erhalten und die Franzosen gelegentlich zu demiitigen. 
Ein osterreichischer Kollege, der lange in Paris war, 
sagte mir: „Wenn die Franzosen anfingen, die Re- 
vanche zu vergessen, dann habt Ihr sie regelmassig 
durch kraftige Tritte dran erinnert." 

Nachdem wir die Versuche des Herrn Delcasse, sieh 
mit uns iiber Marokko zu verstandigen, zuriickge- 
wiesen und vorher feierlich erklart hatten, keine 
politischen Interessen dort zu besitzen — eine Haltung, 
die wohl den Uberlieferungen der Bismarckschen 
Politik entsprach — entdeckten wir plotzlich in Abdul 
Asis einen zweiten Kriiger. Audi ihm verhiessen wir, 
wie den Buren, den Schutz des machtigen deutschen 
Reiches mit demselben Aufwand und dem gleichen 
Erfolge. Denn beide Kundgebungen endeten, wie sie 
enden mussten : mit dem Riickzug, falls wir nicht ent- 
schlossen waren, schon damals den Weltkrieg zu 
fiihren. Daran vermochte auch der traurige Kongress 
in Algeciras nichts zu andern, noch weniger der Sturz 
des Herrn Delcasse. 

Unsere Haltung f order te die russisch-japanische und 
spater die russisch-britische Annaherung. Gegeniiber 
der deutschen Gefahr — "the German peril" — traten alle 
anderen Gegensatze in den Hintergrund. Die Mog- 
lichkeit eines neuen deutsch-franzosischen Krieges war 
augenfallig geworden, und ein solcher konnte, anders 
wie anno 70, weder Russland noch England unberiihrt 
lassen. 

Die Wertlosigkeit des Dreibundes hatte sich bereits 
in Algeciras gezeigt, die der dortigen Vereinbarungen 
aber bald danach durch den Zusammenbruch des 

[28] 



aroused the suspicion that we did not quite know 
what we wanted or that our purpose was to keep 
Europe on edge and, on occasion, to humiliate the 
French. An Austrian colleague, who had been long 
in Paris, said to me: "If the French begin to forget 
la revanche, you regularly remind them of it by a good 
hard kick or two." 

After we had repelled M. Delcasse's efforts to come 
to an understanding with us regarding Morocco and, 
before that, had solemnly declared that we had no 
political interests there — an attitude which was in 
harmony with the traditions of Bismarckian policy — 
we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a second Krii- 
ger. 3 To him, as to the Boers, we promised the protec- 
tion of the mighty German Empire, at the same cost 
to ourselves and with the same outcome. Both 
demonstrations ended, as they were bound to end, in 
a retreat, so long as we had not yet decided to wage 
the World War at that time. The pitiable Congress 
of Algeciras could not modify this fact ; still less could 
the fall of M. Delcasse. 4 

Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japanese and, 
later, the Russo-British rapprochement. In face of 
"the German peril" all other antagonisms slid into 
the background. The possibility of a new Franco- 
German war had become evident, and, as had not 
been the case in 1870, such a war could not leave 
either Russia or England unconcerned. 

The worthlessness of the Triple Alliance had al- 
ready been demonstrated at Algeciras. The equal 
worthlessness of the agreements there made was 

3 See Appendix, note v. 

4 Ibid., note vii. 

[29] 



Sultanats, der naturlich nicht zu verhindern war. Im 
deutschen Volke jedoch verbreitete sich der Glaube, 
dass unsere Auslandspolitik schwachlich sei und vor 
der „Einkreisung" zuriickweiche, und dass hochtonen- 
den Gebarden kleinmutige Nachgiebigkeit folge. 

Es bleibt das Verdienst des Herrn von Kiderlen, 
der als Staatsmann sonst uberschatzt wird, dass er die 
marokkanische Erbschaft liquidierte und sich mit den 
Tatsachen abfand, an denen nichts mehr zu andern 
war. Ob freilich die Welt durch den Coup von Agadir 
erschreckt werden musste, lasse ich dahingestellt. In 
Deutschland wurde das Ereignis lebhaft begnisst, in 
England aber hatte es um so mehr beunruhigt, als 
die Regierung durch drei Wochen vergeblich auf Auf- 
klarung uber unsere Absichten wartete. Die Rede 
Mr. Lloyd Georges, die uns warnen sollte, war die 
Folge. Vor dem Sturze Delcasses und vor Algeciras 
waren Hafen und Gebiet an der Westkuste zu haben 
gewesen, nachher aber nicht mehr. 



Sir Ed. Greys Programm 

Als ich nach London kam im November 191 2, hatte 
man sich liber Marokko beruhigt, da inzwischen in 
Berlin eine Vereinbarung mit Frankreich erfolgt war. 
Die Mission Haldanes war zwar gescheitert, da wir 
die Zusage der Neutralitat verlangten, statt uns mit 
einem Vertrage zu begnligen, der uns vor britischen 
Angriffen und vor Angriffen mit britischer Unter- 
stiitzung sichern sollte. 

Sir Ed. Grey aber hatte den Gedanken, mit uns zu 
einerVerstandigung zu gelangen, nicht aufgegeben und 
versuchte es zunachst auf kolonialen und wirtschaft- 

I30] 



shown soon afterward , by the collapse of the sultanate — 
a result which it was of course impossible for us to 
prevent. Among the German people, however, the 
belief was spreading that our foreign policy was feeble, 
that we were yielding ground to the "encirclement," 
and that ringing assertions were followed by pusil- 
lanimous concessions. 

It stands to the credit of Herr von Kiderlen, other- 
wise overrated as a statesman, that he liquidated the 
Moroccan inheritance and adapted himself to cir- 
cumstances which could not be altered. Whether, 
indeed, it was necessary to alarm the world by the 
Agadir coup is a question I leave unanswered. 5 In 
Germany this occurrence was warmly welcomed; in 
England, on the other hand, it aroused the more un- 
easiness because the government waited in vain for 
three weeks for an explanation of our intentions. Mr. 
Lloyd George's speech, intended to warn us, was the 
consequence. Before Delcasse's fall and before 
Algeciras we could have obtained harbors and territory 
on the West Coast, but not afterwards. 

Sir Edward Grey's Program 

W 7 hen I came to London in November, 191 2, anxiety 
regarding Morocco had subsided, for in Berlin, in the 
meantime, an agreement had been reached with 
France. Haldane's mission had indeed failed, because we 
demanded a promise of neutrality instead of contenting 
ourselves with a treaty which was to insure us against 
British attacks and against attacks with British support. 6 

Sir Edward Grey, however, had not given up the 
idea of coming to an understanding with us, and made 

6 See Appendix, note viii. 
6 Ibid., note xvi. 

[31 1 



lichen Gebieten. Durch Vermittelung des befahigten 
und geschaftskundigen Botschaftrats 4 von Kuhlmann 
waren Besprechungen iiber eine Erneuerung des portu- 
giesischen Kolonialvertrages und iiber Mesopotamien 
(Bagdadbahn) im Gange, die das unausgesprochene 
Ziel verfolgten, sowohl die genannten Kolonien, wie 
Kleinasien in Interessenspharen zu teilen. 

Der britische Staatsmann wollte, nachdem sowohl 
mit Frankreich wie mit Russland die alten Streitfragen 
geregelt waren, auch mit uns zu ahnlichen Abmachun- 
gen gelangen. Nicht uns zu vereinsamen, sondern uns 
moglichst zu Teilnehmern an der bestehenden Genos- 
senschaft zu machen, war seine Absicht. Wie es 
gelang, britisch-franzosische und britisch-russische 
Gegensatze zu iiberbriicken, so wollte er auch die 
britisch-deutschen moglichst beseitigen und durch ein 
Netz von Vertragen, zu denen schliesslich wohl auch 
eine Vereinbarung iiber die leidige Flottenfrage 
gehort hatte, den Weltfrieden sichern, nachdem 
unsere fruhere Politik zu einer Genossenschaft, der 
Entente, gefiihrt hatte, die eine gegenseitige Ver- 
sicherung gegen Kriegsgefahr darstellte. 

Das war das Programm Sir Ed. Greys. In seinen 
eigenen Worten : unbeschadet der bestehenden Freund- 
schaften (zu Frankreich und Russland), die keinerlei 
agressive Zwecke verfolgen und keinerlei bindende 
Verpflichtungen fur England in sich schliessen, mit 
Deutschland zu einer freundschaftlichen Annaherung 
und Verstandigung zu gelangen. "To bring the two 
groups nearer" (die beiden Gruppen einander naher 
bringen). 

Es gab damals in England wie bei uns in dieser 
Hinsicht zwei Richtungen : die der Optimisten, die an 

4 B.-C: "Botschafters." 

[32 1 



such an attempt first in the colonial and economic 
fields. Through the agency of the capable and ex- 
perienced counselor of the embassy, von Kuhlmann, 
discussions were under way concerning a renewal 
of the Portuguese colonial treaty and concerning Mes- 
opotamia (Bagdad railway). The tacit aim of these 
negotiations was to divide not only the above-men- 
tioned colonies but also Asia Minor into spheres of 
interest. 

It was the desire of the British statesman, now that 
the old matters of dispute had been settled both with 
France and with Russia, 7 to come to similar arrange- 
ments with us. His intention was not to isolate us 
but to make us in so far as possible partners in the 
association already established. Just as he had suc- 
ceeded in bridging over British-French and British- 
Russian differences, so he wished as far as possible to 
get rid of causes of controversy between Great Britain 
and Germany, and by a network of treaties — which 
in the end would probably have included an agreement 
on the troublesome naval question — to secure the 
peace of the world. Our previous policy had already 
led to the formation of an association, the Entente, 
which represented a mutual assurance against the risk 
of war. 

This was Sir Edward Grey's program. As he him- 
self put it: Without impairing the existing friendships 
(with France and Russia), which have no aggressive 
purposes and involve no binding obligations for Eng- 
land, to attain a friendly rapprochement and understand- 
ing with Germany — "to bring the two groups nearer." 

In this matter there were then in England, as with 
us, two currents of opinion: that of the optimists, who 
7 See Appendix, notes vi and ix. 

l33l 



die Verstandigung glaubten, und die der Pessimisten, 
die den Krieg fruher oder spater fur unvermeidlich 
hielten. 

Zur erstern gehorten die Herren Asquith, Grey, 
Lord Haldane und die meisten Minister des radikalen 
Kabinetts, sowie die fuhrenden liberalen Organe, wie 
"Westminster Gazette", "Manchester Guardian", "Daily 
Chronicle." Zu den Pessimisten namentlich konser- 
vative Politiker, wie Mr. Balfour, der mir dies wieder- 
holt zu verstehen gab, dann fiihrende Militars, wie 
Lord Roberts, die auf die Notwendigkeit der allge- 
meinen Wehrpflicht hinwiesen. {"The Writing on the 
Wall") Ferner die Northcliffepresse und der bedeu- 
tende englische Journalist Mr. Garvin ("Observer"). 
Wahrend meiner Amtszeit haben sie sich jedoch aller 
Angriffe enthalten und personlich wie politisch eine 
freundliche Haltung eingenommen. Unsere Flotten- 
politik und unsere Haltung in den Jahren 1905, 1908 
und 191 1 hatten bei ihnen aber den Glauben erweckt, 
dass es doch einmal zum Kriege kommen werde. 
Erstere werden heute in England gerade so, wie es 
auch bei uns geschieht, der Kurzsichtigkeit und 
Einfalt geziehen, letztere gel ten als die wahren 
Propheten. 

Albanische Frage 

Der erste Balkankrieg hatte damals zum Zusam- 
menbruch der Tiirkei und damit zu einer Niederlage 
unserer Politik gefiihrt, die sich mit den Tiirken seit 
Jahren identifizierte. Nachdem die Tiirkei in Europa 
nicht mehr zu retten war, gab es zwei Moglichkeiten 
gegeniiber der Regelung ihrer Hinterlassenschaf t : 
entweder wir erklarten unser volliges Desinteressement 
an der Gestaltung der Grenzen auf dem Balkan und 

[34] 



believed in an understanding, and that of the pes- 
simists, who considered war inevitable, sooner or later. 
In the first group were Messrs. Asquith, Grey, 
Lord Haldane, and most of the ministers in the Radical 
Cabinet, as well as the leading Liberal organs, such 
as the Westminster Gazette, the Manchester Guardian, 
and the Daily Chronicle. In the pessimist group 
were, in particular, Conservative politicians like Mr. 
Balfour, who repeatedly indicated to me that this 
was his attitude; also leading military men, like Lord 
Roberts, who insisted on the necessity of universal 
military service ("The Writing on the Wall") ; further, 
the Northcliffe press, and that influential English 
journalist, Mr. Garvin of the Observer. During my 
term of office, however, they abstained from all attacks 
and took up, personally and politically, a friendly 
attitude. Our naval policy and our attitude in the 
years 1905, 1908, and 191 1 8 had, however, convinced 
them that some day or other it would come to war. 
Just as with us, so in England today, those who be- 
longed to the first group are censured as shortsighted 
and simple-minded, while the others are regarded as 
the true prophets. 

The Albanian Question 

At that time, the First Balkan War 9 had led to the 
collapse of Turkey and, consequently, to a defeat of 
our policy, which for years had tied itself up with the 
Turks. Now that European Turkey was past saving, 
two possible courses were open to us as regarded the 
settlement of its estate. Either we declared that we 
were in no wise interested in the determination of 

8 See Appendix, notes vii, iv (last paragraph), and viii. 

9 Ibid., note xi. 

[35] 



iiberliessen die Regelung den Balkanvolkern, oder aber 
wir unterstiitzten unsere „Bundesgenossen", trieben 
Dreibundpolitik im Orient und traten dadurch aus 
der Rolle des Vermittlers heraus. 

Ich befiirwortete von Anfang an die erstere Losung, 
das Auswartige Amt aber vertrat um so entschiedener 
die letztere. 

Der springende Punkt war die albanische Frage. 
Unsere Bundesgenossen wiinschten die Griindung 
eines selbstandigen Staates Albanien, da Osterreich die 
Serben nicht an die Adria und Italien die Griechen 
nicht nach Valona, ja, nicht einmal nordlich von 
Korfu gelangen lassen wollte. Im Gegensatz hierzu 
forderte bekanntlich Russland die serbischen und 
Frankreich die griechischen Wiinsche. 

Mein Rat ging nun dahin, diese Frage als ausserhalb 
des Biindnisses stehend zu betrachten und weder die 
osterreichischen noch die italienischen Wiinsche zu 
unterstiitzen. Ohne unsere Forderung aber ware die 
Errichtung Albaniens, dessen Lebensunfahigkeit vo- 
rauszusehen war, unmoglich gewesen. Serbien ware 
an das Meer gelangt und der jetzige Weltkrieg 
vermieden. Frankreich und Italien hatten sich liber 
Griechenland ernstlich entzweit und die Italiener, falls 
sie nicht gegen Frankreich allein kampfen wollten, sich 
mit der Ausdehnung Griechenlands bis nordlich von 
Durazzo abfinden mussen. Die Zivilisation in dem 
grossten Teil Albaniens ist griechisch. Die Stadte 
sind es im Suden vollkommen, und wahrend der 
Botschafterkonferenz kamen Abordnungen aus gros- 
seren Stadten nach London, um die Angliederung an 
Griechenland durchzusetzen. Auch im heutigen 
Griechenland leben albanische Volksteile und die 
sogenan-nte griechische Nationaltracht sogar ist al- 

[36] 



boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula, and left their 
adjustment to the Balkan peoples, or we supported 
our allies, pursued a Triple Alliance policy in the East, 
and thus abandoned the role of mediator. 

I advocated from the outset the first of these 
solutions, but our Foreign Office gave its support 
all the more decidedly to the second. 

The salient point was the Albanian question. Our 
allies desired the establishment of an independent 
state of Albania, because Austria was unwilling to 
permit the Serbs to gain access to the Adriatic, and 
Italy did not wish the Greeks to push their boundary 
to Valona, or even to the north of Corfu. On the 
other hand, Russia, as is known, favored the Serbian, 
and France the Greek desires. 

My advice was to consider this question as one 
lying outside the alliance, and to support neither the 
Austrian nor the Italian desires. Without our sup- 
port, however, the Albanian state, whose incapacity 
to exist might have been foreseen, could not possibly 
have been established. Serbia would have pushed 
forward to the sea, and the present world war would 
have been avoided. Between France and Italy there 
would have been a serious dispute as to Greece, and 
unless the Italians had been willing to fight France 
singlehanded, they would have been obliged to accept 
the expansion of Greece to a point north of Durazzo. In 
the greater part of Albania the civilization is Greek. 
The southern towns are entirely Greek, and when the 
conference of ambassadors was in session, deputa- 
tions from the larger towns came to London for the 
purpose of securing annexation to Greece. In Greece 
today there are still Albanian groups, and the so- 
called Greek national dress itself is of Albanian origin. 

[371 



banischen Ursprungs. Die Einverleibung der uber- 
wiegend orthodoxen und islamitischen Albaner in den 
griechischen Staat war daher die beste Losung, die 
naturlichste wenn man etwa Skutari und den Norden 
den Serben und den Montenegrinern uberliesse. Fur 
diese Losung war auch S. M. aus dynastischen 
Griinden. Als ich den Monarchen brieflich in dieser 
Richtung bestarkte, erhielt ich vom Reichskanzler 
erregte Vorwiirfe, ich galte als „Gegner Osterreichs" 
und er musste sich solche Eingriffe und die direkte 
Korrespondenz verbitten. 

Orient und Dreibundpolitik 

Wir mussten uns von der verhangnisvollen t)ber- 
lieferung endlich lossagen, Dreibundpolitik auch im 
Orient zu treiben, und den Irrtum erkennen, der darin 
lag, uns im Stiden mit den Tiirken und im Norden mit 
den Austro-Madjaren zu identifizieren. Denn die 
Fortsetzung dieser Politik, die wir beim Berliner 
Kongress begonnen und seither mit Eifer gepnegt 
hatten, musste mit der Zeit und namentlich, wenn die 
notige Gewandtheit an leitender Stelle fehlte, zum 
Zusammenstoss mit Russland und zum Weltkriege 
fuhren. Statt uns mit Russland auf Grundlage der 
Unabhangigkeit des Sultans, den man auch in Petro- 
grad nicht aus Konstantinopel entfernen wollte, zu 
einigen und uns, unter Verzicht auf militarische und 
politische Eingriffe, auf wirtschaftliche Interessen im 
Orient zu beschranken und mit der Zerlegung Klein- 
asiens in Interessenspharen zu begnligen, ging unser 
politischer Ehrgeiz dahin, am Bosporus zu dominieren. 
In Russland entstand die Meinung, der Weg nach 
Konstantinopel bzw. ins Mittellandische Meer fiihre 

[38] 



The incorporation of the Albanians, of whom the 
great majority are either Orthodox Christians or 
Mussulmans, in the Greek state was, therefore, the 
best solution. It was also the most natural, if, let 
us say, Skutari and the northern part had been as- 
signed to the Serbs and Montenegrins. His Majesty 
also was in favor of this solution on dynastic grounds. 
When I wrote to the monarch in support of these 
views, I received from the imperial chancellor agitated 
reproaches: I was taken to be an "enemy of Austria," 
and he must beg me to refrain from such interferences 
and from all direct correspondence. 

The East and the Triple Alliance Policy 

We should have abandoned definitively the fatal 
tradition of pushing Triple Alliance policies in the 
Near East; we should have recognized that it was 
a mistake to make ourselves solidary with the Turks 
in the south and with the Austro-Magyars in the 
north; for the continuance of this policy, which we 
had started at the Berlin Congress and had after- 
wards zealously developed, 10 was bound in time, 
and particularly in case the requisite adroitness should 
be found wanting in the supreme directing agencies, 
to lead to the collision with Russia and the World War. 
Instead of coming to an understanding with Russia 
on the basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom 
even the St. Petersburg government did not wish to 
drive out of Constantinople; instead of renouncing 
military and political interference, confining ourselves 
to economic interests in the Near East, and contenting 
ourselves with a division of Asia Minor into spheres of 
interest, our political ambition was directed to the 

10 See Appendix, notes iii and iv. 

l39l 



iiber Berlin. Statt die kraftige Entwicklung der 
Balkanstaaten zu fordern, die, einmal befreit, alles 
eher sind als russisch, und mit denen wir die besten 
Erfahrungen machten, stellten wir uns auf Seite der 
turkischen und madjarischen 5 Unterdriicker. 

Der verhangnisvolle Irrtum unserer Dreibund- und 
Orientpolitik, die Russland, unseren naturgemassen 
besten Freund und Nachbar, in die Arme Frankreichs 
und Englands gedrangt und von der asiatischen 
Ausbreitungspolitik abgedrangt hatte, war umso 
augenfalliger, als ein russisch-franzosischer TJberfall, 
die einzige Hypothese, die eine Dreibundpolitik 
rechtfertigte, aus unserer Berechnung ausscheiden 
konnte. 

tJber den Wert des italienischen Biindnisses erubrigt 
sich ein wei teres Wort. Italien braucht unser Geld 
und unsere Touristen auch nach dem Kriege mit oder 
ohne Biindnis. Dass letzteres im Kriegsfalle versagen 
wiirde, war vorauszusehen. Das Biindnis war daher 
wertlos. Osterreich braucht unseren Schutz in Krieg 
und Frieden und hat keine andere Anlehnung. Die 
Abhangigkeit von uns beruht auf politischen, natio- 
nalen und wirtschaftlichen Erwagungen und ist umso 
grosser, je intimer unsere Beziehungen zu Russland 
sind. Das hat die bosnische Krise gelehrt. Seit dem 
Grafen Beust ist noch kein Wiener Minister so selbst- 
bewusst gegen uns aufgetreten, wie Graf Ahrenthal in 
den letzten Jahren seines Lebens. Bei richtig geleite- 
ter deutscher Politik, die die Fiihlung mit Russland 
pflegt, ist Osterreich-Ungarn unser Vasall und auf uns 
angewiesen, auch ohne Biindnisse und Gegenleis- 
tungen, bei falsch geleiteter sind wir auf Osterreich 
angewiesen. Das Biindnis war daher zwecklos. 

6 B.-C: "majarischen." 

[40] 



attainment of a dominant position on the Bosporus. 
In Russia the opinion arose that the way to Constan- 
tinople and so into the Mediterranean ran via Berlin. 
Instead of furthering the development of strong 
Balkan states, which, once set free, are anything but 
Russian, and with which our experiences were most 
satisfactory, we placed ourselves on the side of the 
Turkish and Magyar oppressors. 

The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and East- 
ern policy, by which Russia, naturally our best 
friend and neighbor, was driven into the arms of 
France and England, and diverted from the policy of 
Asiatic expansion, was the more obvious, as a Franco- 
Russian attack, the sole hypothesis justifying a Triple 
Alliance policy, could be eliminated from our calcula- 
tions. 

As to the value of the Italian alliance, words may 
be spared. Italy needs our money and our tourists, 
and will need them after the war, with or without an 
alliance. That the alliance would fail to hold in the 
event of war was to be foreseen. The alliance, con- 
sequently, was worthless. Austria needs our protec- 
tion both in war and in peace, and there is no other 
Power on which it can lean. Its dependence on us is 
based on political, national, and economic grounds. 
This dependence increases in proportion to the inti- 
macy of our relations with Russia. This was proved 
in the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust, 11 no Vienna 
minister has assumed toward us so independent an 
attitude as was displayed by Count Ahrenthal dur- 
ing the last years of his life. Given a properly con- 
ducted German policy, which keeps us in touch with 
Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal, and must 

11 See Appendix, note ii. 

[41] 



Ich kannte Osterreich zu genaii, um nicht zu wissen, 
dass eine Riickkehr zur Politik des Fiirsten Felix 
Schwarzenberg 6 oder des Grafen Moritz Esterhazy 
dort undenkbar war. So wenig die dortigen Slawen uns 
lieben, so wenig wollen sie in ein deutsches Kaiserreich 
zuriickkehren, selbst mit Habsburg-Lothringer Spitze. 
Sie streben den Foderalismus innerhalb Osterreichs an 
auf nationaler Grundlage, ein Zustand, der im Rahmen 
des Deutschen Reiches noch viel weniger Aussicht auf 
Verwirklichung hatte wie unter dem Doppeladler. 
Die Deutschen Osterreichs aber erkennen in Berlin 
den Mittelpunkt deutscher Macht und Kultur, und 
wissen, dass Osterreich niemals wieder Prasidialmacht 
werden kann. Sie wunschen einen moglichst intimen 
Anschluss an das Reich, nicht aber eine antideutsche 
Politik. J. 

Seit den siebziger Jahren hatte sich die Lage von 
Grund aus verandert in Osterreich wie etwa in Bayern. 
Wie hier eine Riickkehr zum grossdeutschen Partiku- 
larismus und zur altbayerischen Politik nicht zu be- 
furchten ist, so war dort ein Wiederaufleben der Politik 
des Fiirsten Kaunitz und Schwarzenberg nicht zu ge- 
wartigen. Unsere Interessen aber wurden durch einen 
staatsrechtlichen Anschluss Osterreichs, das auch ohne 
Galizien und Dalmatien nur etwa zur Halfte von 
Germanen bewohnt ist, also etwa ein grosses Belgien 
darstellt, ebenso leiden wie andererseits durch Unter- 
ordnung unserer Politik unter Wiener und Pester 
Gesichtspunkte^ — d'epouser les querelles de VAutriche 
(sich mit den osterreichischen Zwistigkeiten zu 
vermahlen) . 

6 B.-C: "Schwanenberg." 

[42] 



come our way even without an alliance and without 
reciprocal services. Under a misdirected policy, we 
must go Austria's way. Consequently the alliance 
served no purpose. 

I was too thoroughly acquainted with Austria not 
to know that a return to the policy of Prince Felix 
Schwarzenberg or to that of Count Moritz Esterhazy 
was unthinkable. The Slavs living there have little 
love for us, and equally little desire to come back 
into a German Empire, even with a Hapsburg-Lor- 
raine at its head. They are striving to develop in 
Austria a federal system based on nationality — a 
state of things which there would be far less chance of 
establishing within the framework of the German 
Empire than under the two-headed Eagle. The Ger- 
mans in Austria, on the other hand, recognize that 
Berlin is the center of German power and culture, and 
they know that Austria can never recover the presi- 
dency of the German states. They desire as close a 
connection as possible with the Empire but do not 
favor a poiicy directed against [the existing organiza- 
tion of] the German Empire. 

Since the seventies there has been a radical change of 
position in Austria — a change resembling that which 
has taken place in Bavaria. Just as here a return to 
the particularism of the Great German party and to 
the old Bavarian policy is not to be apprehended, so in 
Austria there was no prospect of a revival of the policy 
of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzenberg. 12 Our 
interests, however, would be as injuriously affected by 
a constitutional union with Austria, which even with- 
out Galicia and Dalmatia is inhabited only to the 
extent of , say , one-half by Germans, and which accord- 

12 See Appendix, note ii. 

[43] 



Wir brauchten daher keine Rucksichten auf die 
Wiinsche unserer „Bimdesgenossen" zu nehmen, sie 
waren nicht nur unnotig, sondern auch gefahrlich, weil 
sie zum Zusammenstoss mit Russland fiihrten, wenn 
wir orientalische Fragen durch osterreichische Brillen 
betrachteten. Die Ausgestaltung des Biindnisses aus 
einem unter einer einzigen Voraussetzung geschlos- 
senen „Zweckverbande" zu einer „Gesamtgemeinde", 
zu einer Interessengemeinschaft auf alien Gebieteh, 
war geeignet, eben dasjenige herbeizufiihren, was das 
Rechtsgeschaft verhindern sollte — den Krieg. Eine 
solche Bundnispolitik musste ausserdem den Verlust 
der Sympathien junger. kraf tiger, aufstrebender 
Gemeinwesen auf dem Balkan nach sich ziehen, die 
bereit waren, sich an uns zu wenden und uns ihre 
Markte zu offnen. 

Der Gegensatz zwischen Hausmacht und National- 
staat, zwischen dynastischer und demokratischer 
Staatsidee musste zum Austrag kommen, und wir 
standen wie gewohnlich auf falscher Seite. 

Konig Karol hat zu einem unserer Vertreter gesagt, 
er habe das Biindnis mit uns unter der Voraussetzung 
geschlossen, dass wir die Ftihrung behielten, ginge 
diese aber an Osterreich iiber, so andere das die 
Grundlage des Verhaltnisses, und er werde unter 
solchen Umstanden nicht weiter mitmachen konnen. 

Ahnlich lagen die Dinge in Serbien, wo wir gegen 
unsere eigenen wirtschaftlichen Interessen die oster- 
reichische Erdrosselungspolitik unterstutzten. 

Wir haben stets auf das Pferd gesetzt, dessen Nieder- 
bruch vorauszusehen war, auf Herrn Kriiger, auf 
Abdul Asis, auf Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm Wied und — 
"^ [44] 



ingly is something like a larger Belgium, as, on the 
other hand, by a subordination of our policy to the 
points of view of Vienna and Budapest, with the obli- 
gation "d'epouser les querelles de V Autriche." 

We, therefore, had no need to consider the desires 
of our allies. Such considerations were not only un- 
necessary but also dangerous, inasmuch as they would 
lead to a collision with Russia if we looked at Eastern 
questions through Austrian glasses. The development 
of our alliance from a partnership with a definite pur- 
pose, formed in view of a single contingency, into a 
solidary union, with community of interests in every 
field, was adapted to produce the very result which the 
original treaty 13 was intended to prevent — war. 
Moreover, an alliance policy of this sort could not 
but entail the loss of the sympathies of the young, 
strong, and growing communities in the Balkan Pen- 
insula, which were ready to turn to us and open to 
us their markets. 

The conflict between family power and the national 
state, between the dynastic and the democratic theory 
of the state, had to be definitively settled, and, as usual, 
we stood on the wrong side. 

King Charles [of Rumania] told one of our repre- 
sentatives that he had made an alliance with us on 
the assumption that we were to keep the control of 
affairs. If that control passed to Austria, the basis 
on which his relations with us rested would be changed, 
and under such conditions he could no longer act 
with us. 

The situation was similar in Serbia, where against 
our own economic interests we were supporting the 
Austrian policy of strangulation. 

13 Literally, "legal transaction." 

[45] 



der verhangnisvollste von alien Irrtiimern — schliess- 
lich den grossen plunge auf den Stall Berchtold ge- 
macht ! 



Botschafterkonferenz 

Bald nach meiner Ankunft in London Ende 1912 
regte Sir Ed. Grey eine zwanglose Besprechung an, 
urn zu vermeiden, dass aus dem Balkankriege sich ein 
europaischer entwickelt, nachdem wir leider die 
Aufforderung der franzosischen Regierung, einer 
Desinteressementserklarung beizutreten, bei Aus- 
bruch des Krieges abgelehnt hatten. Der britische 
Staatsmann nahm von Anfang an die Haltung ein, 
dass England an Albanien kein Interesse habe, wegen 
dieser Frage also nicht gewillt sei, es auf einen Krieg 
ankommen zu lassen. Er wollte als „ehrlicher Makler" 
lediglich zwischen den beiden Gruppen vermitteln und 
Schwierigkeiten beilegen. Er stellte sich daher 
keineswegs auf Seite der Ententegenossen und hat 
wahrend der Dauer der etwa achtmonatlichen Unter- 
handlungen durch guten Willen und seinen massge- 
benden Einfluss nicht unwesentlich zur Einigung 
beigetragen. Statt dass wir eine der englischen 
analoge Haltung einnahmen, vertraten wir ohne 
Ausnahme den Standpunkt, der uns von Wien aus 
vorgeschrieben wurde. Graf Mensdorff fuhrte den 
Dreibund in London, ich war sein „Sdaindant". Meine 
Aufgabe bestand darin, seine Vorschlage zu unter- 
stiitzen. In Berlin schaltete der kluge und erfahrene 
Graf Szogyenyi. Sein Refrain war: „Und dann tritt 
der casus foederis (der Bundnisfall) ein", und als ich die 
Richtigkeit dieses Schlusses einmal anzuzweifeln 

[46] 



We have always bet on the horse whose breakdown 
might have been foreseen, on Kriiger, on Abdul Aziz, 
on Abdul Hamid, on Wilhelm of Wied, 14 and — the most 
disastrous of all our mistakes — we finally made our 
great plunge on the Berchtold stable ! 

The Conference of Ambassadors 15 

Soon after my arrival in London, at the close of the 
year 19 12, Sir Edward Grey suggested an informal 
discussion to prevent a European war from growing 
out of the Balkan war. We had unfortunately already 
declined the request of the French government, made 
at the outbreak of the war, to join in a declaration of 
disinterestedness. From the outset the British states- 
man took the position that England had no interest in 
Albania and therefore did not mean to let war come 
on this issue. It was his purpose simply to act as a 
mediator, an "honest broker," between the two groups 
and to try to smooth away difficulties. Accordingly, 
he by no means placed himself on the side of his En- 
tente associates; and during the negotiations, which 
lasted some eight months, by force of his good will and 
his controlling influence he made no slight contribu- 
tions to an understanding. Instead of taking a posi- 
tion like the English, we invariably defended the point 
of view which was prescribed to us by Vienna. Count 
Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London, I was his 
second. My task was to support his proposals. In 
Berlin it was the shrewd and experienced Count 
Szogyenyi who ran the affair. His refrain was : "Here 
the casus foederis comes in"; and when on one occasion 
I ventured to dispute the correctness of this conclu- 

14 See Appendix, notes v, vii and xi. 
16 Ibid., note xi. 

147] 



wagte, wurde ich wegen „Austrophobie" ernstlich 
verwarnt. Unter Anspielung auf meinen Vater hiess 
es auch, ich sei „erblich belastet!" 

Bei alien Anlassen : Albanien, serbischer Adriahafen, 
Skutari, ferner bei der Bestimmung der Grenzen 
Albaniens stellten wir uns auf den Standpunkt Oster- 
reichs und Italiens, wahrend Sir Ed. Grey fast niemals 
den franzosischen oder den russischen unterstutzte. 
Er trat vielmehr meist fur unsere Gruppe ein, um 
keinen Vorwand zu schaffen, wie ihn spater ein toter 
Erzherzog liefern sollte. So gelang es mit seiner Hilfe, 
den Konig Nikita aus Skutari wieder herauszulocken. 
Schon uber diese Frage ware es sonst zum Weltkrieg 
gekommen, da wir sicher nicht gewagt hatten, „unseren 
Bundesgenossen" zur Nachgiebigkeit zu veranlassen. 

Sir Ed. Grey leitete die Verhandlungen mit Um- 
sicht, Ruhe und Takt. Wenn eine Frage sich zu ver- 
wickeln drohte, entwarf er eine Einigungsformel, die 
das Richtige traf und auch stets Annahme fand. 
Seine Personlichkeit genoss bei alien Teilnehmern 
gleiches Vertrauen. 

Wir hatten tatsachlich wieder einmal eine der vielen 
Kraftproben, die unsere Politik kennzeichnen, gliick- 
lich iiberstanden. Russland hatte liberall vor uns 
zuriickweichen miissen, da es niemals in der Lage war, 
den serbischen Wunschen Erfolg zu verschaffen. 
Albanien war als osterreichischer Vasallenstaat 
errichtet und Serbien vom Meere verdrangt. Der 
Verlauf der Konferenz war daher eine neue Demuti- 
gung fur das russische Selbstbewusstsein. Wie 1878 und 
1908 hatten wir uns schon dem russischen Programm 
entgegengestellt, ohne dass deutsche Interessen im 
Spiele waren. Bismarck wusste den Fehler des Kon- 
gresses durch den geheimen Vertrag und durch seine 

[48 1 



sion, I received a serious warning on the ground of my 
"Austrophobia." It was also asserted, alluding to my 
father, that I was under an "hereditary burden." 

On every issue — Albania, a Serbian harbor on the 
Adriatic, Skutari, also in drawing the boundaries of 
Albania — we took the point of view of Austria and of 
Italy, while Sir Edward Grey almost never supported 
that of France or of Russia. On the contrary, in most 
instances he lent his support to our group, in order to 
give no pretext for war, such as was subsequently fur- 
nished by a dead archduke. It was thus with his help 
that we succeeded in coaxing King Nikita out of 
Skutari. Otherwise the World War might have been 
started on this question, since we surely would not 
have ventured to urge our ally to make any concession. 

Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with 
prudence, calmness and tact. As often as a question 
threatened to become complicated, he suggested a 
formula of agreement that met the case and was in- 
variably accepted. His personality won him equal 
confidence among all who took part in the conference. 

So far as [immediate] results were concerned, we 
had again passed successfully through one of those 
many tests of power which were characteristic of our 
policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us all 
along the line; in no instance was it able to attain 
satisfaction of the Serbian desires. Albania was set up 
as an Austrian vassal state, and Serbia was thrust back 
from the sea. The outcome of the conference was 
therefore a new humiliation of Russian national senti- 
ment. As in 1878 and in 1908 we had placed ourselves 
in opposition to the Russian program, although no 
German interests were involved. Bismarck contrived 
to minimize the mistake made at the Congress [of 

[49] 



Haltung in der Battenbergfrage zu mildern; die in 
der bosnischen Frage wieder betretene abschussige 
Bahn wurde in London weiter verfolgt und spater, als 
sie zum Abgrund fuhrte, nicht rechtzeitig verlassen. 

Die Misstimmung, die damals in Russland herrschte, 
kam wahrend der Konferenz durch Angriffe gegen 
meinen russischen Kollegen und die russische Diplo- 
matic in den russischen Blattern zum Ausdruck. Seine 
deutsche Herkunft und katholische Konfession, sein 
Ruf als Deutschenfreund, und der zufallige Umstand, 
dass er sowohl mit dem Graf en Mensdorff, wie mit 
mir verwandt ist, kamen den unzufriedenen Kreisen 
zu statten. Ohne eine sehr bedeutende Personlichkeit 
zu sein, besitzt Graf Benckendorff eine Reihe von 
Eigenschaften, die einen guten Diplomaten kennzeich- 
nen: Takt, gesellschaftliches Geschick, Erfahrung, 
verbindliches Wesen, naturlichen Blick fur Menschen 
und Dinge. Er war stets bestrebt, eine schroffe 
Stellungnahme zu vermeiden und wurde durch die 
Haltung Englands und Frankreichs auch darin 
bestarkt. 

Ich sagte ihm spater einmal: Die Stimmung in 
Russland ist wohl sehr antideutsch. Er entgegnete: 
Es gibt auch sehr starke und einflussreiche prodeutsche 
Kreise, man ist aber allgemein antiosterreichisch ! 

Es eriibrigt sich, hinzuzufiigen, dass unsere Austro- 
philie d, outrance (Osterreich-Freundschaft bis zur 
aussersten Grenze) nicht gerade geeignet war, die 
Entente zu lockern und Russland seinen asiatischen 
Interessen zuzufuhren! 

Balkankonferenz 

Gleichzeitig tagte in London die Balkankonferenz, 
und ich hatte Gelegenheit, mit den Leitern der Balkan- 

l5o] 



Berlin] through the secret treaty [with Russia] and 
through the attitude he took in the Battenberg ques- 
tion; the dangerous slope down which we started 
again in the Bosnian question was followed further in 
London and was not abandoned later in time to save 
us from falling into the abyss. 16 

The dissatisfaction which prevailed at the time in 
Russia found expression during the conference in 
attacks in Russian journals upon my Russian colleague 
and upon the Russian diplomacy. Count Bencken- 
dorff's German origin and Catholic faith, his reputa- 
tion as a friend of the Germans, and the accidental 
circumstance that he was related both to Count Mens- 
dorff and to me, were exploited in the discontented 
circles. Although not a man of great force, Count 
BenckendorfT possesses a number of qualities that are 
essential to a good diplomatist: tact, social adapta- 
bility, experience, pleasant manners and an instinctive 
appreciation of men and of things. It was always his 
effort to avoid taking an uncompromising position, 
and this disposition on his part was strengthened by 
the attitude of England and of France. 

I said to him once, on a later occasion : "The feeling 
in Russia, I suppose, is very anti-German." He 
replied: "There are also very strong and influential 
pro-German circles, but everybody is anti-Austrian." 

It is almost needless to add that our extreme Austrophil 
attitude was not precisely adapted to loosen the Entente 
or to direct Russia's attention to its Asiatic interests ! 

The Balkan Conference 17 

At the same period the Balkan conference was sit- 
ting in London, and I had opportunity to get in touch 

16 See Appendix, notes iii and iv. 

17 Ibid., notexi. 

1 5i] 



staaten in Fiihlung zu treten. Die bedeutendste 
Personlichkeit war wohl Herr Venizelos. Er war 
damals nichts weniger als deutschfeindlich, besuchte 
mich wiederholt und trug mit Vorliebe und sogar auf 
der franzosischen Botschaft das Band des Roten 
Adlerordens. Von gewinnender Liebenswurdigkeit, 
mit weltmannischem Auf treten, wusste er sich Sym- 
pathien zu verschaffen. Neben ihm spielte Herr 
Danew, der damalige bulgarische Minis terprasident 
und Vertrauensmann des Graf en Berchtold, eine grosse 
Rolle. Er machte den Eindruck eines verschlagenen 
und energischen Mannes, und es ist wohl nur dem 
Einfluss seiner Wiener und Pester Freunde zuzu- 
schreiben, tiber deren Huldigungen er sich gelegentlich 
belustigte, dass er sich zu der Torheit des zweiten 
Balkankrieges verleiten Hess und die russische Ver- 
mittelung ablehnte. 

Auch Herr Take Jonescu war ofters in London und 
besuchte mich dann regelmassig. Ich kannte ihn von 
der Zeit her, da ich Sekretar in Bukarest war. Er 
gehorte auch zu den Freunden des Herrn von Kiderlen. 
In London war er bestrebt, durch Verhandlungen mit 
Herrn Danew Zugestandnisse fiir Rumanien zu 
erreichen und wurde dabei von dem sehr befahigten 
rumanischen Gesandten Nisu unterstiitzt. Dass diese 
Verhandlungen an dem Widerstande Bulgariens 
scheiterten, ist bekannt. Graf Berchtold (und wir 
naturiich mit ihm) war ganz auf Seiten Bulgariens, 
sonst ware es wohl gelungen, den Rumanen die ge- 
wiinschte Genugtuung durch einen Druck auf Herrn 
Danew zu verschaffen und uns Rumanien zu verpflich- 
ten, das durch die Haltung Osterreichs wahrend des 
zweiten Balkankrieges und danach den Mittelmachten 
endgiiltig entfremdet wurde. 

[52] 



with the leading men of the Balkan states. Quite the 
most significant personality was that of M. Venizelos. 
At that time he was anything but hostile to Germany. 
He paid me repeated visits, and he wore by preference, 
even at the French embassy, the ribbon of the order 
of the Red Eagle. With winning and kindly ways and 
the manners of a man of the world, he made himself 
generally liked. M. Danef, at that time prime minis- 
ter of Bulgaria and confidant of Count Berchtold, also 
played a leading role. He impressed one as a subtle 
and energetic man; and the mistake he made in per- 
mitting himself to be drawn into the unwise venture of 
the Second Balkan War, refusing Russian mediation, 
is probably to be ascribed solely to the influence of his 
friends at Vienna and at Budapest, by whose homage 
he sometimes showed himself amused. 

M. Take Jonescu also was frequently in London and 
on such occasions always called on me. I had known 
him since the time when I was secretary at Bucharest. 
He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen's friends. In 
London he was trying to gain concessions for Rumania 
by negotiations with M. Danef, and he was supported 
in these efforts by the very able Rumanian envoy, 
M. Nisu. These negotiations, it is known, failed in 
consequence of the resistance of Bulgaria. Count 
Berchtold — and we of course with him — was alto- 
gether on the side of Bulgaria. But for this it would 
probably have been possible, by putting some pressure 
on M. Danef, to obtain for the Rumanians the con- 
cessions they desired, and thus to place Rumania 
under obligations to us. As it was, in consequence of 
the attitude of Austria during the Second Balkan War 
and afterwards, Rumania was completely estranged 
from the Central Powers. 

[53] 



Zweiter Balkankrieg 

Die Niederlage Bulgariens im zweiten Balkankriege 
und der Sieg Serbiens sowie der rumanische Ein- 
marsch bedeuteten naturgemass fur Osterreich eine 
Blamage. Der Gedanke, diese durch einen Waffen- 
gang gegen Serbien auszugleichen, scheint bald in 
Wien Eingang gefunden zu haben. Die italienischen 
Enthullungen beweisen es, und es ist anzunehmen, 
dass Marquis San Giuliano, der den Plan als eine 
„pericolosissima aventura" (ausserst gefahrliches Aben- 
teuer) sehr treffend kennzeichnete, uns davor bewahrt 
hat, schon im Sommer 19 13 in einen Weltkrieg ver- 
wickelt zu werden. 

Bei der Vertrautheit der russisch-italienischen 
Beziehungen wird die Wiener Anregung auch wohl in 
Petersburg bekannt geworden sein. Jedenfalls hat 
Herr Sasonow in Konstanza, wie Herr Take Jonescu 
mir erzahlte, offen gesagt, dass ein Angriff Osterreichs 
auf Serbien fur Russland den Kriegsfall bedeutet. 

Als einer meiner Herren im Fruhjahr 19 14 von 
Urlaub aus Wien zuriickkehrte, erzahlte er, Herr von 
Tschirschky erklarte, es gabe bald Krieg. Da ich aber 
uber wichtige Vorgange stets in Unkenntnis gelassen 
wurde, hielt ich diesen Pessimismus fur unbegriindet. 

Seit dem Bukarester Frieden scheint tatsachlich in 
Wien die Absicht bestanden zu haben, eine Revision 
dieses Vertrages auf eigene Faust durchzufuhren, und 
man wartete anscheinend nur auf einen giinstigen 
Anlass. Auf unsere Unterstiitzung konnten die 
Wiener Staatsmanner selbstverstandlich rechnen. Das 
wussten sie, denn es war ihnen schon wiederholt 
„Schlappheit" vorgeworfen worden. Man drangte in 
Berlin sogar auf eine „Rehabilitierung" Osterreichs. 

[54] 



The Second Balkan War 16 

The defeat of Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War 
the victory of Serbia and the Rumanian march into 
Bulgaria meant for Austria a loss of prestige. The 
idea of offsetting this loss by a campaign against 
Serbia seems to have been entertained in Vienna 
shortly afterward. This is proved by the Italian 
revelations; and it is to be assumed that Marquis di 
San Giuliano, who quite appropriately characterized 
the plan as a "very risky adventure," saved us from 
being involved in a world war in the summer of 1913. 19 

In view of the intimacy of the relations between 
Italy and Russia, it may be assumed that the Viennese 
overture was known in St. Petersburg. At all events, 
M. Sazonof declared openly in Constanza, as M. Take 
Jonescu informed me, that an attack of Austria on 
Serbia would amount to a casus belli for Russia. 

When, in the spring of 19 14, one of the members of 
my embassy returned from a leave of absence in 
Vienna, he told me that Herr von Tschirschky had 
declared that there would soon be war. But as I was 
systematically kept in ignorance of important occur- 
rences, I regarded this pessimistic view as baseless. 

Ever since the Peace of Bucharest, Vienna seems 
really to have intended to secure a revision of this 
treaty by its own independent action and to have been 
waiting only for a favorable occasion. On our support 
the Vienna statesmen could reckon as a matter of 
course. They knew this, for they had been repeatedly 
reproached for "flabbiness." In Berlin there was actual 
insistence that Austria be "rehabilitated." 

18 See Appendix, note xii. 

19 Ibid., note xiv. 

155] 



Liman von Sanders 

Als ich im Dezember 191 3 nach langerem Urlaub 
nach London zuriickkehrte, hatte die Frage Liman von 
Sanders zu einer neuen Verscharfung unserer Bezie- 
hungen zu Russland gefiihrt. Sir Edward Grey 
machte mich nicht ohne Besorgnis auf die Erregung 
aufmerksam, die darliber in Petersburg herrsche! "/ 
have never seen them so excited" (ich habe sie niemals so 
aufgeregt gesehen). 

Ich wurde von Berlin aus beauftragt, den Minister 
zu bitten, in massigendem Sinne in Petersburg zu 
wirken und uns bei Beilegung des Streites behilflich zu 
sein. Sir Edward war hierzu gern bereit, und seine 
Vermittlung hat nicht wenig dazu beigetragen, die An- 
gelegenheit zu ebnen. Meine guten Beziehungen zu 
Sir Edward und sein grosser Einfluss in Petersburg 
wurden auf ahnliche Weise wiederholt benutzt, wenn 
es gait, dort etwas durchzusetzen, da unsere Ver- 
tretung sich hierzu als vollig ungeeignet erwies. 

In den kritischen Tagen des Juli 19 14 sagte mir Sir 
Edward: „Wenn Sie etwas in Petersburg erreichen 
wollen, wenden Sie sich regelmassig an mich, wenn ich 
aber einmal Ihren Einfluss in Wien anrufe, so versagen 
Sie mir Ihre Unterstiitzung." 

Kolonialvertrag 

Die guten und vertrauensvollen Beziehungen, die es 
mir gelang, nicht nur in der Gesellschaft und mit den 
einflussreichsten Personlichkeiten, wie Sir Ed. Grey 
und Mr. Asquith, sondern auch bei public dinners (bei 
offentlichen Diners) mit der Offentlichkeit anzu- 
knupfen, hatten eine merkliche Besserung unseres 
Verhaltnisses zu England herbeigeftihrt. Sir Edward 

[56] 



Liman von Sanders 20 

When, after a lengthy leave of absence, I returned 
to London in December, 1913, the Liman von Sanders 
question had led to renewed tension in our relations 
with Russia. Sir Edward Grey called my attention, 
not without anxiety on his part, to the widespread 
agitation which this matter had aroused in St. Peters- 
burg, saying: "I have never seen them so excited." 

I received instructions from Berlin to ask the min- 
ister to work in favor of moderation in St. Petersburg 
and to assist us in settling the dispute. Sir Edward 
was quite willing to do this, and his mediation con- 
tributed in no small degree to smoothing the matter 
over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his 
great influence in St. Petersburg were repeatedly util- 
ized in a like manner when it was a question of carrying 
any point there; for our representative proved quite 
unfit for any such purpose. 

During the critical days of July, 1914, Sir Edward 
said to me: "If you wish to get anything in St. Peters- 
burg, you always come to me, but if once I ask for 
your influence in Vienna, you refuse me your support." 



Colonial Treaty 

The excellent and confidential relations I succeeded 
in establishing, not only in society and with the most 
influential personalities, such as Sir Edward Grey and 
Mr. Asquith, but also at public dinners with [the 
agencies of] publicity, had brought about a noticeable 
improvement in our relations with England. It was 

20 See Appendix, note xv. 

[57] 



War aufrichtig bemiiht, diese Annaherung weiter zU 
befestigen, und seine Absichten traten besonders in 
zwei Fragen hervor; dem Kolonial- und dem Bagdad- 
vertrag. 

Im Jahre 1898 war zwischen dem Graf en Hatzfeld 
und Herrn Balfour ein geheimes Abkommen unter- 
zeichnet worden, das die portugiesischen Kolonien in 
Afrika in wirtschaftspolitische 7 Interessenspharen 
zwischen uns und England teilte. Da die portugiesi- 
sche Regierung weder die Macht noch die Mittel besass, 
ihren ausgedehnten Besitz zu erschliessen oder sach- 
gemass zu verwalten, hatte sie sich friiher bereits mit 
dem Gedanken getragen, ihn zu veraussern und ihre 
Finanzen dadurch zu sanieren. Eine Einigung 
zwischen uns und England war zustande gekommen, 
welche die beiderseitigen Interessen begrenzte, und 
die um so grosseren Wert besass, als Portugal sich 
bekanntlich in volliger Abhangigkeit von England 
befindet. 

Dieser Vertrag sollte wohl ausserlich die Unver- 
sehrtheit und Unabhangigkeit des portugiesischen 
Reiches sichern, und er sprach nur die Absicht aus, 
den Portugiesen finanziell und wirtschaftlich behilf- 
lich zu sein. Er stand daher dem Wortlaut nach nicht 
im Widerspruch zu dem alten englisch-portugiesischen 
Biindnis aus dem 15. Jahrhundert, das zuletzt unter 
Karl II. erneuert wurde und den gegenseitigen Be- 
sitzstand verbiirgte. 

Trotzdem war auf Bestreben des Marquis Soveral, 
der vermutlich iiber die deutsch-englischen Abma- 
chungen nicht in Unkenntnis blieb, ein neuer Vertrag, 
der sogenannte Windsorvertrag, im Jahre 1899, 
zwischen England und Portugal geschlossen worden, 

7 B.-C: "wirtschaftspolitischen." 

[58] 



Sir Edward's honest endeavor to place this rapproche- 
ment on a firmer basis. His aims were most clearly 
manifested in two matters : the colonial and the Bag- 
dad treaties. 

In the year 1898 a secret convention had been signed 
by Count Hatzfeldt and Mr. Balfour, which divided 
the Portuguese colonies in Africa 21 into economic- 
political spheres of interest as between us and England. 
As the Portuguese government possessed neither the 
power nor the means to open up its extensive posses- 
sions or to administer them suitably, it had already 
at an earlier date entertained the idea of selling them 
and thereby putting its finances on a sound basis. An 
agreement had been reached between us and England, 
delimiting the interests of the two parties. Its value 
was enhanced by the fact that Portugal, as is well 
known, is completely dependent upon England. 

On its face, of course, this treaty was designed to 
secure the integrity and independence of the Portu- 
guese realm, and the only purpose it expressed was to 
give to the Portuguese financial and economic assist- 
ance. In its wording, accordingly, it did not contra- 
vene the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, dating from 
the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under 
Charles II and which contained a reciprocal guaranty 
of existing territorial possessions. 22 

Nevertheless, at the instance of Marquis Soveral, 
who presumably was not left uninformed regarding 
the Anglo-German agreements, a new treaty, the so- 
called Windsor Treaty, was concluded in 1899 between 
England and Portugal, confirming the old agreements, 
which had never been put out of force. 

21 See Appendix, note xvii. 

22 Ibid., note xviii. 

[59] 



welch er die alten, niemals ausser Kraft gesetzten 
Vereinbarungen bestatigte. 

Die Unterhandlungen zwischen uns und England, 
die bereits vor meiner Ankunft begonnen hatten, 
bezweckten, unseren Vertrag von 1898, der auch 
hinsichtlich der geographischen Abgrenzung manche 
Unzutraglichkeiten aufwies, umzugestalten und zu 
verbessern. Dank der entgegenkommenden Haltung 
der britischen Regierung gelang es mir, dem neuen 
Vertrag eine unseren Wunschen und Interessen durch- 
aus entsprechende Form zu geben. Ganz Angola bis 
an den 20. Langengrad wurde uns zugesprochen, so 
dass wir an das Kongogebiet von Siiden gelangten, 
ausserdem noch die wertvollen Inseln San Thome und 
Principe, die nordlich des Aquators liegen und dadurch 
eigentlich dem franzosischen Interessengebiet zufielen, 
eine Tatsache, die meinen franzosischen Kollegen zu 
lebhaften, wenn auch vergeblichen Gegenvorstellungen 
veranlasste. 

Ferner erhielten wir den nordlichenTeil von Mosam- 
bik; der Licango bildete die Grenze. 

Unseren Interessen und Wunschen wurde seitens 
der britischen Regierung das grosste Entgegenkommen 
gezeigt. Sir Ed. Grey beabsichtigte, uns seinen guten 
Willen zu bekunden, er wiinschte aber auch unsere 
koloniale Entwicklung iiberhaupt zu fordern, da 
England die deutsche Kraf tentfaltung von der Nordsee 
und von Westeuropa nach dem Weltmeer und Afrika 
abzulenken hoffte. "We don't want to grudge Germany 
her colonial development" (Wir wollen Deutschland 
seine koloniale Entwicklung nicht missgonnen), sagte 
mir ein Mitglied des Kabinetts. 

Der Kongostaat sollte auf britische Anregung 
ursprunglich auch in den Vertrag einbezogen werden, 

[60] 



The object of the negotiations between us and 
England, which had begun before my arrival, was 
to revise and amend our treaty of 1898, which con- 
tained a number of impracticable provisions, even 
as regarded geographical delimitation. Thanks to 
the conciliatory attitude of the British government, 
I succeeded in giving to the new treaty a form which 
entirely corresponded to our wishes and interests. 
All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of longitude, 
was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo 
territory from the south. Moreover the valuable 
islands of San Thome and Principe, which lie north 
of the equator and therefore really belonged to the 
French sphere of interest, were allotted to us — a fact 
which caused my French colleague to enter energetic 
but unavailing protests. 

Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozam- 
bique ; the Licango formed the boundary. 

The British government showed the utmost readi- 
ness to meet our interests and wishes. Sir Edward 
Grey intended to prove his good will to us, but he 
also desired to promote our colonial development as 
a whole, because England hoped to divert the German 
output of energy from the North Sea and Western 
Europe to the ocean and to Africa. "We don't want to 
grudge Germany her colonial development," a member 
of the Cabinet said to me. 

Originally, at the British suggestion, the Congo 
State also was to have been included in the treaty, 
which would have given us a right of preemption and 
would have enabled us to penetrate it economically. 
But we refused this offer, out of alleged respect for 
Belgian sensibilities! Perhaps the idea was to econo- 
mize our successes? Furthermore, as regarded the 

[61] 



was uns ein Vorkaufsrecht und die Moglichkeit 
gegeben hatte, ihn wirtschaftlich zu durchdringen. 
Angeblich mit Riicksicht auf belgische Empfindlich- 
keiten lehnten wir aber dieses Angebot ab ! Vielleicht 
sollte mit Erfolgen gespart werden ? Auch hinsichtlich 
der praktischen Verwirklichung des eigentlichen un- 
ausgesprochenen Zweckes des Vertrages, der spateren 
tatsachlichen Teilung des portugiesischen Kolonialbe- 
sitzes, bot die neue Fassung wesentliche Vorteile und 
Fortschritte gegen die al te. Es waren namlich Falle vor- 
gesehen, die es uns ermoglichten, zur Wahrung unserer 
Interessen auf den uns zugewiesenen Gebieten ein- 
zuschreiten. Diese Voraussetzungen wurden so weit 
gefasst, dass es eigentlich uns iiberlassen blieb, selbst 
zu bestimmen, wenn „vitale" Interessen vorlagen, so 
dass es bei der volligen Abhangigkeit Portugals von 
England nur darauf ankam, die Beziehungen zu 
England weiter zu pflegen, um mit englischer Zu- 
stimmung unsere beiderseitigen Absichten spater zu 
verwirklichen. 

Die Aufrichtigkeit der britischen Regierung in ihrem 
Bestreben, unsere Rechte zu achten, zeigte sich darin, 
dass Sir Ed. Grey, noch ehe der Vertrag fertiggestellt 
oder unterzeichnet war, englische Unternehmer, die 
in dem uns durch den neuen Vertrag zugewiesenen 
Gebieten Kapitalanlagen suchten, und dafiir die 
britische Unterstiitzung wunschten, an uns verwies, 
mit dem Bemerken, dass das betreffende Unternehmen 
in unsere Interessensphare gehore. 

Der Vertrag war schon zur Zeit des Konigsbesuches 
in Berlin, also im Mai 1913, im wesentlichen fertig. 
In Berlin fand damals unter dem Vorsitz des Herrn 
Reichskanzlers eine Besprechung statt, an der auch 
ich teilnahm, und bei der noch einzelne Wiinsche 

[62] 



practical execution of the real but unexpressed purpose 
of the treaty — the actual partition at a later date of 
the Portuguese colonial possessions — the new formu- 
lation, as compared with the old, offered us important 
advantages and represented a distinct advance. Thus 
it was provided that in certain cases we should be au- 
thorized to intervene in the territories assigned to us 
for the protection of our interests. These conditional 
clauses were so broad that it was really left to us to de- 
cide whether "vital" interests were concerned ; so that, 
Portugal being completely dependent on England, it 
was necessary only to cultivate further our relations 
with England in order, later on, with English assent, 
to realize our respective intentions. 

The sincerity of the British government in its 
effort to respect our rights was proved by the fact 
that, even before the treaty was completed or signed, 
English entrepreneurs who wished to invest capital 
in the districts assigned to us under the new treaty, 
and who desired British support for their undertaking, 
were referred by Sir Edward Grey to us, with the 
information that the enterprise in question belonged 
in our sphere of interest. 

The treaty was substantially complete at the time 
of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. At that 
time a discussion took place in Berlin, under the 
presidency of the imperial chancellor, in which I 
took part, and at which some further desires of ours 
were defined. On my return to London I succeeded, 
with the help of the counselor of the embassy, Herr von 
Kuhlmann, who was working with Mr. Parker upon 
the details of the treaty, in putting through our last 
proposals also; so that in August, 191 3, before I 

I63I 



festgelegt wurden. Bei meiner Rtickkehr nach London 
gelang es mir mit Hilfe des Botschaftsrats, Herrn von 
Kiihlmann, der mit Mr. Parker die Einzelheiten des 
Vertrages bearbeitete, auch unsere letzten Vorschlage 
durchzusetzen, so dass der ganze Vertrag schon im 
August 19 1 3, vor Antritt meines Urlaubs, von Sir Ed. 
Grey und mir paragraphiert werden konnte. 

Nun sollten aber neue Schwierigkeiten entstehen, die 
die Unterzeichnung verhinderten, und erst nach einem 
Jahre, also kurz vor Kriegsausbruch, konnte ich die 
Ermachtigung erhalten zum endgiiltigen Abschluss. 
Zur Unterzeichnung aber ist es nicht mehr gekommen. 

Sir Ed. Grey wollte namlich nur unterzeichnen, /a/Zs 
der Vertrag mitsamt den beiden Vertrdgen von i8q8 
und i8qq veroffentlicht wilrde. England besitze sonst 
keine geheimen Vertrage, und es sei gegen die beste- 
henden Grundsatze, bindende Abmachungen zu ver- 
heimlichen. Er konne daher keinen Vertrag eingehen, 
ohne ihn zu veroffentlichen. Cber Zeitpunkt und Art 
der Veroffentlichung sei er aber bereit, unseren Wiin- 
schen Rechnung zu tragen, vorausgesetzt, dass die 
Veroffentlichung in langstens Jahresfrist nach Unter- 
zeichnung erfolge. 

Im Auswartigen Amt aber, wo meine Londoner 
Erfolge zunehmendes Missvergniigen erregten, und wo 
eine einflussreiche Personlichkeit, die die Rolle des 
Herrn von Holstein spielte, den Londoner Posten fur 
sich in Anspruch nahm, erklarte man, die Veroffent- 
lichung gefahrde unsere Interessen in den Kolonien, 
da die Portugiesen uns alsdann keine Konzessionen 
mehr geben wurden. 

Die Nichtigkeit des Einwandes erhellt aus der 
Erwagung, dass der alte Vertrag den Portugiesen 
hochst wahrscheinlich ebenso langst bekannt war, wie 

[64] 



went on leave, Sir Edward Grey and I were able to 
paragraph the entire treaty. 

At this point, however, new difficulties were to 
arise, which prevented the signing of the treaty; 
and it was only a year later, shortly before the out- 
break of war, that I was able to obtain authorization 
for its definite conclusion. But it never reached the 
point of being signed. 

The difficulty was that Sir Edward Grey was will- 
ing to sign only if the treaty were published, together 
with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899. England, 
he said, had no other secret treaties, and it was con- 
trary to existing principles that binding agreements 
should be kept secret. He could therefore conclude 
no treaty without publishing it. As regarded time 
and manner of publication, however, he was ready 
to take account of our wishes, provided publication 
took place within one year, at latest, after the signing. 

In our Foreign Office, however, where my London 
successes aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and where 
an influential personage, who had taken over the 
role previously played by Herr von Holstein, 23 was 
claiming for himself the post at London, it was ex- 
plained that the publication would imperil our in- 
terests in the colonies, because the Portuguese would 
then give us no more concessions. 

That there was nothing in this objection becomes 
clear when we consider that in all probability, in 
view of the intimacy of the Portuguese-English rela- 
tions, the old treaty had long been known, and the 
new agreements had likewise been made known, to 
the Portuguese. It is also to be remembered that, 
with the influence England has in Lisbon, the Portu- 

88 See Appendix, note i. 

[65] 



unsere neuen Abmachungen, angesichts der Intimitat 
der portugiesisch-englischen Beziehungen, und dass 
bei dem Einfluss, den England in Lissabon besitzt, die 
dortige Regierung einem deutsch-britischen Einver- 
standnisse gegeniiber vollig willenlos ist. 

Es gait also, einen anderen Vorwand zu finden, um 
den Vertrag scheitern zu lassen : Die Bekanntgebung 8 
des Windsorvertrages, der zur Zeit des Fursten 
Hohenlohe geschlossen wurde, und der nur eine 
Erneuerung des niemals ausser Kraft getretenen Ver- 
trags Karls II. war, konne die Stellung des Herrn von 
Bethmann Hollweg gefahrden, als Beweis britischer 
Heuchelei und Perfidie! 

Ich wies darauf hin, dass die Einleitung zu unseren 
Vertragen ganz dasselbe besage, wie der Windsorver- 
trag und wie andere ahnliche Vertrage, namlich, dass 
wir die souveranen Rechte Portugals wahren, und die 
Unversehrtheit seines Besitzes schiitzen wollten. Ver- 
gebens ! Trotz wiederholter Unterredungen mit Sir Ed. 
Grey, bei denen der Minister immer neue Vorschlage 
machte, fur die Veroffentlichung, beharrte das Aus- 
wartige Amt auf seinem Standpunkt, und verabredete 
schliesslich mit Sir Ed. Goschen, dass alles so bleiben 
sollte, wie es bisher gewesen ! 

Der Vertrag, der uns ausserordentliche Vorteile bot, 
das Ergebnis einer mehr als einjahrigen Arbeit, war 
somit gef alien, weil er fur mich ein offentlicher Erfolg 
gewesen ware. 

Als ich im Fruhjahr 19 14 gelegentlich eines Diners 9 
auf der Botschaft, an dem Mr. Harcourt teilnahm, den 
Gegenstand beriihrte, erklarte mir der Kolonialmi- 
nister, er befinde sich in Verlegenheit und wisse nicht, 



8 B.-C: "Bekanntgabe." 
9 B.-C: "Diner." 



(66] 



guese government could not think of opposing a 
German-British understanding. 

Consequently, another pretext had to be found 
for wrecking the treaty. It was urged that the pub- 
lication of the Windsor Treaty, which was concluded 
in the time of Prince Hohenlohe — though it was only 
a renewal of the treaty of Charles II, which had never 
gone out of force — might jeopard the position of 
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, because it would be 
proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy! 

I pointed out that the preamble to our treaties said 
exactly the same thing as the Windsor Treaty and 
other similar treaties — namely, that it was our purpose 
to protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the 
integrity of its possessions. In vain! Although Sir 
Edward Grey, in repeated conversations, kept mak- 
ing fresh proposals concerning publication, our For- 
eign Office persisted in its attitude, and finally ar- 
ranged with Sir Edward Goschen that everything 
should be left as it was before. 

• So the treaty, which gave us extraordinary advan- 
tages and was the result of more than a year's work, 
perished because it would have been a public success 
for me. 

When in the spring of 1 914 I had an opportunity, 
at a dinner in the embassy at which Mr. Harcourt 
was present, to touch upon the matter, the colonial 
secretary explained that he found himself in a per- 
plexing position and did not know what attitude he 
should take. The present state of affairs was intoler- 
able, because he, Mr. Harcourt, wished to respect 
our rights, but, on the other hand, was in doubt as 
to whether he was to be guided by the old treaty or 
the new. It was therefore urgently desirable to clear 

[67] 



wie sich zu verhalten. Der gegenwartige Zustand 
sei unertraglich, da er, Mr. Harcourt, unsere Rechte 
beriicksichtigen wolle, andererseits aber im Zweifel sei, 
ob er sich nach dem alten Vertrage oder dem neuen zu 
tichten habe. Es sei daher dringend erwunscht, 
Klarheit zu schaffen und die Sache, die sich nun schon 
so lange hinziehe, zum Abschluss zu bringen. 

Auf einen diesbezuglichen Bericht erhielt ich einen 
sehr wenig hoflichen, aber um so erregteren Erlass, 
demzufolge ich mich jeder weiteren Einmischung in 
der Sache zu enthalten hatte. 

Ich bedauere es heute, dass ich nicht daraufhin nach 
Berlin gefahren bin, um dem Monarchen meinen 
Posten zur Verfugung zu stellen, und dass ich immer 
noch den Glauben an die Moglichkeit einer Ver- 
standigung zwischen mir und den leitenden Person- 
lichkeiten nicht verloren hatte, ein verhangnisvoller 
Irrtum, der sich wenige Monate spater in so tragischer 
Weise rachen sollte ! 

So wenig ich auch damals das Wohlwollen des ober- 
sten Reichsbeamten noch besass, da er fiirchtete, ich 
strebe nach 10 seinem Posten, so muss ich ihm die Ge- 
rechtigkeit wider fahren lassen, dass er bei unserer 
letzten Unterredung vor Kriegsausbruch, Ende Juli 
1 9 14, auf die ich spater noch zuriickkomme, seine 
Zustimmung zur Unterschrift und Veroffentlichung 
erteilte. Trotzdem bedurfte es noch wiederholter 
Anregungen meinerseits, die von Herrn Dr. Solf in 
Berlin unterstiitzt wurden, um endlich Juli 1914 die 
Genehmigung zu erwirken. Da aber die serbische 
Krisis damals schon den Frieden Europas bedrohte, 
musste die Vollziehung des Vertrages verschoben 
werden. Auch er gehort zu den Opfern dieses Krieges. 

l0 B.-C: "nach nach." 

[68] 



matters up and to bring the affair, which had dragged 
on so long already, to a conclusion. 

In reply to a report on this subject I received a 
dispatch that was far from courteous but was cor- 
respondingly excited, to the effect that I was to 
abstain from any further interference in the matter. 

I now regret that I did not go at once to Berlin 
and place my position at the Emperor's disposal; 
and that I still clung to the belief that an under- 
standing was not impossible between me and the 
persons who were directing our policies — a fatal mis- 
take, and one for which vengeance was to be exacted, 
a few months later, in so tragic a fashion ! 

Although at that time I was no longer in favor with 
the highest official of the Empire, since he feared 
that I aspired to his position, I must do him the 
justice to say that at the end of June, 1914, in our last 
conversation before the outbreak of war — a conver- 
sation to which I shall again refer later — he gave his 
consent to the signing and publication [of the treaty]. 
In spite of this, it still required repeated applications 
on my part, which were supported in Berlin by Dr. 
Solf, to obtain finally, in July, 1914, the [necessary 
formal] approval. Since, however, the Serbian crisis 
was then already threatening the peace of Europe, the 
execution of the treaty had to be postponed. It 
too is one of the victims of this war. 



[69] 



Bagdadvertrag 

Gleichzeitig unterhandelte ich in London, dabei 
wirksam unterstutzt durch Herrn von Kiihlmann, 
iiber den sog. Bagdagvertrag. Dieser bezweckte 
tatsachlich die Einteilung Kleinasiens in Interessen- 
spharen, obwohl dieser Ausdruck mit Rucksicht auf 
die Rechte des Sultans angstlich vermieden wurde. 
Sir Ed. Grey erklarte auch wiederholt, dass keine 
Abmachungen mit Frankreich und Russland bestan- 
den, die die Aufteilung Kleinasiens bezweckten. 

Unter Zuziehung eines tiirkischen Vertreters, als 
welcher Hakki Pascha erschien, wurden alle wirtschaf t- 
lichen Fragen, die mit den deutschen Unternehmungen 
in Verbindung standen, im wesentlichen den Wunschen 
der Deutschen Bank entsprechend geregelt. Das 
wichtigste Zugestandnis, das Sir Ed. Grey mir per- 
sonlich gemacht hatte, war die Verlangerung der 
Bahnstrecke bis Basra. Dieser Standpunkt war 
namlich unsererseits aufgegeben worden zugunsten des 
Anschlusses nach Alexandrette ; Bagdad bildete bisher 
den Endpunkt der Bahn. Fiir die Schiffahrt auf dem 
Schatt-el-Arab sollte eine internationale Kommission 
sorgen. Auch an den Hafenbauten in Basra wurden 
wir beteiligt und erhielten ferner Rechte an der Ti- 
grisschiffahrt, die bisher ein Monopol des Hauses 
Lynch war. 

Durch diesen Vertrag wurde ganz Mesopotamien bis 
Basra unser Interessengebiet, unbeschadet alterer 
britischer Rechte an der Tigrisschiffahrt und den 
Wilcox-Bewasserungsanlagen, ferner das ganze Gebiet 
der Bagdad- und Anatolischen Eisenbahn. 

Als britischer Wirtschaftsbereich galten die Kiisten 
des Persischeh Busens und die Smyrna-Aidin-Bahn, 

[70] 



The Bagdad Treaty** 

During the same period I was carrying on negotia- 
tions in London, with the efficient support of Herr von 
Kiihlmann, in reference to the so-called Bagdad 
Treaty. The real purpose of this treaty was to divide 
Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although this 
expression was anxiously avoided, out of regard for 
the rights of the Sultan. Sir Edward Grey repeatedly 
stated, moreover, that no agreements existed with 
France and with Russia aiming at the dismember- 
ment of Asia Minor. 

After we had drawn into conference a represen- 
tative of Turkey, Hakki Pasha, all the economic 
questions connected with the German enterprises were 
regulated, in substantial accord with the desires of 
the German Bank. The most important concession 
made to me personally by Sir Edward Grey was the 
prolongation of the railway to Basra. This particu- 
lar object had been abandoned, on our part, in favor 
of a connection with Alexandretta. Up to this time 
Bagdad formed the terminus of the line. Naviga- 
tion on the Shatt-el-Arab was to be placed under an 
international commission. We were also admitted 
to participation in the Basra harbor works and, 
in addition, we obtained rights in the navigation of the 
Tigris, which had been previously a monopoly of the 
firm of Lynch. 

By virtue of this treaty all Mesopotamia as far as 
Basra became our sphere of interest, without pre- 
judice to older British rights in the navigation of 
the Tigris and in the Wilcox irrigation works. Our 
sphere further included the whole region of the Bagdad 
and Anatolian railway. 

24 See Appendix, note xix. 

171] 



als franzosischer Syrien, als russischer Armenien. 
Wiirden beide Vertrage vollzogen und veroffentlicht, 
so war damit eine Verstandigung mit England erreicht, 
die alien Zweifeln an der Moglichkeit einer "Anglo- 
German cooperation" (eines englisch-deutschen Zusam- 
menwirkens) fur immer ein Ende machte. 

Flottenfrage 

Die heikelste aller Fragen war und blieb die Flotten- 
frage. Sie wird nicht immer ganz richtig beurteilt. 

Die Schaffung einer machtigen Flotte am anderen 
Ufer der Nordsee, die gleichzeitige Entwickelung der 
bedeutendsten Militarmacht des Festlandes zur be- 
deutendsten Seemacht desselben musste in England 
zum mindesten als Unbequemlichkeit empfunden 
werden. Hieriiber kann billigerweise kein Zweifel 
bestehen. Um den notigen Vorsprung zu behalten und 
nicht in Abhangigkeit zu geraten und die Herrschaft 
der Meere zu sichern, die Britannien benotigt, um 
nicht zu verhungern, musste es zu Riistungen und 
Ausgaben schreiten, die schwer auf dem Steuerzahler 
lasteten. Eine Bedrohung der britischen Weltstellung 
ergab sich jedoch, wenn unsere Politik die Moglichkeit 
kriegerischer Entwickelungen gewartigen liess. Diese 
Voraussetzung war bei den Marokkokrisen und der 
bosnischen Frage in sichtbare Nahe getreten. 

Mit unserer Flotte nach den bestehenden Festle- 
gungen hatte man sich abgefunden, sie war den Briten 
gewiss nicht willkommen und bildete einen der Griinde, 
aber nicht den einzigen und vielleicht auch nicht den 
wich tigs ten, fur den Anschluss Englands an Frank- 
reich und Russland ; aber wegen der Flotte allein hatte 
England ebensowenig zum Schwerte gegriffen, wie 

[72] 



The British economic domain was to include the 
coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin 
line; the French, Syria; the Russian, Armenia. Had 
these two treaties been executed and published, an 
understanding with England would have been reached 
which would forever have dissipated all doubts as 
to the possibility of an Anglo-German cooperation. 

The Naval Question™ 

The naval question was and remained the thorniest 
of all the questions at issue. It is not always quite 
rightly appreciated. 

The creation of a powerful fleet on the other side 
of the North Sea, the development of the most im- 
portant military power of the continent into its most 
important naval power as well, could not but arouse 
in England a sense at least of discomfort. On this 
point there can be no reasonable doubt. In order 
to keep the lead it had gained and needed and not 
to lose its independence, in order to secure the rule 
of the sea, which Great Britain requires to avoid 
starvation, it was forced to proceed to armaments and 
outlays that weighed heavily on the tax-payer. The 
British position in the world, however, was threatened 
if our policy caused possible warlike complications to 
be anticipated. This anticipation had been brought 
into the immediate field of vision in the Moroccan 
crisis and in the Bosnian question. 

The development of our fleet in accordance with 
the plans existing at that time had been accepted. 
It was certainly not welcome to the Britons, and it 
was one of the motives, although not the only and 
perhaps not the most important motive, that had 

25 See Appendix, note xvi. 

1731 



etwa wegen unseres Handels, der angeblich den Neid 
und schliesslich den Krieg gezeitigt hat. 

Ich vertrat von Anfang an den Standpunkt, dass es 
trotz der Flotte moglich u sei, zu freundschaftlicher 
Verstandigung und Annaherung zu gelangen, wenn wir 
keine Novelle brachten und eine zweifelsfreie Friedens- 
politik trieben. Auch vermied ich es, von der Flotte 
zu sprechen, und zwischen Sir Ed. Grey und mir ist das 
Wort iiberhaupt nicht gefallen. Sir Ed. Grey erklarte 
gelegentlich in einer Kabinettssitzung: "The present 
German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to 
me" (Der gegenwartige deutsche Botschafter hat vor 
mir nie die Flotte erwahnt). 

Wahrend meiner Amtszeit regte bekanntlich Mr. 
Churchill, der damalige Erste Lord der Admiralitat, 
den sogenannten "naval holiday" (Flottenfeiertag) an 
und schlug aus finanziellen Griinden und wohl auch 
um der pazifistischen Richtung in seiner Partei ent- 
gegenzukommen, eine einjahrige Riistungspause vor. 
Amtlich von Sir Ed. Grey wurde der Vorschlag nicht 
unterstiitzt, zu mir hat er nie davon gesprochen, Mr. 
Churchill redete mich aber wiederholt darauf an. 

Ich bin iiberzeugt, dass seine Anregung aufrichtig 
gemeint war, wie iiberhaupt Winkelzugigkeit nicht im 
Wesen des Englanders liegt. Es ware fur Mr. Churchill 
ein grosser Erfolg gewesen, dem Lande mit Erspar- 
nissen aufzuwarten und den Riistungsalp, der auf dem 
Volke lastete, erleichtern zu konnen. 

Ich entgegnete, es wurde aus technischen Griinden 
schwer sein, auf seinen Gedanken einzugehen. Was 
sollte aus den Arbeitern werden, die fur diese Zwecke 
geworben seien, was aus dem technischen Personal? 
Unser Flottenprogramm sei einmal festgelegt und 

11 B.-C: "unmoglich." 

[74] 



led England to establish closer relations with France 
and with Russia; but England would no more have 
grasped the sword on account of our fleet alone 
than on account, say, of our trade, which is alleged to 
have bred envy and finally war. 

From the outset I took the position that, in spite 
of the fleet, it was possible to reach a friendly under- 
standing and a rapprochement, provided we introduced 
no new naval bill and conducted our policy on indub- 
itably peaceful lines. I also avoided any mention 
of the fleet and, in the conversations between Sir 
Edward Grey and me, the word was never uttered. 
Sir Edward Grey declared incidentally, at a cabinet 
meeting: "The present German ambassador has 
never mentioned the fleet to me." 

During my term of office Mr. Churchill, at that 
time first lord of the admiralty, suggested, as is 
known, the so-called "naval holiday" and, for financial 
reasons and probably also in order to meet the 
pacifist tendency in his party, proposed a stay of 
armaments for one year. This proposal was not 
officially supported by Sir Edward Grey; he never 
spoke of it to me; Mr. Churchill, however, repeatedly 
addressed me on the subject. 

I am convinced that his suggestion was honestly 
intended. Chicane is not natural to the Englishman. 
It would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill 
if he could have come before the country with reduc- 
tions of expenditure and lightened the burden of 
armament that weighed like a nightmare on the 
people. 

My answer was that for technical reasons it would 
be difficult to accept his idea. What was to become 
of the workmen who had been hired for these purposes? 

1 751 



daran Hesse sich schwer etwas andern. Wir beabsich- 
tigten es andererseits auch nicht zu iiberschreiten. 
Er kam aber wieder darauf zuriick und machte gel tend, 
dass die fur ungeheure Rustungen aufgewendeten 
Mittel auch besser fur andere, nutzbringende Zwecke 
Verwendung fanden. Ich entgegnete, dass auch diese 
Ausgaben der heimischen Industrie zugute kamen. 

Es gelang mir auch durch Unterredungen mit Sir 
W. Tyrrell, dem Kabinettschef Sir Edwards, die Frage 
von der Tagesordnung 12 abzusetzen, ohne zu verstim- 
men, obwohl sie im Parlamente wiederkehrte, und zu 
verhindern, dass ein amtlicher Vorschlag erging. Es 
war aber ein Lieblingsgedanke Mr. Churchills und der 
Regierung, und ich glaube, dass wir durch Eingehen 
auf seine Anregung sowie auf die Formel 16:10 fur 
Grosskampfschiffe einen greifbaren Beweis unseres 
guten Willens geben und die bei der Regierung vor- 
herrschende Tendenz, mit uns in nahere Fiihlung zu 
kommen, wesentlich befestigen und fordern konnten. 

Aber wie gesagt, es war moglich, trotz der Flotte und 
auch ohne "naval holiday" zu einer Verstandigung zu 
gelangen. In diesem Sinne hatte ich meine Mission 
von Anfang aufgefasst, und es war mir auch gelungen, 
mein Programm zu verwirklichen, als der Ausbruch 
des Krieges alles Erreichte vernichtete. 



Handelsneid 

Der Handelsneid, von dem bei uns so viel die Rede 
ist, beruht auf unrichtiger Beurteilung der Verhalt- 
nisse. Gewiss bedrohte das Emporkommen Deutsch- 

12 B.-C: "Tagesornung." 

[76] 



What was to be done with the technical personnel? 
Our naval program was definitely fixed, and it would 
be difficult to make any change in it. On the other 
hand, we did not mean to go beyond it. Nevertheless 
he came back to the matter and urged that the sums 
expended for enormous armaments might better be ap- 
plied to other useful purposes. I answered that even 
these outlays were of advantage to our home industry. 

As a result of conversations with Sir William Tyrrell, 
Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, I succeeded in 
eliminating this question from the order of the day, 
and this without provoking any dissatisfaction, al- 
though it came up again in Parliament; and I was 
able to prevent the submission of any official proposal. 
It was, however, an idea strongly favored by Mr. 
Churchill and by the government; and I believe 
that by accepting his suggestion, and also the rate 
of sixteen to ten for large steam vessels, we might 
have given tangible evidence of our good will and 
sensibly strengthened and furthered the tendency 
that was dominant in the government to bring the 
two countries into closer touch. 

However, as I have said, it was possible to arrive 
at an understanding in spite of the fleet and also 
without a naval "holiday." I had viewed my mission 
in this sense from the outset, and I had succeeded, too, 
in carrying out my program, when the outbreak of 
the war swept away all that had been gained. 

Commercial Jealousy 

The [theory of] commercial jealousy, of which there 
has been so much talk in our country, rests on an 
erroneous view of the situation. Germany's growing 
importance as a commercial power, after the war of 

1771 



lands als Handelsmacht nach dem siebziger Kriege und 
in folgenden Dezennien die Interessen der britischen 
Handeiskreise, die mit ihrer Industrie und mit ihren 
Exporthausern eine Art Monopolstellung besassen. 
Der zunehmende Warenaustausch mit Deutschland 
aber, das an der Spitze aller britischen Exportlander 
in Europa 13 stand, eine Tatsache, auf die ich in meinen 
offentlichen Reden immer hinwies, hatte den Wunsch, 
mit dem besten Kunden und Geschaftsfreund in guten 
Beziehungen zu bleiben, gezeitigt und alle andern 
Erwagungen allmahlich zuruckgedrangt. 

Der Brite ist matter of fact, er findet sich mit 
Tatsachen ab und kampft nicht gegen Windmuhlen. 
Gerade in den kaufmannischen Kreisen fand ich das 
lebhafteste Entgegenkommen und das Bestreben, die 
gemeinsamen wirtschaftlichen Interessen zu fordern. 
Tatsachlich interessierte sich niemand dort fur den 
russischen, italienischen, osterreichischen, ja nicht 
einmal fur den franzosischen Vertreter, trotz seiner 
bedeutenden Personlichkeit und seiner politischen 
Erfolge. Nur der deutsche und der amerikanische 
Botschafter erregte die offentliche Aufmerksamkeit. 

Ich habe, um mit den wichtigen Handelskreisen 
Ftihlung zu bekommen, den Einladungen der vereinig- 
ten Handelskammern sowie der Londoner und Brad- 
forder Kammer entsprochen und war Gast der Stadte 
Newcastle und Liverpool. Uberall war ich der Gegen- 
stand herzlicher Huldigungen. Manchester, Glasgow 
und Edinburg hatten mich gleichfalls geladen und ich 
wollte spater dorthin gehen. 

Es wurde mir von Leu ten, die britische Verhaltnisse 
nicht kennen, und die Bedeutung der "public dinners" 
nicht wiirdigen, und auch von solchen, denen meine 

13 B.-C: omits "in Europa." 

178] 



1870 and in the following decades, undoubtedly men- 
aced the interests of British trade circles, since with 
their industry and their export houses these had a 
sort of monopoly. On the other hand, the increasing 
exchange of goods with Germany, to which Great 
Britain exported more merchandise than to any other 
country in Europe — a fact to which I invariably al- 
luded in my public speeches — had created a desire to 
maintain good relations with their best customer and 
business friend and had gradually supplanted all other 
considerations. 

The Briton is a matter-of-fact person, he adjusts 
himself to conditions and does not tilt against wind- 
mills. It was precisely in commercial circles that 
I found the liveliest disposition to establish good rela- 
tions and to promote common economic interests. As a 
matter of fact there was in these circles no particular 
interest in the Russian, the Italian, the Austrian or 
even the French representative, in spite of the latter's 
marked personality and political successes. Only the 
German and the American ambassadors attracted 
public attention. 

In order to get in touch with the most important 
trade circles, I accepted invitations from the United 
Chambers of Commerce and also from the London 
and Bradford Chamber. I was also entertained by 
the cities of Newcastle and of Liverpool. I received 
everywhere cordial tributes of respect. Manchester, 
Glasgow and Edinburgh had also sent me invitations, 
and I intended to visit these cities later. 

People who do not understand British conditions 
and who do not appreciate the importance of "public 
dinners," and also persons to whom my successes 
were unwelcome, accused me of doing harm by my 

[79] 



Erfolge unerwiinscht waren, der Vorwurf gemacht, ich 
habe durch meine Reden geschadet. Ich glaube viel- 
mehr, dass mein offentliches Auftreten und die Beto 
nung gemeinsamer wirtschaftlicher Interessen nicht 
unwesentlich zur Besserung der Beziehungen beige- 
tragen hat, abgesehen davon, dass es ungeschickt und 
unhoflich gewesen ware, alle Einladungen abzulehnen. 
Auch in alien andern Kreisen habe ich die liebens- 
wurdigste Aufnahme und ein warmes Entgegen- 
kommen gefunden, bei Hof wie in der Gesellschaft und 
bei der Regierung. 

Hof und Gesellschaft 

Der Konig, wenn auch nicht gerade sehr gebildet 
und bedeutend, aber ein harmloser und wohlwollender 
Mann mit einfachem, gesundem Sinn, common sense, 
war bestrebt, mir Wohlwollen zu zeigen und aufrichtig 
gewillt, meine Aufgabe zu fordern. Trotz der geringen 
Macht, die die englische Verfassung der Krone lasst, 
vermag der Monarch, kraft seiner Stellung, die Stim- 
mung doch sehr zu beeinflussen, sowohl in der Gesell- 
schaft, wie auch bei der Regierung. Die Krone ist die 
Spitze der Gesellschaftspyramide, von ihr geht der 
Ton aus. Die Gesellschaft, iiberwiegend unionistisch 
(konservativ) , befasst sich, mit Einschluss der Damen, 
von jeher eifrig mit Politik. Sie ist im House of Lords 
(Oberhaus), wie bei den Commons (Haus der Ge- 
meinen), und daher auch im Kabinett vertreten. Der 
Englander gehort entweder zur Society (Gesellschaft) 
oder mochte zu ihr gehoren. Sein Streben ist und 
bleibt: ein vornehmer Mann, ein Gentleman zu sein, 
und selbst Leute bescheidener Herkunft, wie Mr. 
Asquith, verkehren mit Vorliebe in der Gesellschaft 
und mit schonen, eleganten Damen. 

[80] 



speeches. I am convinced, on the contrary, that my 
public appearances and my insistence on common 
economic interests contributed in no slight degree 
to improving our relations, apart from the fact that 
it would have been awkward and discourteous to 
refuse all invitations. 

In all other circles I was most kindly received and 
warmly welcomed, at court as well as in society and 
on the part of the government. 



Court and Society 

The King, although not highly educated or of very 
marked personality, but yet an inoffensive and kindly 
man, with simple, sound sense — common sense — made 
a point of indicating his good will to me and was 
honestly desirous to further the accomplishment of my 
task. However slight the power that the English con- 
stitution leaves in the crown, the King is still able, by 
virtue of his position, to exercise much influence on 
opinion, not only in society but also within the govern- 
ment. The crown is the apex of the social pyramid ; it 
sets the fashion. Society, which is for the most part 
Unionist (conservative) has always taken a very active 
interest, the women no less than the men, in politics. 
It is represented not only in the House of Lords, 
but also in the Commons, and for this reason in the 
Cabinet as well. The Englishman is either in society 
or wishes to get into society. It is his constant 
effort to be a man of distinction, a gentleman; and 
even men of modest origin, such as Mr. Asquith, 
wish to move in society and prefer to meet handsome 
and fashionable women. 

[8il 



Der britische Gentleman beider Parteien geniesst 
die gleiche Erziehung, besucht dieselben Colleges und 
Universitaten, betreibt die namlichen Sports, sei es 
nun Golf, Cricket, Lawn-Tennis oder Polo. Alle haben 
in der Jugend Cricket und Fussball gespielt, sie haben 
dieselben Lebensgewohnheiten und verbringen das 
week-end (Ende der Woche) auf dem Lande. Keine 
soziale Kluft trennt die Parteien, sondern nur eine 
politische, die sich in den letzten Jahren nur insofern 
zu einer sozialen entwickelte, als die Politiker beider 
Lager sich gesellschaftlich mieden. Man durfte selbst 
auf dem neutralen Boden einer Botschaft beide Lager 
nicht mischen, da die Unionisten seit der Veto- und 
Homerulebill die Radikalen achteten. Als wenige 
Monate nach meiner Ankunft das Konigspaar bei uns 
speiste, verliess Lord Londonderry nach Tisch das 
Haus, um nicht mit Sir Ed. Grey zusammen zu bleiben. 
Aber es ist kein Gegensatz, der in der Kaste und 
Erziehung liegt, wie in Frankreich ; es sind nicht zwei 
getrennte Welten, sondern dieselbe Welt, und das 
Urteil liber einen Auslander ist ein gemeinsames und 
nicht ohne Einfluss auf seine politische Stellung, ob 
nun Mr. Asquith regiert oder Lord Lansdowne. 

Ein Gegensatz der Kaste besteht in England nicht 
mehr, seit der Zeit der Stuarts und nachdem die Welfen 
und die Whigoligarchie im Gegensatz zu dem tori- 
stischen Landadel die burgerlich-stadtischen Kreise 
emporkommen liessen. Es ist vielmehr ein Gegen- 
satz der politischen Meinungen iiber staatsrechtliche 
Fragen oder iiber Steuerpolitik. Gerade Aristokraten, 
die sich der Volkspartei, den Radikalen anschliessen, 
die Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, Crewe, wurden von der 
unionistischen Aristokratie am meisten gehasst. Nie- 
mals begegnete man einem dieser Herren in den 

[82] 



The British gentleman, no matter to which party 
he belongs, enjoys the same education, goes to the 
same colleges and universities, engages in the same 
sports, whether it be golf, cricket, tennis or polo. 
They have all played cricket and football in their 
youth; they have the same habits of life, and they 
spend the week-end in the country. The cleavage 
between the parties is not social but purely political. 
In the last few years it has become a social cleavage 
only in so far as the politicians of the two camps 
avod social intercourse with one another. Even on 
the neutral territory of an embassy the two camps 
could not be brought together, for, since the Home 
Rule and Veto Bills, the Unionists have put the 
Radicals under a ban. When, a few months after 
my arrival, the King and Queen dined with us, Lord 
Londonderry left the house after dinner in order not 
to remain in company with Sir Edward Grey. There 
is, however, no barrier based on caste and education, 
such as exists in France. There are not two separate 
worlds, it is the same world, and its judgment regard- 
ing a foreigner is a common judgment and is not 
without influence on his political position, whether 
Mr. Asquith is governing or Lord Lansdowne. 

There has been no barrier of caste in England 
since the time of the Stuarts, since the Guelphs and 
the Whig oligarchy, in opposition to the Tory landed 
gentry, promoted the rise of the urban middle classes. 
There is rather a difference of political opinions re- 
garding constitutional questions or regarding tax pol- 
icies. The bitterest hatred of the Unionist aristocracy 
is directed precisely against aristocrats, such as Grey, 
Churchill, Harcourt and Crewe, who attach themselves 
to the popular party, to the Radicals. One never 

1 83] 



grossen aristokratischen Hausern, ausser bei den 
wenigen Parteifreunden. 

Wir wurden in London mit offenen Armen auf- 
genommen und beide Parteien iiberboten sich in 
Zuvorkommenheit. Es ware fehlerhaft, gesellschaft- 
liche Beziehungen bei dem engen Verhaltnis, das in 
England zwischen Politik und Gesellschaft besteht, 
zu unterschatzen, selbst wenn die grosse Mehrheit der 
obern Zehntausend sich in Opposition zur Regierung 
befindet. 

Zwischen Herrn Asquith und dem Duke of Devon- 
shire 14 besteht eben nicht die untiberbriickbare Kluft 
wie etwa zwischen Herrn Briand und dem Due de 
Doudeauville. Sie verkehren zwar in Zeiten erregter 
Spannung nicht miteinander, sie gehoren zwei geson- 
derten gesellschaftlichen Gruppen an, es sind aber 
doch Teile derselben Gesellschaft, wenn auch ver- 
schiedener Stufen, deren Mittelpunkt der Hof ist, sie 
haben gemeinsame Freunde und Lebensgewohnheiten, 
sie kennen sich meist von Jugend an und sind auch oft 
verwandt und verschwagert. 

Erscheinungen wie Mr. Lloyd George, der Mann des 
Volkes, kleiner Advokat und Selfmademan, sind 
Ausnahmen. Selbst Mr. Burns, Sozialist, Arbeiter- 
fiihrer und Autodidakt, suchte Fiihlung in der Gesell- 
schaft. Bei dem verbreiteten Bestreben, als Gentle- 
man zu gelten, als dessen unerreichtes Vorbild der 
grosse Aristokrat noch immer erscheint, ist das Urteil 
gerade der Gesellschaft und ihre Haltung nicht zu 
unterschatzen. 

Nirgends spielt daher die gesellschaftliche Eignung 
eines Vertreters eine grossere Rolle wie in England. 
Ein gastreiches Haus mit freundlichen Wirten ist 

W B.-C: "Devoshire." 

[84] 



met any of these gentlemen in the great aristocratic 
houses, except in those of their few party friends. 

We were received in London with open arms, and 
the two parties outbid each other in attentions. 
Given the close relation that exists in England be- 
tween politics and society, it would be a mistake 
to undervalue social connections, even though the 
great majority of the upper ten thousand are in op- 
position to the government. 

Between Mr. Asquith and the Duke of Devonshire 
there is nothing like the unbridgeable gulf that exists, 
let us say, between M. Briand and the Due de Dou- 
deauville. In periods of acute tension, indeed, they 
do not meet each other. They are members of two 
separate social groups ; but these, although on different 
levels, are nevertheless parts of the same society, of 
which the court is the center. They have common 
friends and common ways of living. For the most 
part they have known each other from their youth 
and are often related or connected by marriage. 

Phenomena such as Mr. Lloyd George, a man of the 
people, a lawyer in a small way and a self-made man, 
are exceptional. Even Mr. Burns, a socialist, a labor 
leader, and a self-educated man, tried to get in touch 
with society. Given the general desire to rank as a 
gentleman, whose unattained prototype is still the 
great aristocrat, the judgment of society and its 
attitude are by no means to be undervalued. 

Nowhere in the world, accordingly, does the social 
adaptability of a [diplomatic] representative play a 
more important part than in England. An open 
house with friendly hosts counts for more than the 
profoundest scientific attainments, and a savant with 

185] 



mehr wert als die profundesten wissenschaftlichen 
Kenntnisse, und ein Gelehrter mit provinziellem 
Wesen und allzu kargen Mitteln wurde trotz alles 
Wissens keinen Einfluss gewinnen. 

Was der Brite hasst, ist a bore, a schemer 15 a prig (ein 
langweiliger Kerl, ein Rankeschmied, ein Fant), was 
er liebt, ist a good fellow (ein guter Gesell) ! 

Sir Edward Grey 

Sir Ed. Greys Einfluss war in alien Fragen der aus- 
wartigen Politik nahezu unbeschrankt. Zwar sagte er 
bei wichtigen Anlassen: "I must first bring it before the 
Cabinet" (Ichmuss das erst im Ministerrat vorbringen), 
doch schloss dieses sich seinen Ansichten regelmassig 
an. Seine Autoritat war unbestritten. Obwohl er das 
Ausland gar nicht kennt und ausser einer kurzen Reise 
nach Paris niemals England verlassen hatte, beherr- 
schte er alle wichtigen Fragen durch langjahrige parla- 
mentarische Erfahrung und naturlichen Uberblick. 
Franzosisch versteht er, ohne es zu sprechen. In 
jungen Jahren in das Parlament gewahlt, hatte er bald 
angefangen, sich mit Auslandspolitik zu befassen. 
Unter Lord Rosebery parlamentarischer Unterstaats- 
sekretar des Auswartigen, wurde er 1906 unter Mr. 
Campbell-Bannermann Staatssekretar und bekleidet 
diesen Posten nunmehr seit zehn Jahren. 

Aus einer alten, im Norden Englands beguterten 
Familie stammend, die bereits den bekannten Staats- 
mann Grey geliefert hatte, schloss er sich dem linken 
Fliigel seiner Partei an und sympatisierte mit Sozia- 
listen und Pazifisten. Man kann ihn einen Sozialisten 
im idealsten Sinne nennen, denn er ubertragt die The- 
orie auch auf sein Privatleben, das sich durch die 

"B.-C: "Shemer." 

[86] 



provincial manners and too limited means would, 
despite all his knowledge, gain no influence. 

What the Briton hates is a bore, a schemer, a 
prig; what he loves is a good fellow. 



Sir Edward Grey 

In all questions of foreign policy Sir Edward Grey's 
influence was almost unlimited. On important occas- 
ions he used indeed to say: "I must first bring it 
before the Cabinet," but this body regularly accepted 
his views. His authority was undisputed. Although 
he was wholly unacquainted with foreign countries 
and, except for one short journey to Paris, had never 
left England, he was competent to deal with all 
important questions by reason of many years of par- 
liamentary experience and a natural breadth of vision. 
He understands French, although he does not speak 
it. Elected to parliament at an early age, he soon 
began to occupy himself with foreign affairs. Parlia- 
mentary under-secretary of state for foreign affairs 
under Lord Rosebery, he became secretary of state 
under Mr. Campbell-Bannermann, and has now [1916] 
held this post for ten years. 

Sprung from an old family, possessing estates in 
the north of England — a family which had already 
produced the well-known statesman Earl Grey — he 
attached himself to the left wing of his party and 
exhibited sympathy with socialists and pacifists. He 
may be described as a socialist in the most ideal sense 
of the term; for he carries the theory of socialism 
even into his private life, which is marked by the 

[87] 



grosste Einfachheit und Anspruchslosigkeit auszeich- 
net, obwohl er iiber reichliche Mittel verfiigt. Jede 
Representation liegt ihm fern. Er hatte in London nur 
ein kleines Absteigequartier, gab niemals Diners, 
ausserdem einen amtlichen im Foreign Office (Aus- 
wartigen Amt) zu Konigs Geburtstag. Wenn er aus- 
nahmsweise einige Gaste bei sich sah, so war es zu 
einem einfachen Essen oder Fruhstiick in ganz kleinem 
Kreise und mit weiblicher Bedienung. Auch mied er 
grosse Geselligkeiten und Feste. 

Das week-end verbringt er, wie seine Kollegen, regel- 
massig auf dem Lande, doch nicht mit eleganten, 
grossen Parties. Meist bleibt er allein in seinem 
Cottage im Newforest, wo er lange Spaziergange 
macht, um Vogel zu beobachten als leidenschaftlicher 
Naturfreund und Ornithologe. Oder aber er ging nach 
Norden auf sein Gut, wo er Eichhornchen fiitterte, die 
den Weg durch das Fenster fanden, und verschiedene 
Arten Wasservogel zuchtete. 

Mit Vorliebe setzte er sich gelegentlich nach Norfolk 
in die Siimpfe, um seltene Reiherarten beim Briiten 
zu beobachten, die nur dort nisten. 

In seiner Jugend ein beruhmter Cricket- und 
Racketspieler, treibt er jetzt als Hauptsport das 
Angeln nach Lachs und Forellen in den schottischen 
Gewassern — in Begleitung seines Freundes Lord Glen- 
conner, des Bruders von Mr. Asquith. "All the rest of 
the year I am looking forward to it" (Das ganze Jahres- 
ende warte ich darauf). Er hat ein Buch iiber den 
Angelsport herausgegeben. 

Als wir ein week-end mit ihm allein bei Lord Glen- 
conner in der Nahe von Salisbury verbrachten, kam 
er auf dem Zweirad angefahren und kehrte ebenso 

[88] 



greatest simplicity and absence of all pretension, al- 
though he is possessed of ample means. Display of 
any sort is foreign to him. He had in London modest 
quarters only, and gave no dinners except the one 
official dinner in the Foreign Office on the King's 
Birthday. If, exceptionally, he asked a few people to 
his house, it was to a simple meal or to a small luncheon 
served by a maid. He shunned large gatherings and 
celebrations. 

Like his colleagues, he regularly spends his week- 
ends in the country, but not at large, fashionable 
house parties. For the most part he lives alone, in 
his cottage in the New Forest, where he takes long 
walks to watch the ways of birds, being a devoted lover 
of nature and an ornithologist. Or, on the other hand, 
he goes north, to his property, where he feeds squirrels 
that make their way in through the window and 
breeds different kinds of water-fowl. 

He was specially fond of occasional excursions to the 
Norfolk marshes, to watch during the breeding season 
some rare varieties of heron that nest only in that 
region. 

In his youth he was a noted cricketer and tennis 
player. Now his chief sport is salmon and trout 
fishing, in Scotch waters, in the company of his 
friend Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. 
"All the rest of the year I am looking forward to it." 
He has published a book on fishing. 

When on one occasion we spent a week-end with 
him alone, at Lord Glenconner's, near Salisbury, he 
arrived on a bicycle and returned in the same way 
to his cottage, some thirty miles distant. 

The simplicity and sincerity of his character won for 
him the esteem even of his opponents, who were to be 

[89] 



nach seinem etwa dreissig englische Meilen ent- 
fernten Cottage zuriick. 

Die Einfachheit und Lauterkeit seines Wesens 
verschafften ihm auch die Achtung seiner Gegner, die 
mehr auf dem Gebiete der innern als der auswartigen 
Politik zu suchen waren. Lugen und Intrigen sind 
ihm gleichmassig fern. 

Seine Frau, die er zartlich liebte, trotzdem sie an- 
geblich nicht eigentlich seine Gattin war, und von der 
er sich niemals trennte, starb infolge eines Sturzes aus 
einem Wagen, den sie selbst lenkte. Einer seiner 
Bruder wurde bekanntlich durch einen Lowen getotet. 

Wordsworth ist sein Lieblingsdichter, und er konnte 
ihn auswendig vortragen. 

Der kiihlen Ruhe seines britischen Wesens fehlt 
nicht der Sinn fur Humor. Als er bei uns fruhsttickte 
in Gesellschaft der Kinder, und deren deutsche Unter- 
haltung horte, meinte er: "7 can't help thinking how 
clever these children are to talk German so well" (Ich muss 
immer denken, wie klug sind diese Kinder, dass sie so 
gut deutsch sprechen) und freute sich uber den Witz. 

So sieht der Mann aus, der als Liigen-Grey und als 
Anstifter des Weltkrieges verschrien wird. 

Mr. Asquith 

Mr. Asquith ist ganz anderer Art. Jovialer Lebe- 
mann, Freund der Damen, namentlich der jungen und 
hiibschen, liebt er heitere Gesellschaft und gute 
Kuche, und wird dabei von seiner lebenslustigen 
Gattin unterstiitzt. Ehemals bekannter Advokat mit 
reichem Einkommen und langjahriger Parlamentarier, 
dann Minister unter Mr. Gladstone, Pazifist wie sein 
Freund Grey, und Freund einer Verstandigung mit 
Deutschland, behandelte er alle Fragen mit der 

I90] 



found rather in the field of domestic politics than in 
that of foreign affairs. Falsehood and intrigue are 
equally foreign to him. 

His wife, whom he loved tenderly (in spite of gossip 
that they did not live as man and wife) and from whom 
he was inseparable, was killed by being thrown from 
a trap which she herself was driving. One of his 
brothers, as is known, was killed by a lion. 

Wordsworth is his favorite poet, and he is able to 
recite long passages from memory. 

Under the cool repose of his British manner there 
is no lack of a sense of humor. When, on one occasion, 
he took lunch in our house in the company of the 
children and heard their German conversation, he 
said: "I can't help thinking how clever these children 
are to talk German so well," and he showed himself 
pleased with the joke. 

This is a true picture of the man who is denounced 
as "Liar Grey" and as instigator of the World 
War. 



Mr. Asquiih 

Mr. Asquith is quite a different sort of man. Jovial, 
a bon vivant, a friend of the ladies, especially of those 
who are young and good looking, he loves cheerful 
society and good cooking. His social tastes are shared 
by his vivacious wife. Formerly a well-known barris- 
ter, with a large income, he was for many years 
a member of Parliament and then, under Mr. Glad- 
stone, a minister. Like his friend Grey, a pacifist 
and inclined to an understanding with Germany, he 

[91] 



heiteren Ruhe und Sicherheit eines erfahrenen Ge- 
schaftsmannes, dessen gute Gesundheit und vortreff- 
liche Nerven durch fleissiges Golfspiel gestahlt sind. 

Seine Tochter gingen in deutsche Pensionate und 
sprachen fliessend Deutsch. Wir waren nach kurzer 
Zeit mit ihm und seiner Familie befreundet und seine 
Gaste auf dem Lande in dem kleinen Hause an der 
Themse. 

Um auswartige Politik kiimmerte er sich nur in 
seltenen Fallen, wenn wichtige Fragen vorlagen; dann 
war naturlich die letzte Entscheidung bei ihm. In den 
kritischen Tagen des Juli kam Mrs. Asquith wiederholt 
zu uns, um zu warnen, und war schliesslich ganz ver- 
zweifelt iiber die tragische Wendung. Auch Herr 
Asquith war am 2. August, als ich ihn besuchte, um 
einen letzten Versuch im Sinne einer abwartenden 
Neutralitat zu machen, ganz gebrochen, wenn auch 
vollkommen ruhig. Die Tranen liefen ihm iiber die 
beiden Wangen hinunter. 

Nicolson 

Im Foreign Office (Auswartigen Amt) hatten neben 
dem Minister Sir A. Nicolson und Sir W. Tyrrell 16 
den starksten Einfluss. 

Ersterer war nicht unser Freund, aber seine Haltung 
gegen mich war immer durchaus korrekt und zuvor- 
kommend. Unsere personlichen Beziehungen waren 
die besten. Auch er wollte den Krieg nicht, als wir 
aber gegen Frankreich zogen, hatte er zweifellos im 
Sinne des sofortigen Arischlusses gearbeitet. Er war 
der Vertrauensmann meines franzosischen Kollegen, 
mit dem er in dauernder Flihlung stand ; auch wollte 
er Lord Bertie in Paris ablosen. 

"B.-C: "Tyrell." 

[92] 



treated all questions with the cheerful calmness and 
the sure touch of an experienced man of affairs. His 
sound health and excellent nerves are strengthened 
by assiduous golf-playing. 

His daughters studied in German boarding schools 
and spoke German fluently. We were soon on 
friendly terms with him and with his family, and 
visited him in the country, at his little house on the 
Thames. 

With foreign affairs he occupied himself only on 
rare occasions, when important questions came up; 
at such times naturally the final decision lay with him. 
During the critical days of July Mrs. Asquith came 
repeatedly to our .house to warn us, and in the end she 
was quite in despair over the tragic turn of events. 
Mr. Asquith, also, when on the second of August 
I called on him to make a last attempt to obtain a 
neutral and waiting attitude, was completely broken, 
although quite calm. Tears were rolling down his 
cheeks. 

Nicholson 

In the Foreign Office the men of greatest influence, 
aside from the minister, were Sir Arthur Nicholson 
and Sir William Tyrrell. 

Nicholson was not our friend, but his attitude to- 
wards me was always perfectly correct and courteous. 
Our personal relations could not have been better. 
He also had no desire for war ; but when we marched 
against France, he undoubtedly worked for immediate 
intervention. He was the confidant of my French 
colleague, with whom he kept in constant touch; he 
hoped, moreover, to succeed Lord Bertie in Paris. 

[93 1 



Bekanntlich war Sir Arthur vorher Botschafter in 
Petersburg und hatte den Vertrag des Jahres 1907 
abgeschlossen, der es Russland ermoglichte, sich dem 
Westen und dem nahen Orient wieder zuzuwenden. 

Tyrrell 16 

Viel grosseren Einfluss als der permanente Unter- 
staatssekretar besass der Kabinettschef oder "private 
secretary" Sir Edwards: Sir Tyrrell. 16 Dieser hochin- 
telligente Mann hatte in Deutschland das Gymnasium 
besucht und sich nachher der Diplomatic zugewandt, 
war aber nur kurze Zeit im Ausland gewesen. Zu- 
nachst schloss er sich der damals unter den jtingeren 
britischen Diplomaten modernen antideutschen Rich- 
tung an, um spater ein iiberzeugter Befiirworter der 
Verstandigung zu werden. In diesem Sinne hat er 
auch Sir Ed. Grey beeinflusst, mit dem er sehr intim 
war. Seit Ausbruch des Krieges hat er das Amt ver- 
lassen und im Home Office (Minis terium des Innern) 
Anstellung gefunden, wohl infolge der gegen ihn wegen 
seiner germanophilen Richtung erhobenen Kritik. 

Haltung des Amies 

Die Wut gewisser Herren iiber meine Londoner 
Erfolge und iiber die Stellung, die ich mir in kurzer 
Zeit machen konnte, war unbeschreiblich. Schikanose 
Erlasse wurden ersonnen, um mein Amt zu erschweren ; 
ich blieb in volliger Unkenntnis der wichtigsten Dinge 
und wurde auf die Mitteilung belangloser, langweiliger 
Berichte beschrankt. Geheime Agentennachrichten 
iiber Dinge, die ich ohne Spionage und die notigen 
Fonds nicht erfahren konnte, waren mir niemals 

"B.-C: "Tyrell." 

[94] 



Sir Arthur, as everyone knows, was formerly ambas- 
sador in St. Petersburg. He concluded the treaty of 
1907, which enabled Russia to direct its attention 
again to the West and the Near East. 

Tyrrell 

An influence much greater than that of the perma- 
nent under-secretary of state was exercised by Sir 
Edward Grey's private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell. 
This exceptionally intelligent man had studied in a 
German preparatory school and had then entered the 
diplomatic service, but was abroad for only a short 
time. At the outset, he associated himself with the 
anti-German tendencies which at that time were up-to- 
date among the younger British diplomats; later, he 
became a convinced advocate of an understanding. 
His influence with Sir Edward Grey, with whom he 
was on a very intimate footing, was exercised in this 
direction. After the outbreak of the war he left the 
Foreign Office and obtained a position in the Home 
Office. This change was probably made on account 
of the criticism directed against him on account of 
his Germanophil tendencies. 

Attitude of the Berlin Foreign Office 

The rage excited among certain gentlemen by my 
successes in London, and by the position which I 
had been able to gain for myself in a short time, was 
indescribable. Captious orders were devised to make 
my position difficult; I was kept in complete igno- 
rance of the most important matters; and I was re- 
stricted to sending unimportant and tiresome reports. 
The information acquired by secret agents, regard- 
ing things which I could not ascertain without spies 

[95] 



zuganglich, und erst in den letzten Tagen des Juli 17 
1914 erfuhr ich zufallig durch den Marine-attache die 
geheimen englisch-franzosischen Abmachungen iiber 
das Zusammenwirken beider Flotten im Falle eines 
Krieges. Audi andere wichtige und dem Amt langst 
bekannte Vorgange wie der Briefwechsel Grey-Cambon 
wurden mir vorenthalten. 



Kriegsfall 

Ich hatte bald nach meiner Ankunft die Cberzeu- 
gung gewonnen, dass wir unter keinen Umstanden 
einen englischen Angriff oder eine englische Unter- 
stiitzung eines fremden Angriffes zu befiirchten hatten, 
dass aber unter alien Umstanden England die Fran- 
zosen schiitzen wiirde. Diese Ansicht habe ich in 
wiederholten Berichten und mit ausfuhrlicher Be- 
griindung und grossem Nachdruck vertreten, ohne 
jedoch Glauben zu finden, obwohl die Ablehnung der 
Neutralitatsformel durch Lord Haldane und die 
Haltung Englands wahrend der Marokkokrise recht 
deutliche Winke waren. Dazu kamen noch die bereits 
erwahnten und dem Amte bekannten geheimen 
Abmachungen. 

Ich wies immer darauf hin, dass England als 
Handelsstaat bei jedem Kriege zwischen europaischen 
Grossmachten ausserordentlich leiden, ihn daher mit 
alien Mitteln verhindern wiirde, andererseits aber eine 
Schwachung oder Vernichtung Frankreichs im In- 
teresse des europaischen Gleichgewichts und um eine 
deutsche Ubermacht zu verhindern niemals dulden 

"B.-C: "Jahres." 

[96] 



and the necessary funds, was never placed at my 
disposal; and it was not until the last days of July, 
1 9 14, that I learned by chance from the naval attache 
of the secret Anglo-French agreements concerning 
the cooperation of the two fleets in case of a war. 
Moreover, other important correspondence, longknown 
to the Foreign Office, such as the Grey-Cambon cor- 
respondence, was withheld from me. 26 

The Casus Belli 

Soon after my arrival I became convinced that 
under no circumstances had we to apprehend an 
English attack or any English support of an attack 
by a third power, but that under any circumstances 
England would protect the French. I advanced this 
opinion in repeated reports, with detailed statement 
of my reasons and with great emphasis, but without 
obtaining any credence, although Lord Haldane's re- 
fusal of the proposed neutrality clause 27 and England's 
attitude during the Morocco crisis gave us very clear 
hints. Besides all this, there were those secret agree- 
ments which I have already mentioned and which 
were known to the Foreign Office. 

I always pointed out that, in any war between 
European Great Powers, England, as a commercial 
state, would suffer enormously, and that it would 
therefore make every effort to prevent such a war, but 
that, on the other hand, because of its interest in main- 
taining the European balance of power and in pre- 
venting Germany from gaining a dominant position, 
England could never tolerate a weakening or annihila- 

26 See Appendix, note x. 

27 Ibid., note xvi. 

197] 



konne. Das hatte mir bald nach meiner Ankunft 
Lord Haldane gesagt. In ahnlichem Sinne ausserten 
sich alle massgebenden Leute. 

Serbische Krise 

Ende Juni begab ich mich auf Allerhochsten Befehl 
nach Kiel, nachdem ich wenige Wochen vorher in 
Oxford Ehrendoktor geworden war, eine Wurde, die 
vor mir kein deutscher Botschafter seit Herrn von 
Bunsen bekleidet hatte. An Bord des „Meteor" 
erfuhren wir den Tod des Erzherzogthronfolgers. 
S. M. bedauerte, dass dadurch seine Bemiihungen, den 
hohen Herrn fur seine Ideen zu gewinnen, vergeblich 
waren. Ob der Plan einer aktiven Politik gegen Ser- 
bien schon in Konopischt festgelegt wurde, kann ich 
nicht wissen. 

Da ich iiber Wiener Ansichten und Vorgange nicht 
unterrichtet war, mass ich dem Ereignisse keine 
weitgehende Bedeutung bei. Ich konnte spater nur 
feststellen, dass bei osterreichischen Aristokraten ein 
Gefiihl der Erleichterung andere Empfindungen iiber- 
wog. An Bord des „Meteor" befand sich auch als 
Gast S. M. ein Osterreicher, Graf Felix Thun. Er 
hatte die ganze Zeit wegen Seekrankheit, trotz herr- 
lichen Wetters, in der Kabine gelegen. Nach Ein- 
treffen der Nachricht war er aber gesund. Der 
Schreck oder die Freude hatte ihn geheilt! 

In Berlin angekommen, sah ich den Reichskanzler 
und sagte ihm, dass ich unsere auswartige Lage fur 
sehr befriedigend hielt, da wir mit England so gut 
standen, wie schon lange nicht. Auch in Frankreich 
sei ein pazifistisches Ministerium am Ruder. 

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg schien meinen Opti- 
mismus nicht zu teilen und beklagte sich iiber rus- 

1.98] 



tion of France. Lord Haldane had told me this 
shortly after my arrival. All the influential people 
expressed themselves in the same sense. 

The Serbian Crisis 

At the end of June I went to Kiel, by command of 
the Emperor. A few weeks earlier I had received an 
honorary doctorate at Oxford, a distinction which 
had not been conferred on any German ambassador 
since Herr von Bunsen. On board the Meteor we 
learned of the death of the archducal heir to the 
throne. His Majesty regretted that his efforts to 
win that prince's support for his ideas had thus been 
rendered vain. Whether the plan of an active policy 
against Serbia had already been decided on at Kono- 
pischt, I am not in a position to know. 

As I was not kept posted regarding views and 
proceedings in Vienna, I did not attach very great 
importance to this event. All that I could ascertain 
later was that among Austrian aristocrats a feeling 
of relief outweighed other sentiments. On board the 
Meteor, also as a guest of His Majesty, was an Aus- 
trian, Count Felix Thun. In spite of the splendid 
weather, he had remained in his cabin all the time, 
suffering from sea-sickness. After receiving the news, 
however, he was well. Alarm or joy had cured him! 

On my arrival in Berlin I saw the imperial chancel- 
lor. I told him that I considered our foreign situation 
very satisfactory, since we were on better terms with 
England than we had been for a long time. In France, 
too, a pacifist ministry was at the helm. 

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not seem to share 
my optimism and complained about Russian arma- 
ments. I tried to calm him, emphasizing in particular 

l99l 



sische Rustungen. Ich suchte ihn zu beruhigen und 
betonte namentlich, dass Russland gar kein Interesse 
habe, uns anzugreifen, und dass ein solcher Angriff 
audi niemals die englisch-franzosische Unterstutzung 
finden wiirde, da beide Lander den Frieden wollten. 
Darauf ging ich zu Herrn Dr. Zimmermann, der Herrn 
von Jagow vertrat, und erfuhr von ihm, dass Russland 
im Begriff sei, 900,000 Mann neuer Truppen aufzu- 
stellen. Aus seinen Worten ging eine unverkennbare 
Misstimmung gegen Russland hervor, das uns iiberall 
im Wege sei. Es handelte sich auch um handels- 
politische Schwierigkeiten. Dass General von Moltke 
zum Krieg drangte, wurde mir natiirlich nicht gesagt. 
Ich erfuhr aber, dass Herr von Tschirschky einen 
Verweis erhalten, weil er berichtete, er habe in Wien 
Serbien gegeniiber zur Massigung geraten. 

Auf meiner Riickreise aus Schlesien auf dem Wege 
nach London hielt ich mich nur wenige Stunden in 
Berlin auf und horte, dass Osterreich beabsichtigte, 18 
gegen Serbien vorzugehen, um unhaltbaren Zustanden 
ein Ende zu machen. 

Leider unterschatzte ich in dem Augenblick die 
Tragweite der Nachricht. Ich glaubte, es wiirde doch 
wieder nichts daraus werden und, falls Russland 
drohte, leicht beizulegen sein. Heute bereue ich, nicht 
in Berlin geblieben zu sein und sogleich erklart zu 
haben, dass ich eine derartige Politik nicht mitmache. 

Nachtraglich erfuhr ich, dass bei der entscheidenden 
Besprechung in Potsdam am 5. Juli die Wiener 
Anfrage die unbedingte Zustimmung aller massge- 
benden Personlichkeiten fand, und zwar mit dem 
Zusatze, es werde auch nichts schaden, wenn daraus 
ein Krieg mit Russland entstehen sollte. So heisst 

18 B.-C: "beabsichtige." 

[lOO] 



v [my belief] that Russia had no interest whatever in at- 
tacking us, and that such an attack would in no case 
receive Anglo-French support, since both countries de- 
sired peace. Next I went to Dr. Zimmermann, who was 
acting for Herr von Jagow, and learned from him that 
Russia was about to raise 900,000 additional troops. 
His words revealed unmistakable dissatisfaction with 
Russia, which he found everywhere in our way. There 
was question also of difficulties in the field of trade 
policy. Of course I was not told that General von 
Moltke was pressing for war. I learned, however, 
that Herr von Tschirschky had received a reprimand, 
because he reported that in Vienna he had counselled 
moderation toward Serbia. 

On my return from Silesia, on my way to London, 
I stopped only a few hours in Berlin, where I heard 
that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia 
in order to put an end to an untenable situation. 
• At the moment, unfortunately, I underestimated the 
significance of the news. I thought that nothing 
would come of it, this time either, and that in case 
Russia made threats the matter would be easily ad- 
justed. I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and 
at once declare that I would not cooperate in a policy 
of this kind. 

Subsequently I learned that, at the decisive con- 
ference at Potsdam on July 5th, 28 the Vienna inquiry 
received the unqualified assent of all the controlling 
authorities, with the further suggestion that it would 
not be a bad thing if war with Russia should result. 
At least this statement was made in the Austrian 
protocol which Count Mensdorff received in London 

28 See Appendix, note xx. 

[101] 



es wenigstens 1m 6sterreichischen Protokoll, das Graf 
Mensdorff in London erhielt. Bald darauf war Herr 
von Jagow in Wien, um mit Graf Berchtold alles zu 
besprechen. 

Dann bekam ich die Weisung, darauf hinzuwirken, 
dass die englische Presse eine freundliche Haltung 
einnehme, wenn Osterreich der grossserbischen Be- 
wegung den „Todesstoss" versetze, und durch meinen 
Einfluss moglichst zu verhindern, dass die offentliche 
Meinung gegen Osterreich Stellung nahme. Die 
Erinnerungen an die Haltung Englands wahrend der 
Annexionskrise, wo die offentliche Meinung fur die 
serbischen Rechte auf Bosnien 19 Sympathie zeigte, 
sowie auch an die wohlwollende Forderung nationaler 
Bewegungen zur Zeit Lord Byrons und Garibaldis, 
dieses und anderes sprach so sehr gegen die Wahr- 
scheinlichkeit einer Unterstiitzung der geplanten 
Strafexpedition gegen die Furstenmorder, dass ich 
mich veranlasst sah, dringend zu warnen. Ich warnte 
aber auch vor dem ganzen Projekt, das ich als aben- 
teuerlich und gefahrlich bezeichnete, und riet, den 
Osterreichern Mdssigung anzuempfehlen, da ich nicht 
an Lokalisierung des Konfliktes glaubte. 

Herr von Jagow antwortete mir, Russland sei nicht 
bereit, etwas Gepolter wurde es wohl geben, aber je 
fester wir zu Osterreich standen, um so mehr wurde 
Russland zuriickweichen. Osterreich beschuldigte uns 
schon so der Flaumacherei und so dlirften wir nicht 
kneifen. Die Stimmung in Russland wurde anderseits 
immer deutschfeindlicher, und da mussten wir es eben 
riskieren. 

Angesichts dieser Haltung, die, wie ich spater 
erfuhr, auf Berichten des Grafen Pourtales fusste, dass 

19 B.-C: "Bosniens." 

[102] 



Soon afterwards Herr von Jagow was in Vienna, to 
talk everything over with Count Berchtold. 

Next I received instructions to try to induce the 
English press to adopt a friendly attitude, should 
Austria administer the "death blow" to the Pan- 
Serbian movement, and to use my influence so far as 
possible to prevent public opinion from becoming hos- 
tile to Austria. Recollections of the English attitude 
during the annexation crisis, when public opinion 
showed sympathy for the rights of Serbia to Bosnia, 
and of the benevolent furtherance of national move- 
ments in the days of Lord Byron and of Garibaldi — 
these and other considerations argued so strongly 
against the probability of any support of the in- 
tended punitive expedition against the regicides 
that I found myself moved to give an urgent warning. 
I added a warning against the whole plan, which I 
characterized as adventurous and dangerous; and I 
advised that moderation be recommended to the Aus- 
trians, as I did not believe that the conflict could 
be localized. 

Herr von Jagow replied to me that Russia was 
not ready. There would probably be some blustering, 
but the more firmly we stood by Austria the more 
certainly would Russia give way. Already Austria 
was accusing us of flabbiness, and for this reason we 
must not hold back. Public opinion in Russia, on 
the other hand, was becoming more and more anti- 
German, so we must just risk it. 

In view of this attitude (which, as I found later, was 
based on reports from Count Pourtales that Russia 
would not move under any circumstances — [reports] 
that caused us to incite Count Berchtold to the utmost 
energy) I hoped for rescue through English mediation, 

[103] 



Russland unter keinen Umstanden sich riihren werde, 
und die uns veranlassten, den Graf en Berchtold zu 
moglichster Energie anzufeuern, erhoffte ich die 
Rettung von einer englischen Vermittlung, da ich 
wusste, dass Sir Ed. Greys Einfluss in Petersburg im 
Sinne des Friedens zu verwerten war. Ich benutzte 
daher meine freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zum 
Minister, um ihn vertraulich zu bitten, in Russland zur 
Massigung zu raten, falls Osterreich, wie es schien, von 
den Serben Genugtuung verlangte. 

Zunachst war die Haltung der englischen Presse 
ruhig und den Osterreichern freundlich, da man den 
Mord verurteilte. Allmahlich aber wurden immer 
mehr Stimmen laut, welche betonten, dass, so sehr 
eine Ahndung des Verbrechens notig sei, eine Aus- 
beutung desselben zu politischen Zwecken nicht zu 
rechtfertigen ware. Osterreich wurde eindringlich zur 
Massigung aufgefordert. 

Als das Ultimatum erschien, waren alle Organe, mit 
Ausnahme des stets notleidenden und von den Oster- 
reichern anscheinend bezahlten "Standard" einig in der 
Verurteilung. Die ganze Welt, ausser in Berlin und 
Wien, begriff, dass es den Krieg, und zwar den Welt- 
krieg bedeutete. Die britische Flotte, welche zufallig 
zu einer Flottenschau versammelt war, wurde nicht 
demobilisiert. 

Ich drangte zunachst auf eine moglichst entgegen- 
kommende Antwort Serbiens, da die Haltung der 
russischen Regierung keinen Zweifel mehr an dem 
Ernst der Lage liess. 

Die serbische Antwort entsprach den britischen 
Bemuhungen, denn tatsachlich hatte Herr Paschitsch 
alles angenommen, bis auf zwei Punkte, iiber die er 
sich bereit erklarte zu unterhandeln. Wollten Russ- 

[104] 



as I knew that Sir Edward Grey's great influence in 
St. Petersburg could be utilized in favor of peace. I 
therefore availed myself of my friendly relations with 
the minister to request him in confidence to advise 
moderation in Russia, in case Austria, as seemed 
likely, should demand satisfaction from Serbia. 

At first the attitude of the English press was calm 
and friendly to the Austrians, because the murder 
was generally condemned. But gradually more and 
more voices were raised, insisting that, however much 
the crime merited punishment, its exploitation for 
political purposes could not be justified. Austria 
was earnestly exhorted to show moderation. 

When the ultimatum was published, all the papers, 
with the exception of the Standard, which was always 
in financial difficulties and was apparently paid by the 
Austrians, were unanimous in condemnation. The 
whole world, except in Berlin and Vienna, realized 
that it meant war, and what was more, world war. 
The British fleet, which by chance was assembled for 
a naval review, was not demobilized. 

I urged, in the first place, that as conciliatory a 
reply as was possible be obtained from Serbia, since 
the attitude of the Russian government left room for 
no further doubt as to the gravity of the situation. 

Serbia's answer was in accord with the British 
efforts; M. Pashitch in fact agreed to everything, 
except two points, about which he declared his 
willingness to negotiate. Had Russia and England 
wished for war, in order to fall upon us unawares, a 
hint to Belgrade would have been enough, and the 
unprecedented [Austrian] note would have been left 
unanswered. 

[105] 



land und England den Krieg, um uns zu iiberf alien, so 
genugte ein Wink nach Belgrad, und die unerhorte 
Note blieb unbeantwortet. 

Sir Ed. Grey ging die serbische Antwort mit mir 
durch und wies auf die entgegenkommende Haltung 
der Regierung in Belgrad. Wir berieten dann seinen 
Vermittlungsvorschlag, der eine beiden Teilen an- 
nehmbare Auslegung dieser beiden Punkte vereinbaren 
sollte. Unter seinem Vorsitz waren Herr Cambon, 
Marquis Imperiali 20 und ich zusammengetreten, und es 
ware leicht gewesen, eine annehmbare Form fur die 
strittigen Punkte zu finden, die im wesentlichen die 
Mitwirkung der k. u. k. Beamten bei den Untersu- 
chungen Belgrad betrafen. In einer oder zweiSitzungen 
war alles bei gutem Willen zu erledigen, und schon die 
blosse Annahme des britischen Vorschlages hatte eine 
Entspannung bewirkt und unsere Beziehungen zu 
England weiter verbessert. Ich befiirwortete ihn 
daher dringend, da sonst der Weltkrieg bevorstehe, bei 
dem wir alles zu verlieren und nichts zu gewinnen 
hatten. Umsonst! Es sei gegen die Wurde Oster- 
reichs, auch wollten wir uns in die serbische Sache 
nicht mischen, wir iiberliessen sie unserem Bundes- 
genossen. Ich solle auf „Lokalisierung des Kon- 
fliktes" hinwirken. 

Es hatte natiirlich nur eines Winkes von Berlin 
bedurft, um den Graf en Berchtold zu bestimmen, sich 
mit einem diplomatischen Erfolg zu begniigen und sich 
bei der serbischen Antwort zu beruhigen. Dieser Wink 
ist aber nicht ergangen. Im .Gegen teil, es wurde zum 
Kriege gedrangt . Es ware ein so schoner Erfolg gewesen . 

Nach unserer Ablehnung bat Sir Edward uns, mit 
einem Vorschlag hervorzutreten. Wir bestanden auf 

J0 B.-C: "Imperiali." 

[106] 



Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian .reply 
with me and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of 
the Belgrade government. Thereupon we discussed 
his proposal of mediation, which was to establish by 
agreement an interpretation of the two points which 
should be acceptable to both parties. M. Cambon, 
Marquis Imperiali and I were to meet under his 
presidency; and it would have been easy to find an 
acceptable formula for the points at issue, which in 
substance concerned the cooperation of Austrian 
officials in the investigations at Belgrade. Given 
good will, everything could have been settled at one 
or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the 
British proposal would have brought about a relaxa- 
tion of the tension and would have further improved 
our relations with England. I therefore strongly 
supported the proposal, because otherwise the World 
War was in sight, in which we would have everything 
to lose and nothing to gain. In vain! It was declared 
to be derogatory to the dignity of Austria; moreover 
we did not intend to interfere in the Serbian affair; 
we were leaving this to our ally. I was to work 
for the "localization of the conflict." 

It would of course have required only a hint from 
Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to content himself 
with a diplomatic success and quietly accept the 
Serbian answer. This hint, however, was not given. 
On the contrary, pressure was exercised in favor of 
war, It would have been so fine a success. 

After our refusal, Sir Edward Grey begged us to 
come forward with a proposal of our own. We 
insisted on war. I could not obtain any reply except 
that Austria was showing itself enormously "concili- 

[107] 



dem Kriege. Ich konnte keine andere Antwort 
erhalten, als dass es ein kolossales „Entgegenkommen" 
Osterreichs sei, keine Gebietserwerbungen zu beab- 
sichtigen. 

Sir Edward wies mit Recht darauf hin, dass man 
auch ohne Gebietserwerbung ein Land zum Vasallen 
erniedrigen kann, und dass Russland hierin eine 
Demiitigungerblicken undes daher nicht duldenwerde. 

Der Eindruck befestigte sich immer mehr, dass wir 
den Krieg unter alien Umstanden wollten. Anders war 
unsere Haltung in einer Frage, die uns doch direkt gar 
nichts anging, nicht zu verstehen. Die instandigen 
Bitten und bestimmten Erklarungen des Herrn Saso- 
now, spater die geradezu demiitigen Telegramme des 
Zaren, die wiederholten Vorschlage Sir Edwards, die 
Warnungen des Marquis San Giuliano und des Herrn 
Bollati, meine dringenden Ratschlage, alles niitzte 
nichts, in Berlin blieb man dabei, Serbien muss massa- 
kriert werden ! 

Je mehr ich drangte, um so weniger wollte man ein- 
lenken, schon weil ich nicht den Erfolg haben sollte, 
mit Sir Edward Grey den Frieden zu retten! 

Da entschloss sich letzterer am 29. zu der bekannten 
Warnung. Ich entgegnete, dass ich stets berichtet 
hatte, wir wiirden mit der englischen Gegnerschaft 
rechnen miissen, falls es zum Kriege mit Frankreich 
kame. Wiederholt sagte mir der Minister: "If war 
breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world 
has ever seen" (wenn ein Krieg ausbricht, gibt es die 
grosste Katastrophe, die die Welt je erlebt hat). 

Die Ereignisse iibersturzten sich bald darauf. Als 
endlich Graf Berchtold, der bis dahin auf Berliner 
Weisungen den starken Mann spielte, sich zum Ein- 
lenken entschloss, beantworteten wir die russische 

[108] 



atory" in that it aimed at no annexation of territory. 

Sir Edward rightly pointed out that, without annex- 
ation of territory, it was possible to reduce a country 
to vassalage, and that Russia would see in this a 
humiliation and therefore would not suffer it. 

The impression grew continually stronger that we 
desired war under any circumstances. In no other way 
was it possible to interpret our attitude on a question 
which, after all, did not directly concern us. The 
urgent requests and explicit declarations of M. Saz- 
onof, followed by the Czar's positively humble tele- 
grams; the repeated proposals of Sir Edward Grey; 
the warnings of Marquis di San Giuliano and of 
Signer Bollati; my own urgent counsels — all were 
of no avail. Berlin would not budge; Serbia must be 
massacred. 

The more I pressed, the less inclination there was 
to turn back, if only that I might not have, together 
with Sir Edward Grey, the credit of preserving 
peace. 

Then, on the 29th, Sir Edward decided to give his 
famous warning. 29 I replied that I had invariably 
reported that we should have to reckon with English 
opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeated- 
ly the minister said to me: "If war breaks out, it 
will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever 



seen." 



Soon after this events were precipitated. Until 
this time, following the directions he received from 
Berlin, Count Berchtold had played the part of the 
strong man. When at last he decided to change his 
course, and after Russia had negotiated and waited 

28 See Appendix, note xxi. 

[109] 



Mobilmachung, nachdem Russland eine ganze Woche 
vergeblich unterhandelt und gewartet hatte, mit dem 
Ultimatum und der Kriegserklarung. 

Englische Kriegserklarung 

Noch immer sann Sir Edward Grey nach neuen 
Auswegen. Am i. August vormittags kam Sir W. 
Tyrrell 21 zu mir, um zu sagen, sein Chef hoffe noch 
immer, einen Ausweg zu finden. Ob wir neutral 
bleiben wollten, falls Frankreich es auch tate? Ich 
verstand, dass wir dann bereit sein sollten, Frankreich 
zu schonen, er hatte abergemeint, dass wir tiberhaupt, 
also auch gegen Russland, neutral bleiben. Das war 
das bekannte Missverstandnis. Sir Edward hatte 
mich fur den Nachmittag bestellt. Da er sich gerade 
in einer Kabinettsitzung befand, rief er mich an das 
Telephon, nachdem Sir W.Tyrrell 21 gleich zu ihm geeilt 
war. Nachmittags aber sprach er nur mehr von der 
belgischen Neutralitat und von der Moglichkeit, dass 
wir und Frankreich uns bewaffnet gegeniiber standen, 
ohne uns anzugreifen. 

Es war also tiberhaupt kein Vorschlag, sondern eine 
Frage ohne Verbindlichkeit, da, wie ich fruher schon 
gemeldet, bald darauf unsere Besprechung stattfinden 
sollte. Die Nachrichtwurde aber in Berlin, ohne erst die 
Unterredung abzuwarten, zur Grundlage einer weitge- 
henden Aktion gemach t. Dann kam der Brief des Herrn 
Poincare, der Brief Bonar Laws, das Telegramm des 
Konigs Albert. Die Schwankenden wurden im Kabinett 
bis auf drei Mitglieder, die austraten, umgestimmt. 

Ich hatte bis zum letzten Augenblick auf eine ab- 
wartende Haltung Englands gehofft. Auch mein 
franzosischer Kollege ftihlte sich keineswegs sicher, 

21 B.-C: "Tyrell." 

[no] 



a whole week in vain, we answered the Russian 
mobilization with the ultimatum and the declaration 
of war. 

The English Declaration of War 

Even then Sir Edward Grey continued to search for 
new expedients. On the morning of August 1st, Sir 
William Tyrrell called on me, to tell me that his chief 
still hoped to find a way out. Would we remain 
neutral in case France did the same? I understood 
that we were to declare ourselves ready, in such case, 
to spare France ; but his meaning was that we should 
remain altogether neutral, that is, toward Russia 
also. That was the well-known misunderstanding. 
Sir Edward had an appointment with me for that 
afternoon. At the moment he was at a meeting of 
the Cabinet, and, Sir William Tyrrell having hurried 
to him at once, he called me up on the telephone. 
In the afternoon, he talked only about Belgian neutrali- 
ty and the possibility that we and France might face 
one another in arms without attacking. j 

There was accordingly no proposal at all, but a 
question that carried with it no binding engagement, 
since, as I have already stated, our interview was to 
take place soon afterwards. Berlin, however, without 
waiting for the interview, made the news the basis 
of far-reaching [diplomatic] activity. Then came M. 
Poincare's letter, Bonar Law's letter, King Albert's 
telegram. 30 The waverers in the Cabinet — excepting 
three members who resigned — were converted. 

Till the very last moment I had hoped for a waiting 
attitude on the part of England. My French col- 
league, too, as I learned from a private source, felt far 

30 See Appendix, notes xxii-xxiv. 

[Ill] 



wie ich aus privater Quelle erfuhr. Noch am I. 
August hatte der Konig dem Prasidenten ausweichend 
geantwortet. In dem Telegramm aus Berlin, das die 
drohende Kriegsgefahr ankundigte, war aber England 
schon als Gegner mitgenannt. Man rechnete also 
bereits in Berlin mit dem Kriege gegen England. 

Vor meiner Abreise empfing mich am 5. Sir Edward 
Grey in seiner Wohnung. Auf seinen Wunsch war ich 
hingegangen. Er war tief bewegt. Er sagte mir, er 
werde stets bereit sein, zu vermitteln: "We don't want 
to crush Germany" (Wir wollen Deutschland nicht 
zerschmettern). Diese vertrauliche Unterredung ist 
leider veroffentlicht worden. Damit hat Herr von 
Bethmann Hollweg die letzte Moglichkeit zerstort, 
tiber England den Frieden zu erlangen. 

Unsere Abreise vollzog sich durchaus wiirdig und 
ruhig. Vorher hatte der Konig seinen Equerry (Stall- 
meister) Sir E. Ponsonby zu mir gesandt, um sein 
Bedauern iiber meine Abreise auszusprechen und dass 
er mich nicht selbst sehen konnte. Prinzess Louise 
schrieb mir, die ganze Familie betrauere unseren 
Fortgang. Mrs. Asquith und andere Freunde kamen 
zum Abschied in die Botschaft. 

Ein Extrazug brachte uns nach Harwich. Dort 
war eine Ehrenkompagnie fur mich aufgestellt. Ich 
wurde wie ein abreisender Souveran behandelt. So 
endete meine Londoner Mission. Sie scheiterte nicht 
an den Tucken der Briten, sondern an den Tiicken 
unserer Politik. 

Auf dem Bahnhof in London hatte sich Graf Mens- 
dorff mit seinem Stabe eingefunden. Er war vergniigt 
und gab mir zu verstehen, dass er vielleicht dort 
bliebe, den Englandern aber sagte er, Osterreich habe 
den Krieg nicht gewollt, sondern wir. 

[112] 



from sure [that England would intervene]. As late as 
August 1st the King had given the President an 
evasive reply. 31 In the telegram from Berlin an- 
nouncing imminent danger of war, 32 England how- 
ever was already included in the list of adversaries. Berlin 
was therefore already reckoning on war with England. 

Before my departure, Sir Edward Grey received me, 
on the 5th, at his house. I had called at his request. 
He was deeply moved. He told me he would always 
be ready to mediate. "We don't want to crush Ger- 
many." Unfortunately this confidential interview was 
made public, and thus Herr von Bethmann Hollweg 
destroyed the last possibility of gaining peace through 
England. 

Our departure was put through in a thoroughly 
dignified, quiet way. The King had previously sent 
his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to express his regret 
that I was leaving and that he could not himself see 
me. Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole 
family was sorry that we were going away. Mrs. 
Asquith and other friends came to the embassy to 
take leave. 

A special train took us to Harwich. There a guard 
of honor was drawn up for me. I was treated like 
a departing sovereign. Such was the end of my 
London mission. It was wrecked, not by the wiles 
of the British, but by the wiles of our policy. 

Count Mensdorff had come with his staff to the 
station in London. He was cheerful, and gave me 
to understand that perhaps he would remain there. 
He told the English that we, and not Austria, had 
desired the war. 

31 See Appendix, note xxii. 

32 July 31st. See German White Book, No. 25. 

[113] 



Ruckblick 

Wenn ich jetzt nach zwei Jahren mir alles riickwarts 
schauend vergegenwartige, so sage ich mir, dass ich zu 
spat erkannte, dass kein Platz fur mich war in einem 
System, das seit Jahren nur von Tradition und Routine 
lebte und das nur Vertreter duldet, die so berichten, 
wie man es lesen will. Vorurteilslosigkeit und unab- 
hangiges Urteil werden bekampft, Unfahigkeit und 
Charakterlosigkeit gepriesen und geschatzt. Erfolge 
aber erregen Missgunst und Beunruhigung. 

Ich hatte den Widerstand gegen die wahnsinnige 
Dreibund politik aufgegeben, da ich einsah, dass es 
zwecklos war, und dass man meine Warnungen als 
Austrophobie (Feindschaft gegen Osterreich), als fixe 
Idee hinstellte. In der Politik, die nicht Akrobaten- 
tum oder Aktensport ist, sondern das Geschaft der 
Firma, gibt es keine Philie oder Phobie (Freundschaft 
oder Feindschaft), sondern nur das Interesse des 
Gemeinwesens. Eine Politik aber, die sich bloss auf 
Osterreicher, Madjaren und Tiirken stutzt, muss in 
Gegensatz zu Russland geraten und schliesslich zur 
Katastrophe fiihren. 

Trotz friiherer Irrungen war im Juli 1914 noch alles 
zu machen. Die Verstandigung mit England war 
erreicht. Wir mussten einen wenigstens das Durch- 
schnittsmass politischer Befahigung erreichenden Ver- 
treter nach Petersburg senden und Russland die 
Gewissheit geben, dass wir weder die Meerengen 
beherrschen, noch die Serben erdrosseln wollten. 
"Ldchez VAutriche et nous lacherons les Frangais" (lasst 
Osterreich fallen, und wir werden die Franzosen fallen 
lassen), sagte uns Herr Sasonow. Und Mr. Cambon 
sagte Herrn von Jagow: "Vous n'avez pas besoin de 

[114] 



Retrospect 

When now, after two years, I review the whole 
course of events, I tell myself that I realized too 
late that there was no place for me in a system that 
for years has lived on traditions and routine alone, 
and that tolerates no representatives save those who 
report what [their superiors] wish to read. Absence 
of prejudice and an independent judgment arouse 
hostility; incapacity and want of character are 
praised and esteemed; successes, on the other hand, 
beget disfavor and awaken disquietude. 

I had given up my opposition to the insane Triple 
Alliance policy, because I realized that it was useless 
and that my warnings were attributed to an incurable 
Austrophobia. In politics, which are neither acro- 
batics nor a game played with documents, but the 
business of the firm, there is no "philia" or "phobia," 
but only the interest of the community. A policy, 
however, which leans only on Austrians, Magyars, 
and Turks, must come into conflict with Russia and 
finally lead to a catastrophe. 

In spite of former mistakes, all might still have 
been put right in July, 1914. An understanding with 
England had been attained. We ought to have 
sent to St. Petersburg a representative who was at 
least of average political capacity, and to have con- 
vinced Russia that we wished neither to control the 
Straits nor to strangle Serbia. "Ldchez VAutriche 
et nous lacherons les Francais" ("Drop Austria and we 
will drop the French") M. Sazonof said to us. And 
M. Cambon told Herr von Jagow, "Vous riavez pas 
besoin de suivre VAutriche partout" ("You need not 
follow Austria everywhere") . 

[115] 



suivre VAutriche partout" (Ihr braucht mit Osterreich 
nicht alles mitzumachen) . 

Weder Biindnisse noch Kriege, sondern nur Vertrage 
brauchten wir, die uns und andere schutzten und einen 
wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung sicherten, der in der 
Geschichte ohne Vorgang war. War Russland aber im 
Westen entlastet, so konnte es sich wieder nach Osten 
wenden, und der anglo-russische Gegensatz trat als- 
dann automatisch und ohne unsere Mitwirkung her- 
vor, nicht minder aber der russisch-japanische. 

Wir konnten auch der Frage der Rustungsbeschran- 
kung naher tretenhund brauchten uns um osterrei- 
chische Wirrnisse nicht mehr zu kummern. Osterreich- 
Ungarn war dann der Vasall des Deutschen Reiches 
und ohne Btindnis und namentlich ohne Liebesdienste, 
die schliesslich zum Kriege fuhrten fur die Befreiung 
Polens und die Vernichtung Serbiens, obwohl die 
deutschen Interessen gerade das Gegenteil heischten. 

Ich hatte in London eine Politik zu unterstiitzen, 
deren Irrlehre ich erkannte. Das hat sich an mir 
geracht, denn es war eine Siinde wider den heiligen 
Geist. 

Ankunft 

In Berlin angekommen, sah ich sofort, dass ich zum 
Siindenbock fur die Katastrophe gemacht werden 
sollte, die unsere Regierung im Gegensatz zu meinen 
Ratschlagen und Warnungen verschuldet hatte. 

Von amtlicher Seite wurde geflissentlich verbreitet, 
ich hatte mich durch Sir Ed. Grey tauschen lassen, 
denn wenn er den Krieg nicht gewollt, wiirde Russland 
nicht mobilisiert haben. Graf Pourtales, auf dessen 
Berichterstattung man sich verlassen konnte, sollte 
geschont werden, schon wegen seiner Verwandtschaft. 

[116] 



We needed neither alliances nor wars; we needed 
only treaties protecting us and others and affording 
security to an economic progress that was without 
precedent in history. If Russia had been freed from 
pressure in the West, it could again have turned to 
the East, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry would then 
have reappeared automatically and without our help, 
and not less certainly also the Russo-Japanese rivalry. 

We could also have considered the question of 
the limitation of armaments, and we need no longer 
have troubled ourselves about Austrian complications. 
Austria would then have been the vassal of the German 
Empire, and this without an alliance and, what is 
most important, without the gratuitous services which 
finally led us into war — a war for the liberation of 
Poland and the annihilation of Serbia, although Ger- 
man interests demanded the exact opposite. 

I had to support in London a policy, the heresy 
of which I recognized. For this I have been justly 
punished, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost. 



My Arrival 

As soon as I arrived in Berlin, I saw that I was to 
be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe which our 
government had brought upon itself against my coun- 
sels and warnings. 

A report, proceeding from official sources, was indus- 
triously circulated, that I had allowed myself to be 
deceived by Sir Edward Grey, since if he had not 
desired war Russia would not have mobilized. Count 
Pourtales, whose reports could be relied on, was to 
be protected, not least on account of his family 

[117] 



Er habe sich „grossartig" benommen, er wurde be- 
geistert gelobt, ich um so scharfer getadelt. 

„Was geht denn Serbien Russland an?" sagte mir 
dieser Staatsmann nach achtjahriger Amtszeit in 
Petersburg. Die ganze Sache sollte eine britische 
Tiicke sein, die ich nicht gemerkt. Im Amte erklarte 
man mir auch, im Jahre 1916 ware es doch zum Kriege 
gekommen, dann ware Russland „fertig", daher sei es 
besser jetzt. 

Schuldfrage 

Wir haben, wie aus alien amtlichen Veroffentli- 
chungen hervorgeht und auch durch unser Weissbuch 
nicht widerlegt wird, das durch seine Diirftigkeit und 
Liickenhaftigkeit eine schwere Selbstanklage darstellt, 

1. den Grafen Berchtold ermutigt, Serbien anzu- 
greifen, obwohl kein deutsches Interesse vorlag und 
die Gefahr eines Weltkrieges uns bekannt sein musste 
— ob wir den Wortlaut des Ultimatums gekannt, ist 
vdllig gleichgiiltig; 

2. in den Tagen zwischen dem 23. und 30. Juli 1914, 
als Herr Sasonow mit Nachdruck erklarte, einen 
Angriff auf Serbien nicht dulden zu konnen, die 
britischen Vermittlungsvorschlage abgelehnt, obwohl 
Serbien unter russischem und britischem Drucke 
nahezu das ganze Ultimatum angenommen hatte und 
obwohl eine Einigung iiber die beiden fraglichen 
Punkte leicht zu erreichen und Graf Berchtold sogar 
bereit war, sich mit der serbischen Antwort zu 
begniigen ; 

3. am 30. Juli, als Graf Berchtold einlenken wollte 
und ohne dass Osterreich angegriffen war, auf die 
blosse Mobilmachung Russlands hin ein Ultimatum 

[118] 



connections. He had conducted himself "magnifi- 
cently," he was praised enthusiastically, and I was 
blamed the more severely. 

"What does Serbia matter to Russia?" this states- 
man said to me, after eight years' service at St. 
Petersburg. The whole affair was declared to be a 
British trick that I had not noticed. At the Foreign 
Office I was told that war would in any case have 
come in 191 6. Then Russia would have been ready; 
therefore it was better now. 

The Question of Responsibility 

■ It is shown by all official publications and is not 
disproved by our White Book, which, owing to the 
poverty of its contents and to its omissions, constitutes 
a grave indictment against ourselves, that: 

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Ser- 
bia, although no German interest was involved and 
the danger of a World War must have been known to 
us. Whether we were acquainted with the wording of 
the ultimatum is completely immaterial. 

2. During the period between the 23d and the 30th 
of July, 1914, when M. Sazonof emphatically declared 
that he could not tolerate an attack on Serbia, 
we rejected the British proposals of mediation, al- 
though Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, 
had accepted almost the whole of the ultimatum, 
and although an agreement about the two points at 
issue could easily have been reached and Count Berch- 
told was even prepared to content himself with the 
Serbian reply. 

3. On the 30th of July, when Count Berchtold 
showed a disposition to change his course, we sent 
an ultimatum to St. Petersburg merely because of 

[119] 



nach Petersburg geschickt und am 31. Juli den Russen 
den Krieg erklart, obwohl der Zar sein Wort ver- 
pfandete, solange noch unterhandelt wird, keinen Mann 
marschieren zu lassen, also die Moglichkeit einer 
friedlichen Beilegung geflissentlich vernichtet, 

Es ist nicht zu verwundern, wenn angesichts dieser 
unbestreitbaren Tatsachen ausserhalb Deutschlands 
die gesamte Kulturwelt uns die alleinige Schuld am 
Weltkriege beimisst. 



Feindlicher Standpunkt 

Ist es nicht begreiflich, dass unsere Feinde erklaren, 
nicht eher ruhen zu wollen, bis ein System vernichtet 
ist, das eine dauernde Bedrohung unserer Nachbarn 
bildet? Miissen sie nicht sonst befiirchten, in einigen 
Jahren wieder zu den Waffen greifen zu miissen und 
wieder ihre Provinzen iiberrannt und ihre Stadte und 
Dorfer vernichtet zu sehen? Haben diejenigen nicht 
recht behalten, die weissagten, dass der Geist Treit- 
schkes und Bernhardis das deutsche Volk beherrschte, 
der den Krieg als Selbstzweck verherrlicht und nicht 
als Ubel verabscheut, dass bei uns noch der feudale 
Ritter und Junker, die Kriegerkaste regiere und Ideale 
und Werte gestalte, nicht aber der biirgerliche Gen- 
tleman, dass die Liebe zur Mensur, die die akade- 
mische Jugend beseelt, auch denen erhalten bleibt, die 
die Geschicke des Volkes lei ten? Hatten nicht die 
Ereignisse in Zabern und die parlamentarischen Ver- 
handlungen des Falles dem Ausland gezeigt, wie 
staatsbiirgerliche Rechte und Freiheiten bei uns 
bewertet werden, wenn militarische Machtfragen 
en tgegenstehen ? 

[120] 



the Russian mobilization and though Austria had 
not been attacked ; and on the 31st of July we declared 
war against the Russians, although the Czar pledged 
his word that he would not permit a single man to 
march as long as negotiations were still going on. 33 
Thus we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a 
peaceful settlement. 

In view of these incontestable facts, it is no wonder 
that the whole civilized world outside of Germany 
places the sole responsibility for the World War upon 
our shoulders. 

The Enemy Point of View 

Is it not comprehensible that our enemies declare 
that they will not rest until a system which constitutes 
a permanent menace to our neighbors is destroyed? 
Must they not otherwise fear that within a few years 
they will again be obliged to take up arms and again 
see their provinces overrun and their cities and villages 
destroyed? Have not those proved to be right who 
divined that the German people was dominated by 
the spirit of Treitschke and of Bernhardi, which 
glorifies war as an end in itself and does not loathe 
it as an evil; that with us the feudal knight and 
Junker, the warrior caste, still rules and shapes ideals 
and values, and not the civilian gentleman; that the 
love of the duel which animates our academic youth 
still persists in those who guide the destinies of the 
nation? Did not the occurrences in Zabern and the 
parliamentary discussion of this matter show to for- 
eign countries the value we place on the rights and 

33 See Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 537; also German 
White Book, p. 16. 

[121] 



In die Worte Euphorions kleidete der geistvolle, 
seither verstorbene Historiker Cramb, ein Bewunderer 
Deutschlands, die deutsche Auffassung: 

„Trdumt Ihr den Friedenstag? 22 

Traume wer traumen mag, 

Krieg ist das Losungswort! 

Sieg, und so klingt es fort." 
Der Militarismus, eigentlich eine Schule des Volkes 
und ein Instrument der Politik, macht die Politik zum 
Instrument der Militarmacht, wenn der patriarcha- 
lische Absolutismus des Soldatenkonigtums eine 
Haltung ermoglicht, die eine militarisch-junkerlichen 
Einfliissen entriickte Demokratie nicht zulassen wlirde. 
So denken unsere Feinde, und so miissen sie denken, 
wenn sie sehen, dass trotz kapitalistischer Industriali- 
sierung und trotz sozialistischer Organisierung die 
Lebenden, wie Friedrich Nietzsche sagt, noch von den 
To ten regiert werden. Das vornehmste feindliche 
Kriegsziel, die Demokratisierung Deutschlands, wird 
sich verwirklichen ! — 



Bismarck 

Bismarck, gleich Napoleon, liebte den Kampf als 
Selbstzweck. Als Staatsmann vermied er neue Kriege, 
deren Sinnlosigkeit er erkannte. Er begniigte sich mit 
unblutigen Schlachten. Nachdem er in rascher Folge 
Christian, Franz Joseph und Napoleon besiegt, kamen 
Arnim, Pius und Augusta an die Reihe. Das geniigte 
ihm nicht. Gortschakow hatte ihn wiederholt gear- 
gert, der sich fur grosser hielt. Er wurde bis hart an 
den Krieg bekampft, sogar durch Entziehung des 
Salonwagens. So entstand der traurige Dreibund. 

»B.-C: "Krieg." 

1 122] 



liberties of the citizen, if questions of military power 
stand in the way? 

The keen-witted historian Cramb, who has since 
died, an admirer of Germany, clothed the German 
conception in the words of Euphorion : 

Dream ye of peaceful day ? 

Dream on while dream ye may! 

War is the signal cry; 

Hark! shouts of victory! u 
Militarism, which is properly a school for the nation 
and an instrument of policy, turns policy into the 
instrument of military power, if the patriarchal abso- 
lutism of a soldier-kingship makes possible an attitude 
which a democracy, placed beyond .the control of 
militarist-Junker influences, would not permit. 

So think our enemies; and so they must think if 
they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialization 
and in spite of socialistic organization, the living, as 
Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still ruled by the dead. 
The highest war aim of our enemies, the democratiza- 
tion of Germany, will be realized! 

Bismarck 

Bismarck, like Napoleon, loved conflict for itself. 
As a statesman he avoided fresh wars, the folly of 
which he recognized. He contented himself with 
bloodless battles. After he had vanquished, in rapid 
succession, Christian, Francis Joseph, and Napoleon 
III, it was the turn of Arnim, Pius and Augusta. 
That did not suffice him. Gortschakof, who thought 
himself the greater, had repeatedly annoyed him. 
The conflict was carried almost to the point of war. 
It was carried even to the point of depriving Gort- 

84 Anna Swanwicks' translation. 

[I23l 



Zum Schluss folgte der Kampf gegen Wilhelm, in 
dem der Gewaltige unterlag, wie Napoleon gegen 
Alexander. 

Politische Ehen auf Tod und Leben geraten nur im 
staatsrechtlichen, nicht im volkerrechtlichen Ver- 
bande. Sie sind urn so bedenklicher mit einem 
briichigen Genossen. So war das Biindnis von Bis- 
marck auch niemals gemeint. 

Die Englander aber hat er stets schonend behandelt ; 
er wusste, dass es so kliiger war. Die alte Viktoria 
wurde von ihm besonders ausgezeichnet, trotz des 
Hasses gegen die Tochter und gegen politische 
Englanderei, der gelehrte Beaconsfield und der welter- 
fahrene Salisbury umworben, und auch der sonderliche 
Gladstone, den er nicht mochte, hatte sich eigentlich 
nicht zu beklagen. 

Das Ultimatum an Serbien war die Kronung der 
Politik des Berliner Kongresses, der bosnischen Krise, 
der Londoner Konferenz; doch noch war die Zeit zur 
Umkehr. 

Was vor allem zu vermeiden war, der Bruch mit 
Russland und mit England, das haben wir gliicklich 
erreicht. 



Unsere Zukunjt 

Heute nach zweijahrigem Kampfe kann es nicht 
mehr zweifelhaft sein, dass wir auf einen bedingungs- 
losen Sieg uber Russen, Englander, Franzosen, 
Italiener, Rumanen und Amerikaner nicht hoffen 
diirfen, mit dem Niederringen unserer Feinde nicht 
rechnen konnen. Zu einem Kompromissfrieden ge- 
langen wir aber nur auf Grundlage der Raumung der 

[124] 



schakof of his special railway carriage. Thus arose 
the lamentable Triple Alliance. At last came the 
conflict with William, in which the mighty one was 
vanquished, as the first Napoleon was vanquished 
in the conflict with Alexander. 

Political marriages "until death do us part" are 
successful only when the union is constitutional, not 
when it is international. They are all the more ques- 
tionable when the partner is tottering on the verge 
of the grave. Bismarck never intended that the alli- 
ance with Austria should be such a marriage. 

The English, however, he always handled carefully; 
he knew that this was wiser. He always paid marked 
respect to the old Victoria, despite his hatred of her 
daughter and of political anglomania. He courted 
the learned Beaconsfield and the worldly-wise Salis- 
bury; and even that strange Gladstone, whom he 
did not like, had no real ground for complaint. 

The ultimatum to Serbia was the culminating point 
of the policy of the Berlin Congress, of the Bosnian 
crisis 35 and of the London Conference : but there was 
yet time to turn back. 

What above all we should have avoided, the breach 
with Russia and with England, we have successfully 
attained. 

Our Future 

Today, after two years of fighting, it can no longer 
be doubted that we cannot hope for an unconditional 
victory over the Russians, English, French, Italians, 
Rumanians, and Americans, nor count on' being able 
to wear our enemies down. A peace by compromise, 
however, we can obtain only on the basis of an evacua- 

35 See Appendix, notes iii and iv. 

[125I 



besetzten Gebiete, deren Besitz fur uns iiberdies eine 
Last und Schwache und die Gefahr neuer Kriege 
bedeutet. Daher sollte alles vermieden werden, was 
denjenigen feindlichen Gruppen, die fiir den Kom- 
promissgedanken vielleicht noch zu gewinnen waren, 
den britischen Radikalen und den russischen Reak- 
tionaren, ein Einlenken erschwert. Schon von diesem 
Gesichtspunkte aus ist das polnische Projekt ebenso 
zu verwerfen, wie jeder Eingriff in belgische Rechte 
oder die Hinrichtung britischer Burger, vom wahn- 
witzigen U-Boot-Plane gar nicht zu reden. 

Unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem Wasser. Rich tig, also 
nicht in Polen und Belgien, in Frankreich und Serbien. 
Das ist die Riickkehr zum heiligen Romischen Reich, 
zu den Irrungen der Hohenstaufen und Habsburger. 
Es ist dies die Politik der Plantagenets, nicht die der 
Drake und Raleigh, Nelson und Rhodes. Dreibund- 
politik ist Riickkehr zur Vergangenheit, Abkehr von 
der Zukunft, dem Imperialismus, der Weltpolitik. 
Mitteleuropa ist Mittelalter, Berlin-Bagdad eine 
Sackgasse, nicht der Weg ins Freie, zu unbegrenzten 
Moglichkeiten, zur Weltmission des deutschen Volkes. 

Ich bin kein Gegner Osterreichs oder Ungarns oder 
Italiens undSerbiens oderirgendeines anderen Staates, 
sondern nur ein Gegner der Dreibundpolitik, die uns 
von unseren Zielen ablenken und auf die schiefe Ebene 
der Kontinentalpolitik bringen musste. Sie war nicht 
deutsche, sondern k. u. k. Hauspolitik. Die Oster- 
reicher hatten sich daran gewohnt, das Biindnis als 
einen Schirm zu betrachten, unter dessen Schutz sie 
nach Belieben Ausfliige in den Orient machen konnten. 

Und welches Ergebnis des Volkerringens haben wir 
zu gewartigen? Die Vereinigten Staaten von Afrika 
werden britisch sein, wie die von Amerika, Australien 

[126] 



tion of the occupied territories. For this there is the 
more reason, in that their possession constitutes for us 
a burden and a cause of weakness and involves the risk 
of further wars. Therefore everything should be 
avoided that impedes a change of attitude on the part 
of those enemy groups which may perhaps still be won 
over to the idea of a peace by compromise, namely, the 
British radicals and the Russian reactionaries. Simply 
from this point of view the Polish scheme is as objec- 
tionable as is any interference with Belgian rights, or 
the execution of British civilians, to say nothing of the 
insane submarine plan. 

"Our future lies on the water." 36 Quite right; there- 
fore it does not lie in Poland and Belgium, in France 
and Serbia. This is a reversion to the Holy Roman 
Empire, to the mistakes of the Hohenstaufen and the 
Hapsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, 
not that of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. 
The policy of the Triple Alliance turns back to 
the past; it turns away from the future, from im- 
perialism, from a world-policy. "Middle Europe" is 
of the middle ages; Berlin-Bagdad is a blind alley 
and not the way into the open, to unlimited possi- 
bilities, to the universal mission of the German nation. 

I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or 
Serbia, or of any other state; I am an enemy only of 
the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert 
us from our aims and bring us on the downward slope 
of a continental policy. It was not a German policy, 
but an imperial and royal [Hapsburg] house policy. 
The Austrians had accustomed themselves to regard 
the alliance as a screen, under cover of which they could 
make excursions into the East whenever they pleased. 

86 Emperor William II, Speech of June 18, 1901. 

[127] 



und Ozeanien. Und die lateinischen Staaten Europas 
werden, wie ich schon vor Jahren sagte, in dasselbe 
Verhaltnis zu dem Vereinigten Konigreich geraten, 
wie die lateinischen Schwestern Amerikas zu den 
Vereinigten Staaten. Der Angelsachse wird sie 
beherrschen. Das durch den Krieg erschopfte Frank- 
reich wird sich nur noch enger an Grossbritannien 
anschliessen. Auf die Dauer wird auch Spanien nicht 
widerstehen. 

Und in Asien wird der Russe und der Japaner 
sich ausbreiten mit seinen Grenzen und Sitten, und 
der Siiden wird den Briten bleiben. 

Die Welt wird den Angelsachsen, Russen und 
Japanern gehoren und der Deutsche allein bleiben mit 
Osterreich und Ungarn. Seine Machtherrschaft wird 
die des Gedankens und des Handels sein, nicht aber 
die der Bureaukraten und Soldaten. Es war zu spat 
erschienen, und die letzte Moglichkeit, das Ver- 
saumte nachzuholen, ein Kolonialreich zu griinden, 
hat der Weltkrieg vernichtet. 

Denn wir werden die Sonne Jahwes 23 nicht ver- 
drangen, das Programm des grossen Rhodes wird sich 
erfiillen, der in der Ausbreitung des Britentums, im 
britischen Imperialismus das Heil der Menschheit 
erblickte. 

Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento. 
Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque importer e morem, 
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos. 

(Du sollst die Volker im Romerreiche regieren. 
Deine Kunst wird sein, Friedenssitten zu erzwingen, 
die Unterworfenen zu schonen und die Hochmutigen 
des Krieges zu entwohnen.) 

23B.-C: "Ichwes." 

[128] 



And to what outcome of the struggle of nations have 
we to look forward? The United States of Africa 
will be British, like those of America, Australia, and 
Oceania. And the Latin states of Europe, as I pre- 
dicted years ago, will come into the same relation to 
the United Kingdom as their Latin sisters in America 
to the United States. The Anglo-Saxon will dominate 
them. France, exhausted by the war, will attach 
herself all the more closely to Great Britain. Nor will 
Spain maintain, in the long run, an attitude of 
resistance. 

In Asia, the Russians and the Japanese will extend 
their frontiers and diffuse their customs, while the 
south will remain in the hands of the British. 

The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons, the 
Russians and the Japanese, and the German will be 
left alone with Austria and Hungary. His dominion 
will be that of thought and trade, not that of the 
bureaucrat and the soldier. He made his appearance 
too late; and his last chance of making up what he 
had missed, of founding a colonial empire, has been 
destroyed by the World War. 

For we shall not supplant the sons of Jehovah. 
The future will realize the program of the great 
Rhodes, who saw the salvation of humanity in the 
expansion of British influence, in British imperial- 
ism. 

Roman, be mindful to rule the people with orderly 

power. 
These shall be thine arts: enforcing peace as a 

custom, 
Warring the arrogant down, and sparing those 

who have yielded. 

[129] 



Remarks on the article of Prince Lichnowsky 

"MY LONDON MISSION" 

By Gottlieb Von Jagow 

Former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
[From the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, March 23, igi8\ 

Translation by Munroe Smith * 

So far as it is possible, in general, I shall refrain from 
going into the statements that relate to the policy 
followed before my administration of the Foreign 
Office. 

I should like to make the following remarks about 
particular points in the article: 

When I was appointed secretary of state, in Jan- 
uary, 191 3, I regarded a German-English rapproche- 
ment as desirable, and I also believed an agreement 
attainable on the points where our interests touched 
or crossed each other. At all events, I wished to 
try to work in this sense. A principal point for" us 
was the Mesopotamia-Asia Minor question — the so- 
called Bagdad policy — as this had become for us a 
question of prestige. If England intended to force 
us out there, it certainly appeared to me that a con- 
flict could hardly be avoided. In Berlin I began, 
as soon as it was possible to do so, to negotiate 
concerning the Bagdad Railroad. We found a favor- 

* The editor wishes to acknowledge the courtesy of The New 
York Times in permitting the translation which appeared in the 
June, 1918, issue of Current History, to be used in part as a basis for 
Professor Munroe Smith's translation. 

[ 130] 



able disposition on the part of the English government, 
and the result was the agreement that was almost 
complete when the World War broke out. 

At the same time the negotiations over the Portu- 
guese colonies that had been begun by Count Metter- 
nich, continued by Baron Marschall, and reopened by 
Prince Lichnowsky, were under way. Further nego- 
tiations regarding other — for example, East Asiatic — 
problems I meant to start later, when what was in 
my opinion the most important question, that of the 
Bagdad Railroad, should be settled, and an atmos- 
phere of more confidence thus created. I also left 
the naval question aside, as it would have been 
difficult to reach an early agreement over that matter, 
after past experiences. 

I can pass over the development of the Albanian 
question, as it occurred before my term of office began. 
In general, however, I would like to remark that such 
far-reaching disinterestedness in Balkan questions as 
Prince Lichnowsky advocates does not seem possible 
to me. It would have contradicted the essential 
character of the alliance if we had completely ignored 
really vital interests of our ally. We, too, had 
demanded that Austria should second us at Algeciras, 
and at that time Italy's attitude had caused serious 
resentment among us. Russia, too, although she 
had no interest whatever in Morocco, stood by 
France. Finally, it was our task, as the third member 
of the alliance, to support such measures as would 
render possible an adjustment of the divergent in- 
terests of our allies and avoid a conflict between them. 

It further appeared impossible to me not to pursue 
a "Triple Alliance policy" in matters where the interests 
of the allied powers touched each other. Had no 

1 131] 



such policy been pursued, Italy would have been 
driven entirely into line with the Entente in Oriental 
questions, Austria would have been handed over to 
the mercy of Russia, and the Triple Alliance would 
thus have really gone to pieces. And we, too, would 
have been unable, in the absence of any support, to 
safeguard our interests in the Orient. Even Prince 
Lichnowsky does not deny that we had there great 
economic interests to represent. But today economic 
interests are no longer to be separated from political 
interests. 

That St. Petersburg desired "the independence of 
the Sultan" is an assertion that Prince Lichnowsky 
will hardly be able to prove; it would contradict 
every tradition of Russian policy. If we, furthermore, 
had not had at our command the influence at Con- 
stantinople established by Baron Marschall, it would 
hardly have been possible for us to defend our eco- 
nomic interests in Turkey in the desired way. 

When Prince Lichnowsky further asserts that it 
was first through "our Triple Alliance and Eastern 
policy that Russia, our natural friend and best neigh- 
bor, was driven into the arms of France and England," 
he is in conflict with the historical facts. It was 
because Prince Gortschakof was guiding Russian policy 
toward a rapprochement with a France lusting for 
revenge that Prince Bismarck was first induced to enter 
into the alliance with Austria-Hungary; through the 
alliance with Rumania he barred the advance of 
Russia toward the south. Prince Lichnowsky con- 
demns the basic principles of Bismarck's policy. Our 
attempts to draw closer to Russia went to pieces — 
Bjorki proves it — or remained ineffective, like the so- 
called Potsdam agreement. Moreover, Russia was 

1 132] 



not always our "best neighbor." Under the Empress 
Elizabeth, as at present, Russia strove for possession 
of East Prussia to extend its Baltic coasts and to 
secure for itself the domination of the Baltic Sea. 
The St. Petersburg "window" has gradually widened, 
so as to take in Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and 
Finland and has stretched over toward Aland. Poland 
was arranged as a field in which to concentrate 
troops against us. Pan-Slavism, which was dominat- 
ing the Russian policy to an ever greater degree, had 
positive anti-German tendencies. 

Nor did we divert Russia "from the policy of Asiatic 
expansion," but only tried to check its encroach- 
ments in European policy and its encirclement of 
our Austro-Hungarian ally. 

Just as little as Sir Edward Grey did we wish war 
to come over Albania. Therefore, in spite of our 
unhappy experiences at Algeciras, we agreed to a 
conference. The credit of an "attitude of mediation" 
at the conference should not be denied Sir Edward 
Grey; but that he "by no means placed himself on 
the side of his Entente associates" is, after all, rather 
an overstatement. Certainly he often advised yield- 
ing in St. Petersburg (as we did in Vienna) and found 
"formulas of agreement," but in dealing with the other 
side he represented the Entente, because, like us, 
he neither would nor could abandon his associates. 
That we, on the other hand, "uniformly defended the 
point of view which was prescribed to us by Vienna" 
is absolutely incorrect. We, like England, played a 
mediatory r61e, and in Vienna also we advised yielding 
and moderation far more than Prince Lichnowsky 
appears, or pretends, to be aware. And then Vienna 
made far-reaching concessions in several instances 

Ii33l 



(Dibra, Djakowa). If Prince Lichnowsky, who always 
wished to be cleverer than the Foreign Office, and who 
clearly allowed himself to be strongly impressed by 
the representatives of the Entente, did not know 
this, he ought now, at any rate, to refrain from making 
false assertions! If, to be sure, the degree of yielding 
that was necessary was obtained in Vienna, then of 
course we had to represent the Austrian standpoint 
at the conference. Ambassador Szogj^enyi himself was 
not one of the extremists; in Vienna they were by no 
means always satisfied with his attitude. That the 
ambassador, with whom I was negotiating almost 
every day, constantly sounded the refrain of the 
casus foederis is entirely unknown to me. It certainly 
is true that in Vienna Prince Lichnowsky had been 
regarded, at an earlier period than this, as no friend 
of Austria. Nevertheless, complaints about him came 
oftener to my ears on the part of Marquis di San 
Giuliano than on the part of Count Berchtold. 

King Nikita's seizure of Skutari constituted a 
mockery of the entire conference and a snub to all 
the powers taking part in it. 

Russia was by no means "obliged to give way to us 
all along the line;" on the contrary, it obtained 
"satisfaction of the Serbian desires" in several matters ; 
to such an extent, indeed, that some towns and strips 
of territory that could have been regarded as purely 
or mainly Albanian were allotted to Serbia. Prince 
Lichnowsky says that "the outcome of the conference 
was a fresh humiliation of Russian national sentiment" 
and that "dissatisfaction" prevailed in Russia on 
that account. It cannot be the task of our policy 
to secure, at the cost of our ally, satisfaction of all 
the unjustified demands of the exaggerated national 

[134] 



sentiment of a Power by no means friendly to us. 
Russia has no vital interests on the Adriatic, but our 
allies certainly had. If we, as Prince Lichnowsky 
seems to wish, had completely adopted the Russian 
point of view, the result would have been a humilia- 
tion for Austria-Hungary and thus a weakening of our 
group. It seems to be Prince Lichnowsky's constant 
and sole anxiety that Russia be not humiliated; a 
humiliation of Austria is obviously a matter of in- 
difference to him. 

When Prince Lichnowsky says that our "Austro- 
phil attitude" was not adapted "to direct Russia's 
attention to its Asiatic interests," it is not quite clear 
to me what this means. After a disastrous diversion 
towards East Asia — in the Japanese war we had 
favored Russia without ever being thanked for it! — 
Russia again took up its policy aimed directly toward 
the European Orient (the Balkans and Constantinople), 
and this with increased energy (the Balkan Alliance, 
Buchlau, Iswolsky, etc.). 

Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the "ribbon of 
the order of the Red Eagle," evidently knew how to 
throw a little sand into the eyes of our ambassador. 
He, in contrast to King Constantine and Theototy, 
was always pro-Entente. His present attitude shows 
most clearly this tendency on his part. Herr Danef, 
however, was entirely inclined toward St. Peters- 
burg. 

That Count Berchtold displayed certain leanings 
toward Bulgaria even in its differences with Ru- 
mania is true; but that we "of course went with him" 
is entirely false. With our support, King Charles 
[of Rumania] had the satisfaction of the Bucharest 
Peace. If then, in the case of the Bucharest Peace, 

[135] 



in which we favored the wishes and interests of our 
Rumanian ally, our policy deviated somewhat from 
that of Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet cer- 
tainly did not believe — as Prince Lichnowsky asserts — 
that it "could reckon on our support as a matter of 
course" in securing a revision of this treaty. That 
Marquis di San Giuliano, by his warning, "saved us 
from being involved in a world war in the summer of 
19 1 3," because at that time "the idea of a campaign 
against Serbia was entertained in Vienna," is entirely 
unknown to me. Just as little do I know that Herr 
von Tchirschky — who, it is true, was naturally, rather 
inclined to pessimism — is said to have declared in 
the spring of 1914 that there soon would be war. 
Of the "important occurrences" that Prince Lich- 
nowsky here suspects I was accordingly just as 
ignorant as he was himself! Such events as the 
English visit to Paris — Sir Edward Grey's first to 
the Continent — surely must have been known to the 
ambassador, and we informed him about the secret 
Anglo-Russian naval agreement; to be sure, he was 
unwilling to believe it! 

In the matter of Liman von Sanders, we made an 
important concession to Russia by renouncing the 
general's power of command over Constantinople. 
I am willing to admit that this point in the agreement 
regarding the military mission was politically not op- 
portune. 

When Prince Lichnowsky boasts of having suc- 
ceeded in giving the colonial treaty a form corre- 
sponding to our wishes, this credit is not to be denied 
him. Strong pressure was necessary, however, on 
several occasions to induce him to represent some of 
our desires with more emphasis. 

[136] 



When Prince Lichnowsky says that he received 
authorization definitely to conclude the colonial 
treaty, after previously asserting that the treaty 
"perished," his story contains a contradiction which 
we may leave to the Prince to explain. Lichnowsky's 
assertion, however, that we delayed publication be- 
cause the treaty would have been for him "a public 
success" that we begrudged him, is an unheard-of 
insinuation that can be explained only through his 
egocentric view of things. The treaty would have 
missed its practical and moral effect — one of its main 
objects was to create a good atmosphere between us 
and England — if its publication had been greeted 
with violent attacks upon "perfidious Albion" in our 
Anglophobe press and in our Parliament. For such 
attacks, in view of our internal situation at that time, 
the simultaneous publication of [the colonial and] 
the so-called Windsor Treaty would undoubtedly have 
furnished occasion. And the howl about English 
perfidy that the internal contradiction between the 
text of the Windsor Treaty and our treaty would 
doubtless have evoked could hardly have been so 
met as to satisfy our public opinion through the 
assurance of English bona fides. With justified pre- 
caution, we intended to allow the publication to be 
made only at a suitable moment, when the danger of 
hostile criticism was no longer so acute, if possible 
simultaneously with the announcement of the Bag- 
dad Treaty, which also was on the point of being 
concluded. The fact that two great agreements had 
been established between us and England would have 
materially helped to gain for them a favorable recep- 
tion and would have made it easier to overlook the 
aesthetic defects of the Portuguese convention. It 

[137] 



was consideration for the effect of the agreement, 
through which we wished to obtain an improvement 
in our relations with England — not to stir up more 
trouble — that caused our hesitation. 

It is true that account was also taken — although 
in a secondary degree — of the efforts just then being 
made to acquire economic interests in the Portu- 
guese colonies, which would naturally have been 
harder to obtain if the terms of the convention had 
been announced. These conditions Prince Lichnow- 
sky may not have been able to perceive fully from 
London, but he should have had confidence in our 
judgment as regarded matters of fact and should 
have acquiesced in it, instead of replacing his 
lack of understanding with aspersions and insinua- 
tions of personal motives. Particularly in dealing 
with English statesmen, he would surely have found 
that our arguments were understood by the English 
statesmen themselves. 

The ambassador's speeches gave much offense in 
this country. For the creation of a better atmosphere, 
in which alone the rapprochement we were seeking 
could flourish, it was necessary that confidence in 
our English policy and in our London representative 
should be widely established in our own public 
opinion. Prince Lichnowsky, otherwise so susceptible 
to public opinion, did not take this factor sufficiently 
into account, for he saw everything only through his 
London spectacles. His. charges against the attitude 
of the Foreign Office are too untenable to need dis- 
cussion. I think it desirable, however, to state that 
Prince Lichnowsky was not left in ignorance regard- 
ing the "most important things," in so far as they were 
pertinent to his mission. On the contrary, I gave 

[138] 



the ambassadors generally much fuller information 
than they had usually received under previous ad- 
ministrations. My own experiences as ambassador 
induced me to do so. But with Lichnowsky there 
was the inclination to rely more upon his own impres- 
sions and conclusions than upon the communica- 
tions and instructions of the Central Office. To 
disclose the sources of our information, indeed, I had 
not always either occasion or authority. Here there 
were quite definite considerations, particularly anxiety 
not to compromise our sources. The Prince's memo- 
randum furnishes the best justification for the caution 
exercised in this regard. 

It is not true that in the Foreign Office the reports 
that England would protect France under all circum- 
stances were not believed. 

At Konopischt, on the occasion of the visit of His 
Majesty the Emperor to the Archduke, heir to the 
[Austrian] throne, no plan of an active policy against 
Serbia was laid down. Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
was not at all the advocate of a policy leading to 
war for which he has often been taken. During 
the London conference he advised moderation and 
the avoidance of war. 

Prince Lichnowsky's "optimism" was hardly justi- 
fied, as he has probably since convinced himself 
through the revelations of the Sukhomlinof trial. 
Besides, the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement 
(of which, as has been said before, he was informed) 
should have made him more skeptical. The mistrust 
voiced by the imperial chancellor and the under 
secretary of state was, unfortunately, well grounded. 
How does this agree with the assertion that we, 
replying upon the reports of Count Pourtales that 

1 139] 



"Russia would not move under any circumstances," 
had not considered the possibility of a war? Further- 
more, so far as I can recollect, Count Pourtales 
never made any such report. 

That Austria-Hungary wished to intervene against 
the repeated provocations fomented by Russia (Herr 
von Hartwig), which reached their climax in the 
Serajevo assault, we had to recognize as justified. 
In spite of all former compromises and adjustments 
of threatened conflicts, Russia did not abandon her 
policy, which aimed at the complete exclusion of the 
Austrian influence (and naturally of ours also) from 
the Balkans. The Russian agents inspired by St. 
Petersburg, continued their incitement. It was a 
question of the prestige and the existence of the Dan- 
ube monarchy. It must either submit to the Russo- 
Serbian machinations, or command a quos ego, even 
at the risk of war. We could not leave our ally in 
the lurch. Had it been intended to exclude altogether 
the ultima ratio of war, the alliance should not have 
been concluded. Besides, it was plain that the Russian 
military preparations (for instance, the extension of rail- 
roads and reconstruction of forts in Poland) , for which 
a France lusting for revenge had lent the money and 
which would have been completed in a few years, were 
directed principally against us. But despite all this, 
despite the fact that the aggressive tendency of the 
Russian policy was becoming constantly more evident, 
the idea of a preventive war was far removed from 
us. We did not decide to declare war on Russia 
until we had to face the Russian mobilization and 
to defend ourselves against a Russian invasion. 

I have not at hand the letters exchanged with the 
Prince — it was a matter of private letters. Lich- 

[140] 



nowsky pleaded for an abandonment of Austria. I 
replied, so far as I remember, that we, aside from our 
treaty obligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the 
uncertain friendship of England. If we abandoned 
our only trustworthy ally, we should stand later 
entirely isolated, face to face with the Entente. It 
is probable that I also wrote that "Russia was becom- 
ing more and more anti-German" and that we must 
"just risk it." Furthermore, it is possible that in order 
to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a little and to prevent 
him from exposing his views in London also, I wrote 
that there would probably be some "blustering," 
and that "the more firmly we stood by Austria the 
more certainly would Russia give way." I have 
said already that our policy was not based upon 
alleged reports excluding war. At that time, it is 
true, I still thought war could be avoided, but, like 
all of us, I was fully aware of the very serious danger. 
We could not agree to the English proposal of a 
conference of ambassadors, for it would undoubtedly 
have led to a serious diplomatic defeat. For Italy, too, 
was Serbophil and, with its Balkan interests, stood 
rather opposed to Austria. The "intimacy of the 
relations between Italy and Russia" is admitted by 
Prince Lichnowsky himself. The best and only feasible 
way of escape was a localization of the conflict and 
an understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg. 
We worked toward that end with all our energy. That 
we "insisted upon" the war is an unheard-of assertion, 
which is sufficiently invalidated by the telegrams of 
His Majesty the Emperor to the Czar and to King 
George, published in the White Books — Prince Lich- 
nowsky chooses to speak only of "the Czar's positively 
humble telegram" — as well as by the instructions 

[ 141 1 



we sent to Vienna. The worst distortion of facts is 
contained in the following sentence: 

"When Count Berchtold at last decided to change 
his course, and after Russia had negotiated and waited 
a whole week in vain, we answered the Russian 
mobilization with the ultimatum and the declaration 
of war." 

Should we, perhaps, have waited until the mobi- 
lized Russian army was streaming over our borders? 
The reading of the Sukhomlinof trial has probably- 
given even Prince Lichnowsky a feeling of "0 si 
tacuisses!" On July 5th, I was absent from Berlin. 
The statement that I was "soon afterwards in Vienna 
to talk everything over with Count Berchtold" is 
false. I returned to Berlin on July 6th, from my 
wedding journey, and I did not stir from there until 
August 15th, on the occasion of the shifting of the 
Great Headquarters. As secretary of state I was 
only once in Vienna before the war, in the spring of 

I9I3- 

Prince Lichnowsky slides over the matter of the 
confusing dispatch that he sent us on August 1st — 
I have not the exact wording at hand — as a "misunder- 
standing" and even seems to intend to reproach us 
because "without waiting for the interview," we "made 
the news the basis for far-reaching activity." The 
question of war with England was a matter of minutes, 
and immediately after the arrival of the dispatch it 
was decided to make an eleventh-hour attempt to 
avert the war with France and England. His Majesty 
sent the well-known telegram to King George. The 
content of the Lichnowsky dispatch could not have 
been understood in any other way than we under- 
stood it. 

[142 J 



In matters of fact, Prince Lichnowsky's narrative 
presents such an abundance of inaccuracies and dis- 
tortions that it is scarcely surprising that his con- 
clusions are also entirely wrong. A really grotesque 
effect is produced when he reproaches us for sending 
an ultimatum to St. Petersburg on July 30th, merely 
because of the mobilization of Russia, and for de- 
claring war upon the Russians, on July 31st, although 
the Czar had pledged his word that not a man should 
march so long as negotiations were under way, thus 
willfully destroying the possibility of a peaceful ad- 
justment. At the close, his point of view seems to 
become almost identical with that of our enemies. 

When the ambassador makes the accusation that 
our policy identified itself "with Turks and Austro- 
Magyars" and subordinated itself to the "viewpoints 
of Vienna and Budapest," he may be suitably an- 
swered by saying that he saw things only through 
London spectacles and exclusively from the point of 
view of his desired rapprochement with England & 
tout prix. He also appears to have forgotten com- 
pletely that the Entente was formed much more 
against us than against Austria. 

I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at an under- 
standing with England, because I was of the opinion 
that this was the only way for us to escape from the 
unfavorable position in which we were placed by the 
unequal division of strength and the weakness of the 
Triple Alliance. But Russia and France pressed 
towards war. We were under obligations resulting 
from our treaty with Austria, and we too were menaced 
in our position as a Great Power — hie Rhodus, hie 
salta. But England, that was not tied up in the same 
way with Russia and that had received far-reaching 

[143] 



assurances from us regarding the sparing of France 
and of Belgium, seized the sword. 

In saying this, I by no means accept the view- 
that is widely held among us today, that England 
laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on 
the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of 
peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an under- 
standing with us. But he had allowed himself to 
become entangled too far in the net of the Franco- 
Russian policy; he no longer found the way out, and 
he did not prevent the World War — a thing that he 
could have done. Neither was the war popular with 
the English people; Belgium had to serve as battle 
field.* 

"Political marriages until death do us part" are, as 
Prince Lichnowsky says, not possible in international 
unions. But neither is isolation, under the present 
condition of affairs in Europe. The history of Europe 
consists of coalitions, which sometimes have led to the 
avoidance of warlike outbreaks and sometimes to vio- 
lent clashes. A loosening and dissolving of old alli- 
ances that no longer answer all conditions is only in 
order when new constellations are attainable. This 
was the object of the policy of a rapprochement with 
England. So long as this policy did not offer reliable 
guarantees we could not sacrifice the old guarantees — 
even with their obligations. 

The Morocco policy had led to a political defeat. 
In the Bosnian crisis this had been luckily avoided, 
as was the case also at the London Conference. A 
fresh diminution of our prestige was not endurable 
for our position in Europe and in the world. The 

* "Schlachtfeld." This may possibly be a misprint for Schlachtruf 
(battle-cry). 

[144] 



prosperity of states, their political and economic suc- 
cesses, are based upon the prestige that they enjoy 
in the world. 

The personal attacks contained in the article, the 
unheard-of aspersions and slanders of others, condemn 
themselves. The evei -recurring suspicion that every- 
thing happened only because it was not desired to 
allow him, Lichnowsky, any successes speaks of 
wounded self-love, of disappointed hopes for personal 
successes, and has a painful effect. 

In closing, let me recall the memorandum of 
Prince Bismarck, which Hermann Oncken also has 
quoted in his work, The Old and The New Middle 
Europe — the memorandum which was written in the 
year 1879, and in which the idea is developed that 
the German Empire can never permit a situation to 
arise in which it would remain isolated on the Euro- 
pean Continent between Russia and France, side by 
side with a defeated Austria-Hungary that Germany 
had left in the lurch. 



[145 J 



APPENDIX TO PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S 
MEMORANDUM 

Personal and Historical Notes 

By Munroe Smith and Henry F. Munro 

I 

The Berlin Foreign Office 

During Prince Lichnowsky's term of service in the 
Foreign Office (i 899-1 904), Count (later Prince) von 
Biilow was chancellor, Baron von Richthofen was 
foreign secretary, and Herr von Miihlberg was under- 
secretary. The foreign secretary was director of the 
section of politics and personnel, in which Lichnowsky 
was employed, and it is he, presumably, who is de- 
scribed as laboring under insane delusions. The senior 
counselor in the same section was Herr von Holstein. 
His long service, which began in 1879, and the fact 
that he represented the traditions of the Bismarckian 
period naturally gave him a certain authority. His 
retirement from office, in April, 1906, was ascribed to 
"differences" with Prince von Biilow. It gave rise to 
much comment, since he had been regarded, in many 
circles, as the virtual director of German foreign policy 
since 1890. [Schultess, Europdischer Geschichtskalen- 
der, 1906, p. 97, citing Zukunft, July, 1906, and Preus- 
sische Jahrbiicher, vol. 1 25, 3.] 

In 1 9 12, when Lichnowsky was sent to London, 
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was chancellor, Herr von 
Kiderlen-Wachter was foreign secretary, and Herr von 
Stumm was director of the political section. Von 

[146] 



Stumm had previously been connected with the 
German embassies in London, Washington, Paris, 
Vienna, St. Petersburg and Madrid, and then, a 
second time, with the London embassy. It is he, 
apparently, who is described by Lichnowsky as en- 
deavoring to play the r61e of Herr von Holstein. 

In January, 191 3, Herr von Jagow was appointed 
foreign secretary. 

II 

Austro- Prussian and Austro-German Relations 

The long struggle between the Hapsburgs and the 
Hohenzollerns for a controlling influence in German 
affairs was brought to an end by the Prussian victory 
of Sadowa in 1866. Germany was reorganized under a 
Prussian hegemony. 

In the 1 8th century, Count (later Prince) Kaunitz 
(1711-1794) was one of Prussia's most dangerous 
enemies. In retaliation for the conquest of a large 
part of Silesia by Frederick the Great, Kaunitz suc- 
ceeded in forming an Austrian-French alliance against 
Prussia, to which Russia became a party. In the Seven 
Years' War which followed (1 756-1 763) Prussia was 
brought to the verge of destruction. It was saved 
only by Russia's abandonment of the Austrian cause. 

After the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire of 
the German nation in 1804 and the reconstruction of 
Germany as a confederation in 1 814, Austria remained 
the dominant power in Germany. On account of the 
large proportion of non-German elements in the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, many Germans began to 
desire a closer union of the rest of Germany under 
Prussian leadership. These were called "Little Ger- 
mans" (Kleindeutsche) . A more numerous party advo- 

[147] 



cated the retention of all Germans within a single 
federal union. These were the "Great Germans" 
(Grossdeutsche) . Inasmuch as neither of the two 
leading states could be expected to submit to a supe- 
rior authority exercised by the other, it was clear that 
any such wider union must remain decentralized. 
"Great German" and "particularist" thus became prac- 
tically interchangeable terms. The looser union 
recommended itself to most of the smaller states of 
Germany, as preserving their independence. In order 
that these states might be more effectively protected 
against both Austria and Prussia, a closer union 
among them and the organization of Germany as a 
"triad" found many advocates. The "old Bavarian" 
policy, to which Prince Lichnowsky alludes, aimed 
at the establishment of such a union of the smaller 
states under the leadership of Bavaria. 

The question of a greater or smaller Germany be- 
came one of the chief issues in the revolutionary 
Frankfort Parliament of 1848. The refusal of Aus- 
tria to come into the new German Empire with its 
German territories only, Hungary and the Slav pro- 
vinces remaining outside, gave the Little Germans the 
victory; and the imperial crown was offered to King 
Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia. He rejected the 
offer; but his ministers took steps for a narrower 
union of North Germany through the cooperation of 
the kings of Prussia, Saxony and Hanover. This 
plan was not really welcome either to Saxony or to 
Hanover, and was bitterly resisted by Austria. A 
conflict was averted by a complete Prussian surrender 
at Olmutz, in 1850, and the old confederation, as it 
had existed since 18 14, was reestablished. 

In this period the Austrian policy was directed by 

[148] 



Prince Felix Schwarzenberg (i 800-1 852). It was 
under his leadership that Austria forced Prussia to 
submit at Olmiitz. His program was, first to humiliate 
Prussia, then to destroy it — "avilir puis demolir." 

Count Moritz Esterhazy (1 807-1 890) was a mem- 
ber of the Austrian ministry from 186 1 to 1866. He 
was of the clerical party and was bitterly hostile to 
Prussia. He is said to have been one of the strongest 
advocates of war with Prussia. 

By the victory of Prussia in 1866, Austria was ex- 
cluded from the new Germany. It was, of course, not 
reconciled to the new order of things, and its con- 
tinued hostility to Prussia is shown in the selection of 
Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust (1 809-1 886) as Austro- 
Hungarian minister of foreign affairs. From 1867- 
187 1 he held the post of Austrian premier. He had 
been minister of foreign affairs in Saxony since 1849 
and Saxon prime minister since 1853, and had been a 
persistent opponent of Prussia. After 1866 he was, 
of course, impossible as a Saxon minister. From 1866 
to 1870 there were negotiations between France and 
Austria for an alliance against Prussia, but these came 
to nothing. At the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian 
war, von Beust found it inadvisable to take sides with 
France in a war which was regarded, even in South 
Germany, as a national German war. Before the end 
of 1870 he established fairly friendly relations between 
Austria and Prussia. 

Baron (later Count) Aloys von Ahrenthal (1854- 
1912), whom Lichnowsky describes as more inde- 
pendent in his attitude than his immediate predeces- 
sors, was Austro-Hungarian foreign minister from 1907 
to his death in February, 1912. In this office he was 
succeeded by Count Berchtold. 

1 149] 



Ill 

The Berlin Congress {1878) 

The war of 1 877-1 878 between Russia and Turkey 
was terminated by the treaty of San Stefano. The 
provisions of this treaty were unsatisfactory to other 
Great Powers, notably to Great Britain and to Aus- 
tria, and Russia agreed that the arrangements made at 
San Stefano should be revised by a European Con- 
gress. This met at Berlin, in July, under the presi- 
dency of Prince Bismarck, who declared that his role 
was that of an "honest broker." The Congress re- 
stored to Turkey much of the territory ceded at San 
Stefano and changed the status and limits assigned to 
the Christian Balkan states. In giving to Austria 
the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, the Congress, as we now know, simply put 
into execution a secret agreement made between Rus- 
sia and Austria at Reichstadt before the outbreak of 
the war — an agreement by which Russia secured Aus- 
trian neutrality in that war (Bismarck, speech in the 
Reichstag, February 6, 1888; see also Hofmann, 
Fiirst Bismarck, vol. ii, p. 5). This concession to 
Austria, however, as well as other provisions of the 
Berlin Treaty, aroused resentment in Russia, and this 
resentment was directed largely against Germany. 
In return for the friendly neutrality of Russia in the 
Franco-Prussian war of 1 870-1 871, the Russians had 
expected that Germany would support their interests 
in the Near East. Bismarck subsequently claimed 
that he had given them all possible support, that he 
had acted almost as "the fourth Russian plenipoten- 
tiary" in the Congress; but the Russians held him 
largely responsible for their diplomatic defeat. Rela- 

[150] 



tions between the two countries became so strained 
that, much against the wishes of Emperor William I, 
who regarded friendship with Russia as the first of 
German political interests, Bismarck formed, in 1879, 
a defensive alliance with Austria. 

IV 

German-Russian Relations (1884-1908) 

The relations between Germany and Russia, 
strained by the revision of the Peace of San Stefano 
at the Congress of Berlin, were greatly improved in 
1884, when Bismarck negotiated a treaty by which 
Germany and Russia each agreed to remain neutral 
in case the other should be attacked by a third Power. 
This is generally known as the "reinsurance treaty"; 
because by the treaty of 1879 with Austria Germany 
was assured of Austrian support in case it should be 
attacked by Russia, and by this new treaty it was 
assured of Russian neutrality in case it should be 
attacked by France. This treaty was renewed in 1887 ; 
but in 1890, when Bismarck was removed from office, 
his successor, General von Caprivi, declined to renew 
it, because he found the relations of Germany to Aus- 
tria and to Russia "too complicated." The real reason, 
apparently, why it was not renewed was because 
William II wished to be free to support Austria against 
Russia in the Near East, even if it should be found 
advisable that Austria should attack Russia. The 
existence of this German-Russian treaty from 1884 
to 1890 was first made known to the general public 
by Bismarck, after his retirement from office, in an 
article published in the Hamburger Nachrichten, Octo- 
ber 24, 1896. 

1 151] 



It was Bismarck's desire to lessen the chance of war 
between Austria and Russia by inducing them to 
recognize that each had its special sphere of influence 
in the Balkans, Austria in the West, Russia in the 
East. Bulgaria, accordingly, was in the Russian 
sphere of influence. 

Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria, suc- 
ceeded in 1885 in uniting East Rumelia with Bulgaria, 
thus establishing for his principality the boundaries 
which Russia had sought to give it in the Peace of 
San Stefano. Attacked by Serbia, "to maintain the 
balance of power in the Balkans," the Bulgarian army, 
under Prince Alexander's leadership, was completely 
victorious. Serbia was protected against loss of terri- 
tory only by the diplomatic intervention of Austria. 
Prince Alexander, however, had accomplished all these 
results without the consent of Russia. He had shown 
himself independent of Russian influence; and in 
August, 1886, Russian agents stirred up a revolution, 
kidnapped the Prince, and carried him out of the 
country. Reinstated by a counter-revolution, he re- 
signed his throne, in order, as he said, to save Bulgaria 
from occupation by Russian troops. 

In Germany there was general sympathy with 
Alexander, as a German prince. Great admiration was 
aroused by his achievements, and extreme indignation 
was felt on account of the treatment he had received 
at the hands of Russia. Bismarck, however, sup- 
ported Russia, insisting that Germany had no inter- 
ests in the Balkans. 

After Bismarck's retirement from office, Germany 
not only supported Austrian interests in the Balkans, 
but also sought to acquire a dominant influence in 
Constantinople. This was regarded in Russia as an 

[152] 



invasion of its special sphere of influence, justifying 
a counter-invasion of the Austrian sphere. When, 
in 1908, Austria converted its occupation and adminis- 
tration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a formal 
annexation of these provinces, the protest of the Serbs 
was supported by Russia. The German Emperor, 
however, "took his stand in shining armor at the side 
of his ally," and Russia, weakened by its recent con- 
flict with Japan, was forced to acquiesce. 

V 

The Krilger Telegram (i8q6) 

One of the aspirations of Germany has been the 
creation of a great colonial empire in Africa. To that 
end she began, in the nineties, to cultivate intimate 
relations with President Kriiger of the Transvaal, in 
the hope of controlling and, possibly, of ultimately 
absorbing the Boer republic. German support of 
Kriiger, it was clearly realized, would make trouble for 
Great Britain, between which and the Transvaal 
there were serious controversies over suzerainty and 
over the political grievances of the Uitlanders. Early 
in 1895 President Kriiger stated, at a celebration in 
honor of the Kaiser's birthday, that "the time had 
arrived for the establishment of the closest friendly 
relations between the Transvaal and Germany." 

On December 29, 1895, in response to an invitation 
from the Uitlanders, Dr. Jameson, with 400 or 500 
troopers of the British South African Company, 
crossed the Transvaal frontier and marched towards 
Johannesburg. The Reform Committee (Uitlanders) 
failed to cooperate, and Jameson was forced to sur- 
render. The situation, already serious, was intensified 

1 153] 



by the action of the Kaiser, who, on January 3, 1896, 
after consultation with his chancellor and other minis- 
ters, sent the following telegram to President Kruger: 

I express to you my sincere congratulations that, without 
appealing to the help of friendly powers, you and your people 
have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed 
bands which had broken into your country and in maintaining 
the independence of your country against foreign aggression. 

In Great Britain this telegram caused profound in- 
dignation. It was felt to be directed against Great 
Britain, and it was regarded as a deliberate attempt to 
challenge the British position in South Africa. The 
incident marked the beginning of, and in large part 
contributed to, that settled antagonism between 
Great Britain and Germany which is being fought out 
in the present war. By holding out specious hopes to 
President Kruger, it helped to bring on the South 
African War and the defeat of the Boers. In this 
instance, as in others, Germany, as Lichnowsky points 
out, "backed the wrong horse." 

The English journalist, Mr. Valentine Chirol, has 
recently given the substance of a conversation which 
he, as correspondent of the London Times, had with 
Baron Marschall at the German Foreign Office con- 
cerning the Kruger telegram. See the London Times 
of May 14, 1918. 

VI 

The British- French Colonial Agreements (i8q8-iqo4) 

The chief cause of friction between France and 
Great Britain during the later decades of the 19th cen- 
tury had been their colliding interests in Egypt, which 
Britain occupied in 1882. When in 1898 the control 
of the upper Nile was wrested from the Mahdi by the 

1 154] 



British-Egyptian forces under Kitchener, a conflict 
arose over the French occupation of Fashoda. This 
was adjusted March 21, 1899, by a joint declaration, 
supplementing an earlier convention, which had been 
signed June 14, 1898. The convention of 1898 de- 
limited French and British possessions and spheres of 
influence east and west of the Niger; the supplemen- 
tary agreement of 1 899 drew a boundary between the 
British Egyptian Soudan and the French possessions 
and spheres of influence in Central Africa. 

A general settlement of all outstanding differences 
between the two countries was attained by a conven- 
tion and two declarations signed at London, April 8, 
1904. In this general settlement, France recognized 
the existing British control of Egypt, and Great 
Britain recognized that France was entitled to a domi- 
nant interest in Morocco (see note vii, below). France 
undertook to come to an understanding with Spain 
regarding their respective interests on the Moorish 
coast, and a treaty embodying such an understanding 
was concluded in the same year (1904). The British- 
French agreement contained five secret articles; and, 
although it was officially announced in October, 1904, 
that Spain had accepted the British-French arrange- 
ments and had itself signed a convention with France, 
this convention was not published. The only reason, 
apparently, why these further arrangements were 
kept secret was that the contingency that the Sultan 
of Morocco might "cease to exercise authority" was 
envisaged, in which event there was to be a division 
of his realm between France and Spain. 

On the west coast of Africa minor cessions of terri- 
tory were made to France by Great Britain, and in 
Central Africa the line drawn in 1898 was modified 

1 155] 



to the advantage of the French. British objections 
to the tariff introduced by France in Madagascar 
were withdrawn. 

In Siam the British and French spheres of influence 
were delimited. 

Privileges in the Newfoundland fishing industry 
secured to France by the Treaty of Utrecht were re- 
linquished, French citizens engaged in that industry 
being indemnified by Great Britain. The respective 
rights of British and French fishermen in the New- 
foundland waters were accurately defined. 

All the British-French conventions above summar- 
ized were published in British and Foreign State Papers. 
The Egypt-Morocco convention of 1904 was repub- 
lished in 191 1, with the secret articles, as number 24 
of the Treaty Series. According to Bertrand Russell 
{Justice in War Time, 1916, page 144) the French- 
Spanish Morocco treaty was published in Le Matin 
(Paris), in November, 191 1. 

VII 

The Moroccan Question {1Q05-IQ06) 

Morocco, at the beginning of the present century, 
was one of the few desirable fields still open for 
colonial enterprise on the part of the Powers. In 
consequence, it was for a decade or so one of the storm 
centers of European diplomacy. By reason of geo- 
graphical proximity (in Algeria) France had a special 
interest in suppressing the chronic disorder in Mo- 
rocco, particularly on the Algerian border. This 
French interest was recognized by Great Britain in 
the following article of the convention of April 8, 
1904: 

[156 J 



His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recog- 
nize that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power 
whose dominions are coterminous for a great distance with 
those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to 
provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, eco- 
nomic, financial and military reforms which it may require. 

Apparently this was satisfactory to Germany; 
for on April 2, 1904, von Billow, the German chan- 
cellor, stated in the Reichstag that "from the point 
of view of German interests we have nothing to 
complain of." 

But Germany was not satisfied, because the con- 
vention indicated that England and France were 
ready to compose their quarrels, which had long been 
a source of diplomatic profit to Germany. Nothing 
was done, however, until the defeat of Russia in the 
battle of Mukden revealed the weakness of France's 
ally. Suddenly, on March 31, 1905, the German 
Emperor appeared at Tangier, Morocco, and pro- 
ceeded to pay a visit to the Sultan, Abdul-Aziz, in 
the course of which he spoke as follows: 

It is to the Sultan in his position of an independent sovereign 
that I am paying my visit today. I hope that under the 
Sovereignty of the Sultan a free Morocco will remain open to 
the peaceful rivalry of all nations, without monopoly or an- 
nexation, on the basis of absolute equality. The object of 
my visit to Tangier is to make it known that I am determined 
to do all that is in my power to safeguard efficaciously the in- 
terests of Germany in Morocco, for I look upon the Sultan as 
an absolutely independent sovereign. 

This demonstrative intervention created a diplo- 
matic crisis in Europe and was generally regarded as 
a challenge to the recently formed Entente. The 
demand of Germany that France bring the Moroccan 

[157] 



question before an international conference was ac- 
cepted, in spite of the opposition of M. Delcasse, the 
French foreign minister, who was thus virtually com- 
pelled to resign at German dictation. 

The Conference met at Algeciras, in Spain, in Janu- 
ary, 1906. The participants were the twelve Powers 
(including the United States) who were parties to the 
Convention of Madrid of 1880, and Morocco. The 
outcome was a diplomatic defeat for Germany, which 
was supported by Austria-Hungary alone, even Italy, 
the ally of Germany, ranging itself on the side of 
France. The Act of Algeciras provided for the settle- 
ment of the Moroccan question upon "the triple 
principle of the sovereignty and independence of 
His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, 
and economic liberty without any inequality." How- 
ever, while accepting in theory the German demand 
for internationalization of control, the Act accorded 
to France and Spain a privileged position with respect 
to financial and police measures in Morocco. 

VIII 

Agadir (iqii) 

Germany's last card in Moroccan diplomacy was 
played in 191 1. On July 1 of that year the German 
gunboat Panther appeared at Agadir, on the southern 
coast of Morocco, ostensibly to protect German in- 
terests, but in reality to test the strength of the Triple 
Entente. This action of Germany was the more 
surprising because, by the treaty of February, 1909, 
it had recognized the paramount position of France in 
Morocco. For some time Germany ignored the re- 
peated requests of Great Britain for explanation as to 

1 158] 



German intentions, but the positive intimation by 
Lloyd George, in his speech at the Mansion House, 
July 21, that Great Britain intended to back up 
France, led Germany to compromise, by withdrawing 
completely from Morocco in consideration of terri- 
torial concessions by France in West Africa (Franco- 
German treaty of November 4, 191 1). With this 
adjustment the Moroccan question disappeared from 
European diplomacy. 

IX 

The British-Russian Convention {igoy) 

On August 31, 1907, a convention was signed by 
Great Britain and Russia, similar in its nature to that 
concluded by Great Britain and France in 1904. The 
purpose of the British-Russian agreement was to 
settle all outstanding differences between the two 
Powers with respect to their interests in Asia. It 
comprises three separate arrangements, as follows: 

1. The two parties mutually engage to respect the integrity 
and independence of Persia; but, having regard to each 
other's special geographical or economic interests, they agree 
to recognize certain spheres of influence in that country: a 
Russian sphere in the north and a British sphere in the south, 
with Central Persia not directly included in either. 

2. Afghanistan is recognized as lying outside of Russian 
influence. All Russian relations with Afghanistan are to be 
carried on through the British government, which declares 
that it has no intention of changing the political status of 
Afghanistan. The principle of equality of commercial oppor- 
tunity in Afghanistan is maintained. 

3. Thibet is recognized as under the suzerainty of China. 
All negotiations with Thibet are to be conducted through the 

[159] 



Chinese government. Its territorial integrity is to be re- 
spected; neither party is to send representatives to Lhassa; 
and no concessions or other rights in Thibet are to be sought 
or obtained. 

X 

The Grey-Cambon Correspondence \1912) 

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London 

Foreign Office, November 22, 19 12 
My dear Ambassador: 

From time to time in recent years the French and British 
naval and military experts have consulted together. It has 
always been understood that such consultation does not 
restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any 
future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. 
We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and 
ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits 
either Government to action in a contingency that has not 
arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, 
of the French and British fleets respectively at the present 
moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government 
had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third 
Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in 
that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to 
expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something 
that threatened the general peace, it should immediately dis- 
cuss with the other whether both Governments should act 
together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if 
so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. 
If these measures involved action, the plans of the General 
Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the 
Governments would then decide what effect should be given 
to them. 

[160] 



M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey 

French Embassy, London 

November 23, 1912 
Dear Sir Edward: 

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd No- 
vember, that during the last few years the military and naval 
authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with 
each other from time to time; that it had always been under- 
stood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty 
of either Government to decide in the future whether they 
should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, 
on either side, these consultations between experts were not 
and should not be considered as engagements binding our 
Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, 
however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the 
two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked 
attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential 
to know whether it could count on the armed support of the 
other. 

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to 
state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having 
grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third 
Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that 
Government would immediately examine with the other the 
question whether both Governments should act together in 
order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. 
If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the mea- 
sures which they would be prepared to take in common; if 
those measures involved action, the two Governments would 
take into immediate consideration the plans of their General 
Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to 
those plans. 

[British Diplomatic Correspondence, relating to the outbreak 
of the War, No. 105, enclosures 1 and 2.] 



[161] 



XI 

The First Balkan War (1912-IQ13) 

In 1912 Turkey was at war with Italy over Tripoli. 
In addition, Albania was in revolt, Crete was clamor- 
ing for annexation to Greece, and Macedonia, for 
years in a state of anarchy, became the scene of fright- 
ful massacres of Bulgarians and Serbians at the hands 
of the Mohammedan Turks. All this at a time when 
German influence was paramount at Constantinople. 
Early in the year, the Balkan states achieved what 
had been deemed impossible — a league against the 
common enemy. This was brought about by a series 
of treaties between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and 
Montenegro, supplemented by military conventions, 
all of which contemplated not only relief for the sub- 
ject Christian populations of Turkey but also the 
extension of territory at Turkey's expense. 

In spite of efforts by the Great Powers to preserve 
peace, the Balkan League mobilized in the early 
autumn of 19 12. Montenegro declared war against 
Turkey on October 8, and its allies issued similar 
declarations ten days later. Then followed a remark- 
able series of campaigns, in which the Balkan Allies 
were uniformly successful. By the first of December, 
Adrianople was invested; Macedonia and, in part, 
Albania were occupied; Serbia had reached the 
Adriatic; Greeks and Bulgarians were at Saloniki, 
and the Montenegrins were laying siege to SkutarL 
An armistice was signed on December 3, and a peace 
conference between Turkey and the Allies was opened 
at London on December 16. 

By this time, however, the Balkan War had raised 
several questions affecting the general peace of Europe 

1 162 ] 



and necessitating action on the part of the European 
Powers to prevent a general war. Consequently, par- 
allel with the peace conference, an ambassadorial 
conference sat in London under the presidency of Sir 
Edward Grey for the purpose of advising the belligerent 
parties and of taking necessary decisions on matters 
of European concern. The demand of Serbia for 
territory on the Adriatic conflicted with the foreign 
policies of Austria and Italy. So, also, did the desire 
of Montenegro to capture and retain Skutari. This 
town, in the opinion of Austria and Italy as well as 
of the other Powers, should form part of an autono- 
mous Albania, "the independence and neutrality" of 
which had already been proclaimed by an Albanian 
assembly at Avlona on November 28. The ambassa- 
dorial conference promptly agreed that Albania should 
be autonomous and that Serbia should have commer- 
cial access to Adriatic ports. 

The peace conference, however, found it impossible 
to reconcile the demands of the respective belligerents 
and, the armistice having expired, the war was re- 
newed. Again Turkey was defeated and again, after 
much diplomatic discussion with the Great Powers, an 
armistice was signed by all the belligerents save 
Montenegro. The Balkan Allies accepted the media- 
tion of the Powers, and the peace conference opened 
for a second time in London on May 20. On this 
occasion a treaty of peace was successfully negotiated. 
It was signed on May 30. By its terms the frontier 
of Turkey in Europe was established by a line running 
from Enos on the ^Egean to Midia on the Black Sea. 
All territory west of this line was ceded to the Allies, 
who were left to divide it among themselves in 
accordance with their respective treaties of alliance. 

[163] 



Turkey gave up Crete, which was later apportioned 
to Greece; the autonomy of Albania was recognized; 
and the disposal of the JEgean islands was left in the 
hands of the Great Powers. 

Meanwhile Montenegro, in defiance of the Powers, 
had persisted in the siege of Skutari. On April 10 a 
blockade of the Montenegrin coast was put in force 
by an international squadron. On April 22 Skutari 
fell, but this made the Powers only the more insistent 
that Montenegro should evacuate the captured for- 
tress. Finally, faced by an intervention which would 
probably be entrusted to Austria-Hungary, Monte- 
negro yielded. For its compliance, it received assur- 
ance of a loan. 

At the London ambassadorial conference in 19 12, 
it was agreed that a European prince should be nom- 
inated as ruler of Albania. Early in 1914 the new 
throne was offered to William of Wied. He arrived 
at Durazzo March 7, 1914. Early in the summer of 
the same year he was driven out of Albania by a suc- 
cessful insurrection. 

XII 

The Second Balkan War (1Q13) 

The Second Balkan War arose out of disputes over 
the spoils of the war against Turkey. The peace con- 
ference had failed to reach agreement on this matter, 
and the treaty left it to the Balkan Allies to apportion 
the ceded territory among themselves by supple- 
mentary conventions. But there was slight prospect 
of settlement. Bulgaria disputed the claim of Greece 
to possess Saloniki and the territory to the north and 
east of it. Serbia challenged the arrangement made 
in the Bulgar-Serbian treaty of 1912, maintaining that 

[164] 



the creation of Albania had essentially modified the 
equity of that arrangement. A military convention 
was promptly concluded between Greece, Serbia and 
Montenegro. An attempt was made to avert conflict 
through Russian mediation, but difficulties were 
raised over demobilization and all parties refused 
to recede. Suddenly, on June 30, 191 3, the Bulgarians 
attacked the Greek and Serbian armies, hoping to 
crush them separately before they could unite* 
In the campaign that followed the Greeks and 
Serbians were more than a match for the Bulgarians, 
but the issue was decided by the intervention of the 
Rumanian army. Meanwhile Turkey took advantage 
of Bulgaria's extremity to recover Adrianople. As a 
result Bulgaria was compelled to ask for an armistice. 
Peace was restored in the Balkans by the Treaty of 
Bucharest (August 10, 1913). Bulgaria, recognizing 
defeat, had to yield most of its new acquisitions to 
Greece and Serbia and a considerable portion of its 
former territory to Rumania. A treaty of peace 
with Turkey on September 29 involved further ces- 
sions on the part of Bulgaria. 

XIII 

Rumanian Intervention (1913) 

in the negotiations following the First Balkan War, 
Rumania had demanded a "rectified" frontier in the 
Dobrudja, in return for its neutrality, which was 
alleged to have been maintained on the understand- 
ing that Austria-Hungary and Russia would support 
the Rumanian claims when the war was over. In 
consequence, Bulgaria ceded to Rumania the town of 
Silistria with some adjoining territory. This did not 

[165] 



satisfy Rumania; and, as already stated, it inter- 
vened in the Second Balkan War. Its reasons for 
intervening were set forth in its declaration of July 9: 

The Rumanian Government gave due warning to the Bul- 
garian Government that, if the Balkan allies were to find them- 
selves in a state of war, Rumania would not be able to main- 
tain the reserve which it has hitherto observed in the interests 
of peace and would be compelled to take action. The Bul- 
garian Government did not consider it necessary to reply to 
this communication. On the contrary, war unhappily began 
by a series of sudden attacks by the Bulgarians against the 
Serbian troops, without any observance by the Bulgarians of 
even the elementary rules of preliminary notification, which 
would at least have testified to a respect for the conventions 
of international usage. In presence of this situation the 
Rumanian Government has ordered the Rumanian army to 
enter Bulgaria. 

[Annual Register, 1913, p. 351.] 

XIV 

San Giuliano's Warning to Austria (1Q13) 

In a speech delivered in the Italian Parliament, 
December 5, 1914, Signor Giolitti declared that on 
August 9, 1913, Austria communicated to Italy and 
to Germany its intention of taking action against 
Serbia. It described such action as defensive and 
stated that it hoped to receive Italian as well as Ger- 
man support. Signor Giolitti was at that time prime 
minister and, on receiving the report of the Italian 
minister of foreign affairs, Marquis di San Giuliano, 
he directed the latter to reply in the following sense: 

If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is clear that a casus 
foederis cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking 
on her own account. There is no question of defense, inas- 

[166] 



much as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary 
that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in 
the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the 
part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous 
adventure. 

XV 

Liman von Sanders 

After its crushing defeat at the hands of the Balkan 
Allies, Turkey applied to Germany for a military com- 
mission to reorganize its army. In October, 1913, it 
was announced that General Liman von Sanders had 
been chosen head of such a commission, which was to 
include some thirty other German officers. Russia 
at once began to protest, and protested the more 
strongly when it was stated that Liman von Sanders, 
in addition to his advisory duties, was to command 
the First Army Corps at Constantinople. This created 
a delicate situation. According to the Russian con- 
tention, this German military command would con-, 
trol the capital and the Straits and would thus be in a 
position to affect Russian interests adversely. Be- 
sides, the German ambassador at Constantinople 
would, in effect, be backed up by military power to 
the prejudice of the other (and especially of the En- 
tente) ambassadors. The Russian press was intensely 
excited over the appointment, but the Russian govern- 
ment worked for a compromise, suggesting that 
Liman's headquarters be transferred to Adrianople 
and that Germany support Armenian reforms. On 
December 14, the Russian, French and British am- 
bassadors asked the grand vizier for information as 
to the scope of the powers conferred on Liman von 
Sanders. No official answer was given, but it was 

U67] 



announced in the course of a day or two that Turkey- 
was not actuated by political motives but had merely 
applied for the services of an expert whose duties were 
to be chiefly educational. It was further stated that 
Liman would not command the garrisons at the Bos- 
porus and the Dardanelles. y 

According to Mr. Henry Morgenthau, former 
American ambassador to Turkey, it was asserted by 
the German charge d'affaires, in the matter of prece- 
dence at a diplomatic dinner given by Mr. Morgen- 
thau, that von Sanders was "the personal representa- 
tive of the Kaiser and as such . . . entitled to 
equal rank with the ambassadors. He should have 
been placed ahead of the cabinet ministers and the 
foreign ministers" [The World's Work, May, 191 8, 
p. 66]. Fortunately for Morgenthau, the order of 
precedence at the dinner had been arranged by Palla- 
vicini, the Austrian ambassador, who was at the time 
doyen of the diplomatic corps. 

It may be added that after the outbreak of the war 
in August, 1 9 14 (but before Turkey had become a 
belligerent), Liman von Sanders was appointed com- 
mander-in-chief of the Turkish army. 

XVI 

British-German Negotiations (1912-1914) 

The rapid development of German naval power had, 
as Prince Lichnowsky indicates, aroused anxiety in 
Great Britain; and the necessity, arising from Brit- 
ain's insular position, of keeping its fleet equal to the 
combined fleets of any two other Powers was throwing 
a heavy burden on the British taxpayers. Lord Hal- 
dane was sent to Berlin early in 19 12, to see whether 

[168 ] 



the German plan for the creation of a third squadron 
could not be modified. This suggestion being nega- 
tived, he inquired whether it would not be possible to 
delay construction, to "spread the tempo." It was in- 
dicated, on the German side, that no concessions could 
be made in the matter of naval construction unless 
Germany could be assured that, in case it should be 
involved in war, Great Britain would remain neutral. 
It was proposed that such assurance should be given 
by a formal treaty. After Haldane's return to Lon- 
don, negotiations oil this matter were continued 
between Sir Edward Grey and the German ambassa- 
dor, Count Metternich. Various formulas were sug- 
gested, but no agreement was attained, because the 
German diplomats found the British proposals inade- 
quate, while the British regarded the German pro- 
posals as ambiguous. The Germans wished for an 
agreement that, if either nation should become in- 
volved in a war "in which it cannot be said to be the 
aggressor," the other nation should remain neutral; 
but they proposed to add: 

The duty of neutrality which arises out of the preceding 
article has no application in so far as it may not be reconcila- 
ble with existing agreements which the high contracting par- 
ties have already made. 

This, as Lord Haldane puts it, meant that 
while Germany, in the case of a European conflict, would have 
remained free to support her friends, this country would have 
been forbidden to raise a finger in defense of hers. Germany 
could arrange without difficulty that the formal inception of 
hostilities should rest with Austria. 

Another clause in the German draft forbade "the 
making of new agreements which render it impossible 
for either of the parties to observe neutrality towards 

[169] 



the other." This, of course, meant that while the Triple 
Alliance treaties were to remain binding and Great 
Britain was to be pledged to neutrality if Germany 
should make war to support Austria, Great Britain 
was to make no similar treaty arrangements with 
Russia or with France. "In a word," as Lord Haldane 
observes, "there was to be a guaranty of absolute neu- 
trality on one side, but not on the other." 

In response to a request for counter-proposals, Sir 
Edward Grey, on March 14, 1912, gave Count Metter- 
nich the following draft formula, which had been 
approved by the Cabinet : 

England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany, 
and pursue no aggressive policy towards her. 

Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no 
part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which 
England is now a party, nor will she become a party to any- 
thing that has such an object. 

Count Metternich thought this formula inadequate, 
and suggested two alternative additional clauses : 

England will therefore observe at least a benevolent neu- 
trality should war be forced upon Germany, or: England will 
therefore, as a matter of course, remain neutral if a war is 
forced upon Germany. 

Sir Edward Grey considered that the British pro- 
posals were sufficient. He explained that if Germany 
desired to crush France, England might not be able to 
sit still, though if France were aggressive or attacked 
Germany, no support would be given by His Majesty's 
government or approved by England. He even- 
tually proposed the following formula: 

The two powers being mutually desirous of securing peace 
and friendship between them, England declares that she will 
neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon Ger- 

[1703 



many. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and 
forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to 
which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to 
anything that has such an object. 

Count Metternich, in accordance with instructions 
received from Berlin, stated that the project for a 
further increase of the German navy could not be 
abandoned except on the basis of a neutrality treaty 
of a far-reaching character and leaving no doubt as to 
its interpretation. "He admitted/' Lord Haldane 
writes, "that the chancellor's wish amounted to a 
guaranty of absolute neutrality." 

At this point the negotiations for a reduction of 
naval armaments and for a neutrality agreement were 
dropped. 

Sir Edward Grey, however, expressed the hope that 
this result would not put an end to negotiations or 
form an insurmountable obstacle to better relations. 
The British government hoped that the formula 
which it had suggested might be considered in con- 
nection with the discussion of territorial arrange- 
ments, even if it did not prove effective in preventing 
the increase of naval expenditure. Sir Edward Grey 
added that, if some arrangement could be made be- 
tween the two governments, it would have a favorable 
though indirect effect upon naval expenditure as time 
went on; it would have, moreover, a favorable and 
direct effect upon public opinion in both countries. 

This suggestion was taken up ; and at this point the 
British-German negotiations entered upon their third 
phase, that of the adjustment of conflicting interests 
in Africa and in Asia. These, as Prince Lichnowsky 
indicates, were under way when he came to London. 

Brief statements regarding the negotiations for a 

# li7i] 



neutrality agreement were made by Prime Minister 
Asquith, in a speech at Cardiff, October 2, 1914, and 
by Sir Edward Grey, in a speech at London, March 
22, 19 1 5. These statements were substantially con- 
firmed by extracts from the correspondence of 19 12, 
published by the German Foreign Office in July, 191 5. 
Further documentary material was published by the 
British Foreign Office, August 31, 191 5. The fullest 
account of the negotiations — an account in which the 
question of naval armaments is brought into connec- 
tion with the question of British neutrality — is given 
in Lord Haldane's report, made in 1912, a large part of 
which was published by the British government late 
in May, 1918. 
See New York Times, June 2, 191 8. 

XVII 

The Portuguese Colonies in Africa 

The African treaty negotiated by Prince Lichnow- 
sky dealt, as he states, with German and British 
spheres of influence in the Portuguese colonies. The 
following are the Portuguese dependencies in Africa 
(excluding the Cape Verde Islands), with statistical 
data, as given in the Statesman's Year Book for 191 5: 

1. Portuguese Guinea, on the west coast of Africa, south of 
Cape Verde; area, 13,940 square miles; population, 820,000. 

2. Islands of Principe and St. Thomas, in the Gulf of 
Guinea; area, 360 square miles; population, 42,103. 

3. Angola, between German South- West Africa on the 
south and the Belgian and French Congo on the north; area, 
484,800 square miles; population, 4,119,000. 

4. Portuguese East Africa, bounded by British Central and 
South Africa and German East Africa; area, 293,400 square 
miles; population, 3,120,000. 

[172]' 



XVIII 

Anglo-Portuguese Treaties 

According to the British and Foreign State Papers 
(vol. i, page 462) there were still subsisting in 1 8 14 
(and presumably still subsist) several ancient treaties 
of friendship and alliance between England and Por- 
tugal, the earliest dating back to 1373, in the reign of 
Edward III. The treaty of Charles II's time, referred 
to by Lichnowsky, was made in 1661 and constituted 
the marriage contract between Charles II and Cathe- 
rine, Infanta of Portugal. Article 16 promised that 

if the King of Portugal shall be pressed in any extraordinary 
manner by the power of the enemies, all the King of Great 
Britain's ships which shall at any time be in the Mediterranean 
Sea or at Tangier shall have instructions in such cases to obey 
any orders they shall receive from the King of Portugal and 
shall betake themselves to his succour and relief. 

Also, under Article 17, the King of Great Britain 
was to 

afford timely assistance of men and shipping according to 
the exigency of the circumstances, and proportionable to the 
necessity of the King of Portugal. 

XIX 

The British-German Bagdad Agreement 

In his book entitled Obstacles to Peace (Boston, 1917, 
pp. 41-42), Mr. S. S. McClure states that in 1916 
he obtained from Dr. Jaeckh, who had been private 
secretary to von Kiderlen-Wachter, the terms of the 
Bagdad Treaty which was to have been signed in 19 14. 
He took this statement, he tells us, to the German 
Foreign Office in Berlin, where certain slight correc- 
tions were made; and he publishes the document 

1 173] 



"exactly as I got it from Dr. Zimmermann, the for- 
eign minister of the imperial German government." 

1. The Bagdad Railway from Constantinople to Basra is 
definitely left to German capital in cooperation with Turkey. 
In the territory of the Bagdad Railway German economical 
working will not be hindered by England. 

2. Basra becomes a sea harbor in the building of which 
German capital is concerned with sixty per cent, and English 
capital with forty per cent. For the navigation from Basra to 
the Persian Gulf the independence of the open sea is agreed to. 

3. Kuweit is excluded from the agreement between Ger- 
many and England. 

4. In the navigation of the Tigris, English capital is inter- 
ested with fifty per cent., German capital with twenty-five per 
cent., and Turkish with twenty-five per cent. 

5. The oil-wells of the whole of Mesopotamia shall be de- 
veloped by a British company, the capital of which shall be 
given at fifty per cent, by England, at twenty-five per cent, 
by the German Bank, at twenty-five per cent, by the "Royal 
Dutch Company" (a company which is Dutch, but closely 
connected with England). For the irrigation works there had 
been intended a similar understanding. The rights of the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which, as is known, the 
English Government is concerned, remained unaffected. 
This society exercises south of Basra, on the Shatt-el-Arab 
as well as in all south and central Persia, a monopoly on the 
production and transport of oil. 

6. A simultaneous German-French agreement leaves free 
hand to French capital for the construction of railways in 
southern Syria and Palestine. 

Besides this, there is an agreement, already made before, 
between Germany and England, concerning Africa, with a 
repartition of their spheres of influence in Angola and Mo- 
zambique. 

Finally there is to be mentioned the Morocco agreement, 
which established the political predominance of France in 

[174] 



Morocco, but, on the other hand, stated the principle of 
"open door" to the trade of all nations. 

An analysis of the German-French agreement 
alluded to above, under point 6, is to be found in a 
dispatch dated February 20, 1914, from the Belgian 
minister at Berlin to the Belgian foreign minister. 
This dispatch is to be found in the collection of Bel- 
gian documents seized by the Germans at Brussels 
and published by the German imperial government. 
[See American Journal of International Law, April, 
1918, page 392; or this volume, page 238.] 

XX 

The Potsdam Conference of July 5, IQ14 
In "Ambassador Morgenthau's Story," of which the 
first two instalments have appeared in The World's 
Work, May and June, 1918, Mr. Morgenthau, our 
ambassador at Constantinople during the earlier part 
of the World War, tells what he learned from the 
German ambassador, Baron von Wangenheim. 

On July 4, 1914, Mr. Morgenthau was surprised to 
note the absence of the German ambassador from the 
requiem mass for the Archduke Ferdinand and his 
wife, and also from the celebration of Independence 
Day at the American embassy. Afterwards Mr. 
Morgenthau had the explanation from Wangenheim's 
own lips. He had left some days before for Berlin. 
The Kaiser had summoned him to an imperial council, 
which met on July 5th at Potsdam (page 73). 

The Kaiser presided ; nearly all the ambassadors attended ; 
Wangenheim came to tell of Turkey and enlighten his asso- 
ciates on the situation in Constantinople. Moltke, then chief 
of staff, was there, representing the army, and Admiral von 
Tirpitz spoke for the navy. The great bankers, railroad direc- 

[1751 



tors, and the captains of German industry, all of whom were as 
necessary to German war preparations as the army itself, also 
attended. 

Wangenheim now told me that the Kaiser solemnly put the 
question to each man in turn: Was he ready for war? All 
replied "Yes" except the financiers. They said that they must 
have two weeks to sell their foreign securities and to make 
loans. At that time few people had looked upon the Serajevo 
tragedy as something that was likely to cause war. This con- 
ference took all precautions that no such suspicion should be 
aroused. It decided to give the bankers time to readjust their 
finances for the coming war, and then the several members 
went quietly back to their work or started on vacations. The 
Kaiser went to Norway on his yacht, von Bethmann Hollweg 
left for a rest, and Wangenheim returned to Constantinople. 

In telling me about this conference, Wangenheim, of course, 
admitted that Germany had precipitated the war. I think 
that he was rather proud of the whole performance; proud 
that Germany had gone about the matter in so methodical 
and far-seeing a way; especially proud that he himself had 
been invited to participate in so momentous a gathering. 
. . . Whenever I hear people arguing about the responsi- 
bility for this war or read the clumsy and lying excuses put 
forth by Germany, I simply recall the burly figure of Wangen- 
heim as he appeared that August afternoon, puffing away at a 
huge black cigar, and giving me his account of this historic 
meeting. Why waste any time discussing the matter after 
that? . . . 

This imperial conference took place July 5; the Serbian 
ultimatum was sent on July 22. That is just about the two 
weeks interval which the financiers had demanded to complete 
their plans. All the great stock exchanges of the world show 
that the German bankers profitably used this interval. Their 
records disclose that stocks were being sold in large quantities 
and that prices declined rapidly. At that time the markets 
were somewhat puzzled at this movement; Wangenheim's 
explanation clears up any doubts that may still remain. Ger- 

[176] 



many was changing her securities into cash, for war pur- 
poses. . . . 

Wangenheim not only gave me the details of this Potsdam 
conference, but he disclosed the same secret to the Marquis 
Garroni, the Italian ambassador at Constantinople. Italy 
was at that time technically Germany's ally (pages 170, 
171). 

XXI 

Sir Edward Grey's Warning of July 2Q, IQ14 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goscken, 
British Ambassador at Berlin 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914 
Sir: 

After speaking to the German ambassador this afternoon 
about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to 
him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was 
on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was 
restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no 
thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved 
in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it 
would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him 
to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation — which I 
hoped would continue — into thinking that we should stand 
aside. 

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether 
I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, inter- 
vene? 

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything 
that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by 
saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. 
There would be no question of our intervening if Germany 
was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But 
we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we 
thought British interests required us to intervene, we must 
intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very 
rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped 

[177] 



that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as 
at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in 
touch with the German Government in working for peace. 
But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the 
issue spread so that it involved practically every European 
interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him 
that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him 
or his Government into supposing that we should not take 
action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so mis- 
led, the course of things might have been different. 

The German ambassador took no exception to what I had 
said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had 
already given in Berlin as his view of the situation. 

That this warning was promptly transmitted to 
Berlin is shown by the following extract from a dis- 
patch sent to Sir Edward Grey by Sir Edward 
Goschen, British ambassador at Berlin, on July 30, 
reporting a conversation with Foreign Secretary von 
Jagow: 

His Excellency added that [the] telegram received from 
Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had 
heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all 
events he thoroughly appreciated [the] frankness and loyalty 
with which you had spoken. 

[British Diplomatic Correspondence, relating to the outbreak 
of the War, Nos. 89, 98.] 

XXII 

Correspondence between the President of the French 
Republic and King George 

The President of the French Republic to 
His Majesty King George 

Paris, July 31, 1914 
Dear and Great Friend : 

In the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel 
bound to convey to your Majesty the information which the 

[178] 



Government of the Republic have received from Germany. 
The military preparations which are being undertaken by the 
Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neighbour- 
hood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward every 
day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to continue 
to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain 
peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most 
indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not ap- 
pear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Ger- 
many's action; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, 
then, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the 
Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the 
most terrible events. 

From all the information which reaches us it would seem 
that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that 
the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in 
which France might be engaged: if, on the other hand, Ger- 
many were convinced that the entente cordiale would be af- 
firmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field 
side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace 
would remain unbroken. 

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave 
complete liberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, 
in the letters exchanged in 191 2 between Sir Edward Grey and 
M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into 
nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another 
in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert 
whether common action were advisable. 

But the character of close friendship which public feeling 
has given in both countries to the entente between Great 
Britain and France, the confidence with which our two 
Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance 
of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your Majesty has 
ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite 
frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Govern- 
ment of the Republic and of all France. 

[ 179] 



It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the 
British Government that henceforward the last chances of a 
peaceful settlement depend. 

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have en- 
joined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which 
they have not swerved. In concert with your Majesty's 
Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest 
suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines. 

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and 
if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of 
Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and 
an agreement between her and Russia will become impos- 
sible. I am profoundly convinced that, at the present mo- 
ment, the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can give a 
deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic ac- 
tion, the .more possible will it be to count upon the pre- 
servation of peace. 

I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only 
inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power 
definitely reaffirmed. 
His Majesty King George to the President 
of the French Republic 

Buckingham Palace, August I, 19 14 
Dear and Great Friend : 

I most highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you 
to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am 
grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and 
frankly. 

You may be assured that the present situation in Europe 
has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, 
and I am glad to think that our two Governments have 
worked so amicably together in endeavouring to find a peaceful 
solution of the questions at issue. 

It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united 
efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not without 
hope that the terrible events which seem so near may be 
averted. 

[180] 



I admire the restraint which you and your Government are 
exercising in refraining from taking undue military measures 
on the frontier and not adopting an attitude which could in 
any wise be interpreted as a provocative one. 

I am personally using my best endeavours with the Empe- 
rors of Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution 
by which actual military operations may at any rate be post- 
poned, and time be thus given for calm discussion between the 
Powers. I intend to prosecute these efforts without inter- 
mission so long as any hope remains of an amicable settlement. 

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so 
rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but 
you may be assured that my Government will continue to 
discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of in- 
terest to our two nations with M. Cambon. 

[Collected Diplomatic Documents, part ix, sec. v, pp. 542- 

544-] 

XXIII 

Bonar Law's Letter of August 2, 1 gi 4 
The letter to which Lichnowsky alludes is undoubt- 
edly that in which the Conservative leader tendered 
to the prime minister the support of his party. 

2d August, 1914 
Dear Mr. Asquith: 

Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that 
in our opinion, as well as in that of all the colleagues whom 
we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honour 
and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting 
France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our 
unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they 
may consider necessary for that object. 

Yours very truly, 

A. Bonar Law 

[First published in the London Times, December 15, 1914.] 

[181] 



XXIV 

King Albert's Telegram 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, 
British Ambassador at Berlin 

Foreign Office, August 4, 19 14 

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His 
Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of 
Belgium in the following terms: 

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's 
friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly atti- 
tude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have 
just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplo- 
matic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safe- 
guard the integrity of Belgium." 

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the Ger- 
man Government have delivered to the Belgian Government 
a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage 
through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the in- 
dependence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions 
at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to 
treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within 
twelve hours. 

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused 
this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. 

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against 
this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in 
common with themselves, and must request an assurance 
that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded 
with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. 
You should ask for an immediate reply. 

[British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 153.] 



[182] 



II 

Memoranda and Letters of Dr. Muehlon 



Reprint of International Conciliation No. 130, September, 1918 



INTRODUCTION 

At the outbreak of the World War, Dr. Muehlon 
was a member of the Krupp board of directors at 
Essen. As his letters show, he was in touch with per- 
sons well informed of the real course of events. He 
was, therefore, one of the relatively few Germans who 
knew, from the outset, that the Central Empires had 
forced an unnecessary and unjustifiable war upon 
Europe; and he was one of the far smaller number of 
Germans whom the conduct of their government 
stirred to indignation and moral revolt. He was un- 
willing to further Germany's military activities by 
continued service in the munitions business, and he 
accordingly severed his connection with the Krupp 
Company and betook himself to Switzerland. He was 
willing, at first, to serve his country in other and 
peaceful ways, and he conducted negotiations on be- 
half of the German government to obtain wheat from 
Rumania, at a time when Rumania was still neutral. 
In 191 7, however, he notified Chancellor von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg that he had lost all confidence in the 
persons who were directing Germany's policies and 
saw no hope for the world or for Germany itself except 
in the transfer of power to men of a different stamp. 
In the spring and early summer of 19 18 he published 
the memoranda and letters reproduced in the following 
pages, and also a collection of extracts from his war 
diary, extending from the early part of August to the 
middle of November, 1914. 

1 185] 



In several important matters, Muehlon's revelations 
supplement the evidence previously at our disposal 
and confirm our earlier inferences. As regards the 
Austrian dispute with Serbia, he shows that, before the 
middle of July, 19 14, full agreement had been reached 
between Berlin and Vienna as to the substance of the 
ultimatum to be sent to Belgrade. That the framing of 
this document was left to the Austrian Foreign Office 
seemed to Muehlon and to Krupp von Bohlen, as it 
seemed to the French ambassador at Berlin, almost 
incredible. There is no good reason, however, to 
doubt von Jagow's statement that the text of the 
ultimatum was not communicated to the German For- 
eign Office. Since 1890 the German Emperor had 
been, not only his own chancellor, but also his own 
foreign secretary; and the titular incumbents of these 
offices had been virtually vice-chancellors and under- 
secretaries. 1 

As regards the attitude of the German government 
towards an eventual Russian mobilization, Muehlon 
shows that the German Emperor had fully accepted, 
in advance, the fatal military theory that mobilization 
is not to be regarded as a precautionary measure but as 
an act of war. 2 

Of especial interest is Muehlon's report of the inter- 
view between the Emperor and von Bohlen. This con- 
firms the impression, derived from other sources, that 
the unfavorable outcome of the Emperor's Moroccan 
enterprise (1905-1911) had left him in a warlike frame 
of mind. The failure of German diplomacy, directed 
by the monarch himself, had convinced him that in 
the next crisis he must unsheathe the German sword. 

1 Munroe Smith, Militarism and Statecraft (Putnam, 191 8), p. 84. 

2 Ibid., pp. 46, 77-78, 93-95. 101-103, 137-139- 

[186] 



He was stung by the knowledge that his conduct had 
been regarded as irresolute; and he repeatedly assured 
von Bohlen that, this time, he would not "fall down." 
His insistence struck von Bohlen as "comic." Sooner 
or later, all Germans will realize that it was tragic. 

Of interest, also, is Helfferich's statement that the 
Emperor had gone on his Norwegian cruise in July, 19 14, 
only for the sake of appearances. It will be remem- 
bered that in the summer of 1870, when the trap of the 
Hohenzollern candidacy for the throne of Spain was 
sprung on France, Bismarck was at his country home 
and King William was taking a cure at Ems. To equal 
the substantial achievements of a man of genius is not 
easy, but it is very easy to imitate his tricks. 

Muehlon's evidence on these matters is, of course, 
hearsay evidence. He tells us what HelfTerich heard 
from persons who are not named, but are described 
as men in a position to know the facts, and he repeats 
what von Bohlen heard from the Emperor and from 
von Jagow. Hearsay evidence, however, may be of 
great value. If the historian excluded all evidence 
that is barred by the technical rules of English judicial 
procedure, history would lose much of its clarity and 
completeness. The value of hearsay evidence depends 
upon the position and character of the immediate and 
ultimate witnesses. Its credibility is enhanced when 
the statements cited fit in with fully established facts 
and help to explain the course of events. Muehlon's 
revelations satisfy all these tests. 

In one important matter Muehlon's evidence is 
direct. The dealings of the Belgian government with 
the Krupp Company were matters of which he had 
immediate personal knowledge. The German asser- 
tion that the Belgian government had arranged to 

1 187] 



cooperate with Great Britain in aggressive war against 
Germany has never been substantiated; it has, in- 
deed, been disproved; but Muehlon's testimony that, 
for years before the war, Belgium had made itself de- 
pendent on Germany for military supplies and that, 
at the outbreak of war, fortress artillery, ordered and 
fully paid for by the Belgian government and long 
ready for shipment, was, at the request of the Belgians 
themselves, still held in storage in the Krupp works at 
Essen — this testimony reduces the German assertion 
to an absurdity. It leaves the Belgians at fault in one 
respect only: they had misplaced their confidence. 
They believed that the German government would 
observe its treaty obligations and keep its repeatedly 
plighted faith. 

Muehlon's recent pamphlet, made up of extracts 
from his war diary and entitled The Devastation of 
Europe (Die Verheerung Europas, Fiissli, Zurich, 191 8, 
149 pp.), brings no revelations comparable in impor- 
tance to those contained in his earlier memoranda and 
letters. The diary is nevertheless of interest and value 
as a contemporary picture of German sentiments and 
beliefs in the early months of the war. It is of interest, 
also, because it depicts, more fully than the letters, the 
reaction of at least one German conscience against the 
conduct of the German government — not only against 
the way in which that government precipitated the 
war, but also against the manner in which the war was 
waged. In this respect the pamphlet is a valuable 
addition to the scanty but growing German literature 
of protest. 

Munroe Smith 



[188 



True translation filed with the Postmaster at New York, N. Y., 
on August 28, 1918, as required by the Act of October 6, 1917. 



DENKSCHRIFTEN UND BRIEFE VON 
DR. W. MUEHLON 

Bis zum Kriegsausbruch Mitglied des Direktoriums der 
Kruppwerke in Essen 

I 
DAS WIENER ULTIMATUM AN SERBIEN * 

Mitte Juli 1914 hatte ich, wie des ofteren, eine 
Besprechung mit Dr. Helfferich, dem damaligen 
Direktor der Deutschen Bank in Berlin und heutigen 
Stellvertreter des Reichskanzlers. Die Deutsche 
Bank hatte eine ablehnende Haltung gegeniiber 
einigen grossen Transaktionen eingenommen (Bul- 
garien und Tiirkei) an denen die Firma Krupp aus 
geschaftlichen Grunden (Lieferung von Kriegsma- 
terial) ein lebhaftes Interesse hatte. Als einen der 
Griinde zur Rechtfertigung der Haltung der Deutschen 
Bank nannte mir Dr. Helfferich schliesslich den 
folgenden: Die politische Lage ist sehr bedrohlich 
geworden. Die Deutsche Bank muss auf jeden Fall 
abwarten, ehe sie sich in Ausland weiter engagiert. 
Die Osterreicher sind dieser Tage beim Kaiser ge- 
wesen. Wien wird in acht Tagen ein sehr scharfes, 
ganz kurz befristetes Ultimatum an Serbien stellen, 
in dem Forderungen en thai ten sind, wie Bestrafung 

1 Published in the Berliner Tageblatt, March 21, 191 8. Reprinted 
in Die Freie Zeitung (Bern), March 27, 1918. Also in Meine Londoner 
Mission, von Fiirst Lichnowsky (Fiissli, Zurich, 19 18), Anhang, 
PP. 50-53- 

[190] 



MEMORANDA AND LETTERS OF 
DR. W. MUEHLON 

Until the outbreak of the war a member of the Board of Directors of the 
Krupp Works at Essen 

I 

THE VIENNESE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA 

In the middle of July, 1914, I had, as I frequently 
had, a conversation with Dr. Helfferich, at that time 
director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and now vice- 
chancellor of the Empire. The Deutsche Bank had 
indicated unwillingness to take part in several large 
transactions (in Bulgaria and Turkey) in which the 
Krupp Company, for business reasons (delivery of war 
material) had a lively interest. One of the reasons ulti- 
mately given me by Dr. Helfferich to justify the 
attitude of the Deutsche Bank was as follows: The 
political situation had become very menacing. The 
Deutsche Bank must in any case wait before entering 
into any further engagements in foreign countries. 
The Austrians had recently been with the Emperor. 
Within a week Vienna would send to Serbia a very 
sharply worded ultimatum with a very short term for 
reply. In it would be contained such demands as 
punishment of a number of officers, dissolution of 
political associations, criminal investigations in Serbia 

[191] 



einer Reihe von Offizieren, Auflosung politischer 
Vereine, Strafuntersuchungen in Serbiendurch Beamte 
der Doppelmonarchie, iiberhaupt eine Reihe bestimm- 
ter, sofortiger Genugtuungen verlangt wird, andern- 
falls Osterreich-Ungarn an Serbien den Krieg erklart. 

Dr. Helfferich fiigte noch hinzu, dass der Kaiser 
mit Entschiedenheit fur dieses Vorgehen Osterreich- 
Ungarns ausgesprochen habe. Er habe gesagt, dass er 
einen osterreichisch-ungarischen Konflikt mit Ser- 
bien als eine interne Angelegenheit zwischen diesen 
beiden Landern betrachte, in die er keinem andern 
Staat eine Einmischung erlauben werde. Wenn Russ- 
land mobil mache, dann mache er audi mobil. Bei 
ihm aber bedeute Mobilmachung den sofortigen Krieg. 
Diesmal gdbe es kein Schwanken. Die Osterreicher 
seien liber diese entschlossene Haltung des Kaisers 
sehr befriedigt gewesen. 

Als ich Dr. Helfferich daraufhin sagte, diese un- 
heimliche Mitteilung mache meine ohnehin starken 
Befurchtungen eines Weltkrieges zur volligen Gewiss- 
heit, erwiderte er, es sehe jedenfalls so aus. Vielleicht 
iiberlegten sich aber Russland und Frankreich die 
Sache doch noch anders. Den Serben gehore entschie- 
den eine bleibende Lektion. Dies war die erste Mit- 
teilung, die ich erhielt uber die Besprechung des 
Kaisers mit den Bundesgenossen. Ich kannte Dr. 
Helfferichs besonders vertrauensvolle Beziehungen zu 
den Personlichkeiten, die eingeweiht sein mussten, 
und die Verlasslichkeit seiner Mitteilung. Deshalb 
unterrichtete ich nach meiner Riickkehr von Berlin 
unverziiglich Herrn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, 
dessen Direktorium in Essen ich damals als Mitglied 
angehorte. Dr. Helfferich hatte mir dies iibrigens 
ausdriicklich erlaubt. (Es bestand damals die Absicht, 

[192 J 



by officials of the Dual Monarchy, and, in general, 
a series of definite and immediate satisfactions; 
otherwise Austria-Hungary would declare war on 
Serbia. 

Dr. Helfferich added that the Emperor had ex- 
pressed decided approval of this procedure on the part 
of Austria-Hungary. He had said that he regarded 
an Austro-Hungarian conflict with Serbia as an inter- 
nal affair between these two countries, in which he 
would permit no other state to interfere. If Russia 
mobilized, he would then mobilize also. To him, how- 
ever, mobilization meant immediate war. This time 
there would be no wavering. The Austrians were 
very well satisfied by this resolute attitude on the part 
of the Emperor. 

When I thereupon said to Dr. Helfferich that this 
gruesome communication converted my fears of a 
world war, which were already strong, into absolute 
certainty, he replied that it certainly looked like that. 
Perhaps, however, France and Russia would think 
twice on the matter and reach a different decision. 
The Serbs certainly deserved a lasting lesson. This 
was the first information I received about the Empe- 
ror's conversations with our allies. I knew Dr. 
Helfferich's particularly confidential relations with 
the personages who were sure to have inside informa- 
tion and the trustworthiness of his communication. 
Accordingly, after my return from Berlin, I promptly 
communicated my information to Herr Krupp von 
Bohlen und Halbach, of whose board of directors at 
Essen I was at that time a member. Dr. Helfferich, 
I may add, had expressly given me permission to do 

1 193] 



ihn in den Aufsichtsrat derFirmaKrupp aufzunehmen.) 
Von Bohlen schien betroffen, dass Dr. Helfferich im 
Besitz solcher Kenntnisse war, machte eine abfallige 
Bemerkung, dass die Leute von der Regierung doch 
nie ganz den Mund halten konnten, und eroffnete mir 
alsdann folgendes: Er sei selbst beim Kaiser dieser 
Tage gewesen. Der Kaiser habe auch zu ihm von der 
Besprechung mit den Osterreichern und deren Ergeb- 
nis gesprochen, jedoch die Sache als so geheim be- 
zeichnet, dass er nicht einmal gewagt haben wiirde, 
seinem Direktorium davon Mitteilung zu machen. 
Da ich aber einmal Bescheid wisse, konne er mir 
sagen, die Angaben Helfferichs seien richtig. Dieser 
scheine freilich noch mehr Details zu wissen, als er, 
Bohlen, selbst. Die Lage sei in der Tat sehr ernst. 
Der Kaiser habe ihm personlich erklart, er werde 
sofort den Krieg erklaren, wenn Russland mobil 
mache. Diesmal werde man sehen, dass er nicht 
umfalle. Die wiederholte kaiserliche Betonung, in 
diesem Falle werde ihm kein Mensch wieder Unschliis- 
sigkeit vorwerfen konnen, habe sogar fast komisch 
gewirkt. 

Genau an dem mir von Helfferich bezeichneten Tage 
erschien denn auch das Ultimatum Wiens an Serbien. 
Ich war zu dieser Zeit wieder in Berlin und ausserte 
mich gegeniiber Helfferich, dass ich Ton und Inhalt 
des Ultimatums geradezu ungeheuerlich fande. Dr. 
Helfferich aber meinte, das klinge nur in der deutschen 
Ubersetzung so. Er habe das Ultimatum in franzo- 
sischer Sprache zu sehen bekommen und da konne man 
es keineswegs als ubertrieben empfinden. Bei dieser 
Gelegenheit sagte mir Helfferich auch, dass der 
Kaiser nur des Scheins wegen auf die Nordlandreise 

1 194] 



i 



this. (At that time there was an intention to appoint 
him to membership in the supervisory council of 
the Krupp Company.) Von Bohlen seemed disturbed 
that Dr. Helfferich was in possession of such infor- 
mation, and he made a censorious remark to the 
effect that the government people could never quite 
hold their tongues. He then disclosed to me the 
following facts. He had himself been with the Em- 
peror recently. The Emperor had spoken to him also 
of the conversation with the Austrians and of its out- 
come, but had characterized the affair as so secret that 
he would not have ventured to communicate it even 
to his board of directors. Since, however, I was 
already posted, he could tell me that Helfferich's 
statements were correct. Indeed, the latter appeared 
to know more details than he, Bohlen, himself. The 
situation was really very serious. The Emperor had 
told him personally that he would declare war im- 
mediately if Russia mobilized. People would see 
this time that he would not weaken. 1 The Emperor's 
repeated insistence that in this matter no one would 
be able to reproach him again with want of resolution 
had produced an almost comic effect. 

On the very day indicated to me by Helfferich the 
ultimatum from Vienna to Serbia appeared. At this 
time I was again in Berlin, and I told Helfferich that 
I regarded the tone and contents of the ultimatum as 
absolutely monstrous. Dr. Helfferich, however, 
thought that the note had that ring only in the German 
translation. He had had opportunity to see the ulti- 
matum in French, and in that text it could not give 
any impression of over-statement. On this occasion 
Helfferich also said to me that it was only for the 

1 More literally: "would not fall down." 

1 195 1 



gegangen sei, ihr keineswegs die ubliche Ausdehnung 
gegeben habe, sondern sich in jederzeit erreichbarer 
Nahe und in standiger Verbindung halte. Nun musse 
man eben sehen, was komme. Hoffentlich handelten 
die Osterreicher, die auf eine Annahme des Ulti- 
matums natiirlich nicht rechneten, rasch, bevor die 
anderen Machte Zeit fanden, sich hineinzumischen. 
Die Deutsche Bank habe ihre Vorkehrungen schoh so 
getroffen, dass sie auf alle Eventualitaten geriistet sei. 
So habe sie das einlaufende Gold nicht mehr in den 
Verkehr zuriickgegeben. Das lasse sich ganz unauf- 
fallig einrichten und mache Tag fur Tag schon sehr 
bedeutende Betrage aus. 



Alsbald nach dem Wiener Ultimatum an Serbien 
gab die deutsche Regierung Erklarungen dahin ab, 
dass Osterreich-Ungarn auf eigene Faust gehandelt 
habe ohne Vorwissen Deutschlands. Bei dem Ver- 
such, diese Erklarungen mit den oben genannten Vor- 
gangen iiberhaupt vereinigen zu wollen, blieb nur 
etwa die Losung, dass der Kaiser sich schon festgelegt 
hatte, ohne seine Regierung mitwirken zu lassen, und 
dass bei der Besprechung mit den Osterreichern 
deutscherseits davon abgesehen wurde, den Wortlaut 
des Ultimatums zu vereinbaren. Denn dass der 
Inhalt des Ultimatums in Deutschland ziemlich genau 
bekannt war, habe ich oben gezeigt. 

Herr Krupp von Bohlen, mit dem ich iiber diese 
wenigstens der Wirkung nach liignerischen deutschen 
Erklarungen sprach, war davon gleichfalls wenig er- 
baut, weil in einer so schwerwiegenden Angelegenheit 
Deutschland doch keine Blankovollmacht an einen 
Staat wie Osterreich hatte ausstellen diirfen, und es 

[196] 



sake of appearances that the Emperor had gone on 
his northern cruise; that he was not going anything 
like so far as usual, but was keeping himself near 
enough to be reached at any time and in constant 
[telegraphic] connection. Now one must wait and 
see what would happen. It was to be hoped that 
the Austrians, who, of course, did not expect the 
ultimatum to be accepted, would act rapidly before 
the other Powers would have time to interfere. The 
Deutsche Bank had already made such arrangements 
as to be prepared for all eventualities. For instance, 
it was no longer putting back into circulation the 
gold that came in. This could be done without 
attracting any notice, and the amounts thus secured 
day by day were already very considerable. 

Immediately after the [publication of the] Viennese 
ultimatum to Serbia, the German government issued 
declarations to the effect that Austria-Hungary had 
acted on its own hand, without Germany's prior 
knowledge. When one attempted to bring these 
declarations into any sort of harmony with the pro- 
ceedings mentioned above, the only possible explana- 
tion was that the Emperor had already committed 
himself without arranging that his government should 
cooperate, and that, in the conversation with the 
Austrians, no provision was made on the German side 
for agreement upon the wording of the ultimatum. 
For, as I have already shown, the contents of the ulti- 
matum were pretty accurately known in Germany. 

Herr Krupp von Bohlen, with whom I spoke about 
these German declarations — which, in effect at least, 
were lies — was also far from edified by them, because 
in so weighty an affair Germany ought not to have 
given unlimited power of attorney to a state like Aus- 

[i97] 



Pflicht der leitenden Staatsmanner gewesen ware, so- 
wohl vom Kaiser wie von den Bundesgenossen zu ver- 
langen, dass die osterreichischen Forderungen und 
das Ultimatum an Serbien auf das eingehendste dis- 
kutiert und festgelegt werden und gleichzeitig das 
genaue Programm des weiteren Vorgehens iiberhaupt. 
Gleichviel auf welchem Standpunkt man stehe, man 
diirfe sich doch nicht den Osterreichern in die Hande 
geben, sich nicht Eventualitaten aussetzen, die man 
nicht vorher berechnet habe, sondern hatte an seine 
Verpflichtungen entsprechende Bedingungen kniipfen 
miissen. Kurz, Herr von Bohlen hielt die deutsche 
Ableugnung eines Vorwissens, falls in ihr eine Spur 
von Wahrheit stecke, fur einen Verstoss gegen die 
Anfangsgriinde diplomatischer Staatskunst und stellte 
mir in Aussicht, er werde mit Herrn von Jagow, dem 
damaligen Staatssekretar des auswartigen Amtes, der 
ein besonderer Freund von ihm war, in diesem Sinne 
red en. Als Ergebnis dieser Besprechung teilte mir 
Herr von Bohlen folgendes mit: Herr von Jagow sei 
ihm gegeniiber fest dabei geblieben, dass er an dem 
Wortlaut des osterreichisch-ungarischen Ultimatums 
nicht mitgewirkt habe, und dass eine solche Forderung 
von Deutschland iiberhaupt nicht erhoben worden sei. 
Auf den Einwand, das sei doch unbegreiflich, habe 
Herr von Jagow erwidert, dass er als Diplomat natur- 
lich auch daran gedacht habe, ein solches Verlangen zu 
stellen. Der Kaiser habe sich aber in dem Zeitpunkt, 
in dem Herr von Jagow mit der Angelegenheit befasst 
und hinzugezogen wurde, schon so festgelegt gehabt, 
dass es fiir ein Vorgehen nach diplomatischem Brauch 
schon zu spat und nichts mehr zu machen gewesen sei. 
Die Situation sei so gewesen, dass man mit Verklausu- 
lierungen gar nicht mehr habe kommen konnen. 

[198] 



tria. It was the duty of our leading statesmen to de- 
mand, as well of the Emperor as of our allies, that the 
Austrian demands and the ultimatum to Serbia should 
be discussed and settled in minute detail and that 
at the same time the exact program of all further pro- 
ceedings should be determined. No matter what 
point of view one took, we ought not to have put 
ourselves into the hands of the Austrians and exposed 
ourselves to eventualities that had not been reckoned 
out in advance. On the contrary, we ought to have 
attached suitable conditions to our engagements. In 
short, Herr von Bohlen regarded the German denial 
of previous knowledge, if there was any trace of truth 
in it, as an offense against the elementary principles 
of diplomatic statecraft; and he told me that he 
intended to speak in this sense to Herr von Jagow, 
then secretary of state in the Foreign Office, who was 
a special friend of his. The outcome of this conversa- 
tion, as communicated to me by Herr von Bohlen, 
was as follows: Herr von Jagow remained firm in 
assuring von Bohlen that he had not collaborated in 
formulating the text of the Austro-Hungarian ulti- 
matum, and that no demand whatever for such 
collaboration had been advanced by Germany. In 
reply to the objection that this was incomprehensible, 
Herr von Jagow said that he, as a diplomatist, had 
naturally thought of making such a demand. At the 
time, however, when Herr von Jagow was consulted 
and drawn into the affair, the Emperor had so com- 
mitted himself that it was too late for any action on 
customary diplomatic lines, and there was nothing 
more to be done. The situation was such that it was 
no longer possible to suggest modifying clauses. In 
the end, he, Jagow, had thought that the failure to 

1 199] 



Schliesslich habe er, Jagow, sich gedacht, die Unter- 
lassung werde auch ein Gutes haben, namlich den 
guten Eindruck, den man in Petersburg und Paris 
deutscherseits mit der Erklarung machen konne, dass 
man an dem Wiener Ultimatum nicht mitgearbeitet 
habe. 

True translation filed with the Postmaster at New York, N. Y., 
on August 28, 191 8, as required by the Act of October 6, 191 7. 

II 

ULTIMATUM AN SERBIEN 
RUSSLANDS MOBILMACHUNG 

Eine Antwort an die Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 2 

An meiner Darstellung ist wohl die Hauptsache 
langst bekannt und von der deutschen Regierung 
nicht geleugnet, namlich: 

1. Dass nach deutscher Auffassung Osterreich- 
Ungarn Serbien zuchtigen solle, ohne dass eine 
dritte Macht darein zu reden habe ; 

2. Dass die russische Mobilmachung die sofortige 
Kriegserklarung Deutschlands bedeute. 

Beide Standpunkte waren schwere politische Fehler. 
D?s Verhaltnis Russlands zu Serbien war naher als 
das zwischen blossen Verbiindeten. Deutschland, das 
seine Hilfsstellung gegeniiber Osterreich-Ungarn mit 
seinen Bundnispflichten erklarte, hatte Russland 
mindestens als in der gleichen Lage gegeniiber Serbien 
befindlich anerkennen miissen. Wie verhangnisvoll 
der starre Standpunkt hinsichtlich der russischen 
Mobilmachung war, ergibt sich schon daraus, dass 
Deutschland seine Kriegserklarungen in dem Augen- 

2 Die Freie Zeitung (Bern), May 15, 1918. 

[200] 



take such precautions would have its advantages — 
namely, the good impression which could be made on 
the German side in St. Petersburg and in Paris by 
the declaration that Germany had not cooperated in 
the preparation of the Viennese ultimatum. 2 



II 

the ultimatum to serbia and 
Russia's mobilization 

A Reply to the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 

Long known and not denied by the German govern- 
ment are, I take it, the chief points in my statement, 
namely: 

1. That, as the Germans conceived, Austria-Hun- 
gary was to chastise Serbia and no other Power was 
to interfere in the affair. 

2. That Russian mobilization meant immediate 
declaration of war by Germany. 

Both these positions were grave political mistakes. 
The relation of Russia to Serbia was closer than that 
between ordinary allies. Germany, which explained 
its attitude of support as regarded Austria-Hungary 
by pleading its duties as an ally, was bound to recog- 
nize that Russia was, at the very least, in the same 
position as regarded Serbia. The peril involved in 
Germany's rigid attitude toward Russian mobilization 
was shown when it sprang upon the world its declara- 
tions of war at the moment when Vienna and St. 

2 See Appendix, note i. 

[201] 



blicke in die Welt rief , an dem Wien und St. Petersburg 
eine gemeinsame Basis zu friedlichen Verhandlungen 
gefunden hatten. 

Neu an meiner Darstellung ist etwa, dass die 
Haltung des Kaisers in Person entschieden im Sinne 
der genannten beiden Standpunkte war. Wer die 
Zustande in Deutschland kannte, durfte ohnehin an 
der starken personlichen Stellungnahme des Kaisers 
nicht gezweifelt haben. 

Dass die sogenannte Unkenntnis des Ultimatums 
an Serbien und das angebliche Unbeteiligtsein an den 
osterreichisch-ungarischen Planen gegen Serbien nur 
ein deutsches sophistisches Spiel mit Worten waren, 
ergab sich unter anderm langst aus der Einleitung des 
deutschen Weissbuches selbst. 

Ich antworte zugleich auf ein Dementi meiner 
Niederschrift, das unlangst die Norddeutsche Allge- 
meine Zeitung brachte, wenn ich weiter sage, aus 
meinen Aufzeichnungen gehe nicht hervor, dass der 
Kaiser unter alien Umstanden den Weltkrieg gewollt 
habe. Aber er hat ihn verschuldet in engerem Sinne. 
Gewollt hat er eine blutige Ziichtigung Serbiens. 
Warum hatte er statt eines Weltkrieges, dessen 
Lorbeeren nicht billig zu erringen waren, nicht lieber 
den Zaren, seinen Freund, iiberreden wollen, um auf 
diese Weise die Macht Deutschlands zu vermehren? 



Aber dieses Mai war sein Spiel zu verwegen. Er 
musste es in Ernst verwandeln, als er die russische 
Mobilmachung nicht verhindern konnte. Es ist wohl 
glaubwiirdig, dass Berlin sogar einen gewissen Druck 
in jenen kritischen Tagen auf Wien ausiibte, die Faden 

[202] 



Petersburg had discovered a common basis for peace- 
ful negotiations. 

What is perhaps new in my statement is that the 
personal attitude of the Emperor was decidedly in 
line with these two points of view. No one, however, 
who knew the conditions obtaining in Germany could 
have doubted, even in default of positive evidence, the 
strong stand personally taken by the Emperor. 

That the alleged ignorance of the ultimatum to 
Serbia and the claim to have played no part in the 
shaping of the Austro-Hungarian plans against Serbia 
were, on Germany's part, only sophistical juggling 
with words, was proved long ago, apart from other 
evidence, by the introduction to the German White 
Book. 

In reply, at the same time, to an article recently 
published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 
which disputes my assertions, I make the further 
statement that my memoranda do not indicate that 
the Emperor had decided, no matter what happened, 
to bring on the World War. In a narrower sense, how- 
ever, he was responsible for its outbreak. He had 
decided on a sanguinary chastisement of Serbia. Why, 
instead of risking a World War, in which the laurels of 
victory were not to be bought cheap, should he not 
rather have decided to win over his friend, the Czar, 
by argument, in order thus to increase Germany's 
power? 

This time, however, his play was over rash. He 
was obliged to follow it up in earnest when he failed 
to prevent Russian mobilization. We may well be- 
lieve that, in those critical days, Berlin went so far as 
to put a degree of pressure on Vienna, urging that 

[203] 



mit St. Petersburg nicht ganz zu zerreissen, um die 
russische Mobilmachung hintan zu halten. Als sie 
aber da war, war es nicht Wien, das Russland den 
Krieg erklarte; Wien war vielmehr gerade auf dem 
besten Weg zur Einigung, sondern der Kaiser in 
Berlin, gemass dem feierlichen, aber trotzdem wahn- 
witzigen Standpunkt, den er von Anfang an ruck- 
sichtslos einzunehmen fur gut befunden hatte. 

Wenn die Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung aus- 
driicklich sagt, dass die russische Mobilmachung den 
Krieg bedeute, habe Berlin stets ausdrucklich betont, 
so gibt sie die Hauptsache zu: Durch Drohung mit 
einem grosseren Unrecht und Ungliick sollte die Welt 
eingeschuchtert werden in ihren Versuchen, ein klei- 
neres Unrecht und Ungliick (gegen Serbien) abzu- 
wenden, und dadurch sollte nicht nur Serbien, sondern 
der ganzen Welt eine brutale, fur Deutschlands 
kunftige Geltung ausschlaggebende Vergewaltigung, 
wenn auch eventuell eine unblutige, zugefiigt werden. 

Auf die iibrigen Behauptungen der Norddeutschen 
Allgemeinen Zeitung, die nur ablenken sollen, verlohnt 
es sich kaum einzugehen. Ich habe nichts von einem 
Potsdamer Kronrat am 5. Juli gesagt, sondern nur, 
dass der Kaiser in einer Besprechung mit den Oster- 
reichern sich in der und der Weise festgelegt habe. Ich 
habe auch keinen Anlass zu bestreiten, dass die zu- 
standigen Organe die Verhandlungen uber die durch 
den Mord in Serajewo geschaffene schwierige Lage 
gefiihrt haben, aber wohlverstanden gemass der 
allerhochst ausgegebenen Direktive: Niemand hat in 
den Streit zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien 
hinein zu reden, russische Mobilmachung bedeutet 
sofortigen Krieg. 

[204] 



connections with St. Petersburg be not wholly cut 
off, but that efforts be made to delay the Russian 
mobilization. Nevertheless, when the mobilization 
came, it was not Vienna that declared war against 
Russia. On the contrary, Vienna was on the direct 
road to an understanding. It was the Emperor in 
Berlin, maintaining the solemnly assumed but never- 
theless insane attitude which, regardless of conse- 
quences, he had seen fit to take from the outset. 

When the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung expressly 
declares that Berlin expressly and uniformly empha- 
sized the view that Russian mobilization meant war, 
it concedes the main point : by the threat of a greater 
wrong and calamity the world was to be frightened 
out of its effort to avert from Serbia a lesser wrong 
and calamity, and so not only Serbia but all the world 
was to be subjected to a brutal, although possibly 
bloodless duress, which was decisively to establish 
Germany's future position. 

The other assertions of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung, which are meant only to throw its readers off 
the track, are scarcely worth discussing. I said 
nothing about a Potsdam crown council on July 5; 
I said only that in a conversation with the Austrians 
the Emperor had committed himself in such and such 
a manner. I have, moreover, no occasion to deny that 
the negotiations concerning the difficult situation 
created by the murder in Serajevo were conducted by 
the agencies in whose competence the matter lay. 
I maintain, however, that they were conducted on the 
lines laid down by the Emperor: no one has any right 
to interfere in the conflict between Austria-Hungary 
and Serbia; Russian mobilization means instant war. 

[205] 



Nicht einmal die Bemuhungen um Erhaltung des 
Friedens bestreite ich, wie schon eben gesagt, aber 
Bemuhungen nicht im Sinne einer Verstandigung, 
sondern im Sinne der restlosen Kapitulation vor dem 
deutschen Standpunkt, mit andern Worten Friedens- 
bemiihungen mittels Kriegsdrohungen. 

Zu verwahren hat man sich nur noch gegen die 
Behauptung der Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung, 
der Suchomlinowprozess habe erwiesen, dass die 
wahren Schuldigen am Weltbrand in St. Petersburg 
sitzen. Dieser Prozess hat nichts neues erwiesen, als 
einige interne Vorgange anlasslich der russischen 
Mobilmachung. Diese sind nicht erheblicher als etwa 
die Feststellung ware, dass auch der deutsche Kaiser 
geschwankt habe, bevor er sich zum aussersten ent- 
schloss. 

Auf die Taten kommt es an. Mobilmachung musste 
nicht Krieg bedeuten, das wussten die Osterreicher 
am besten, die an lange Mobilmachungen ohne Krieg 
gewohnt waren. 

Schuldige im weiteren Sinne am Weltkriege mag es 
genug und seit langer Zeit geben, Schuldige im engeren 
Sinne nur wenige und hinsichtlich der hier behandelten 
Vorgange sitzen sie in Berlin und Wien. -j 

True translation filed with the Postmaster at New York, N. Y., 
on August 28, 1918, as required by the Act of October 6, 1917. 

Ill 
DEUTSCHLAND UND BELGIEN 3 

Die Vergewaltigung Belgiens war ebenso wie die 
Hollands zwar oft vor dem Kriege als Eventualitat 
erortert worden, jedoch war es ein militarisches Ge- 

3 Die Freie Zeitung (Bern), May 4, 1918. 

[206] 



I do not for a moment dispute, I have indeed already 
reaffirmed, that efforts were made to preserve the 
peace. These efforts, however, were not directed 
towards an understanding; their purpose was to 
secure an unconditional surrender to the German 
point of view. In a word, they were efforts to pre- 
serve peace by threats of war. 

Further protest needs to be made only against the 
assertion of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung that 
the Sukhomlinof trial has conclusively shown that the 
real culprits who set the world on fire are to be found 
in St. Petersburg. This trial has brought out nothing 
new, except certain internal occurrences connected 
with the Russian mobilization. These are of no 
greater importance than would be, let us say, decisive 
evidence that the German Emperor also wavered 
before he decided to proceed to extremes. 

It is the facts that are of importance. Mobilization 
did not necessarily mean war. No people knew this 
better than the Austrians, who were accustomed to 
long mobilizations without war. 

Of those who are to blame in the broader sense for 
the World War there may be a plenty, and their 
guilt may date far back. Of those to blame in the 
narrower sense there are but few; and, as regards 
the occurrences here under discussion, they are to be 
found in Berlin and in Vienna. 

Ill 
GERMANY AND BELGIUM 

The forcible occupation of Belgium, as well as that 
of Holland, was, it is true, often discussed before the 
war as a possibility; but it remained a military secret 

1 207 J 



heimnis geblieben, dass fur den Fall eines gleichzeiti- 
gen Krieges gegen Russland und Frankreich der 
deutsche Plan definitiv feststand, Frankreich auf die 
schnellste Weise und mit alien Kraften niederzuwerfen, 
bevor das langsame Russland schlagbereit sei, und 
deshalb unter alien Umstanden den Durchmarsch 
durch Belgien zu fordern. 

Nachdem der Reichskanzler die dem militarischen 
Gebot entsprechenden Schritte getan hatte und nach- 
dem er schon wusste, dass Belgien sich zur Wehr setze, 
trat er vor den Reichstag und entschuldigte sich : Not 
kenne kein Gebot. Belgien werde wiederhergestellt 
und entschadigt werden. Seine Rede zeigte klar, dass 
Belgien ohne eigenes Verschulden, lediglich aus deut- 
schen strategischen Erwagungen misshandelt werde. 
Wenn seine Rechtfertigung audi nicht die Notwen- 
digkeit, gerade diesen Feldzugsplan zu wahlen, ent- 
hiillte, sondern vielmehr die schrankenlose Brutalitat 
der Planeschrniede, so war doch sein Eingestandnis 
der Schuldlosigkeit Belgiens sein grosster Augenblick 
im Kriege. Das will im heutigen Deutschland etwa 
so viel heissen, als dass dieses Eingestandnis seine 
grosste und unverzeihlichste Ungeschicklichkeit war, 
die gutgemacht werden musste. Es dauerte auch 
nicht lange, so fingen die bekannten Verdachtigungen 
der belgischen Neutralitat an, die fur denkende 
Menschen zur Geniige widerlegt sind. Belgien sollte 
eben — besten Falles fur dieses Land — ein Handels- 
objekt beim Friedensschlusse werden. Inzwischen hat 
der Krieg so lange gedauert und die Deutschen haben 
ihre Fange so tief in das ungliickliche Land einge- 
schlagen, dass man nur mit Schauder daran denken 
kann, was sie einmal davon zurticklassen. 

[208] 



that in the event of a simultaneous war against Russia 
and France, the German authorities had definitively 
adopted the plan of overthrowing France in the 
quickest possible way and with all available forces, 
before slow-moving Russia was ready to strike, and 
had therefore decided, whatever might be the situa- 
tion, to demand passage through Belgium. 

After the imperial chancellor had taken action in 
conformity with the military mandate, and after he 
was aware that Belgium was preparing to defend 
itself, he appeared before the Reichstag and gave his 
excuse: "Necessity knows no law." Belgium, he 
said, would be restored and indemnified. His speech 
showed plainly that Belgium was being maltreated 
without any fault of its own, solely because of Ger- 
man strategic considerations. Although his plea in 
justification did not reveal the necessity of choosing 
precisely this plan of campaign, but rather the 
boundless brutality of those who framed the plan, his 
admission of Belgium's innocence was, nevertheless, 
his greatest moment in the war. In the Germany of 
today that amounts to saying that this admission 
was his greatest and most unpardonable blunder. 
It was a blunder that had to be rectified. It was 
not long before the now familiar aspersions against 
Belgian neutrality were started — aspersions which 
have been sufficiently refuted to satisfy all those who 
are capable of thinking. Belgium — in the outcome 
least unfortunate for that country — was to be simply 
an object of barter at the conclusion of peace. In 
the meantime the war has lasted so long and the 
Germans have sunk their fangs so deep in the unhappy 
country, that one shudders to think how little of it 
they will leave. 

1 209] 



Immerhin kein Reichskanzler hat das Wort vom 
4. August 1 9 14 zuruckgenommen, nur vor einer 
klaren Wiederholung hat man sich gescheut. 

Ich habe selbst in Deutschland zwar manchen 
kompetenten Mann gesprochen, aber niemals einen, 
der mir gegenuber auch nur versucht hatte, mit 
irgend einem Wort eine Schuld Belgiens anzu- 
deuten. Trotzdem Hess man und lasst man Tausende 
von Handlangern immer neue Anschuldigungen ver- 
breiten, die jene Erklarung des Reichskanzlers ver- 
gessen machen und das deutsche Volk gegenuber 
Belgien hart machen sollen. Das deutsche Volk, das 
ohnehin seine Fiihrer wenig mit Fragen nach Wahr- 
heit und Gerechtigkeit im Kriege beunruhigt, das 
vor alletn das unvermeidliche Elend auf andere abwalzen 
m'dchte und von seinen Fiihrern in der Hauptsache 
nur verlangt, dass sie keinen materiellen Misserfolg 
haben! Das deutsche Volk, das ohnehin — mag der 
Reichskanzler gesagt haben was nur immer — gewisser- 
massen glauben will, die Belgier hatten den Uberfall 
verdient und keine Bereicherung seines alten Marchen- 
schatzes iiber Belgien (die Franzosen waren zuerst in 
Belgien — die Englander waren doch nach Belgien ge- 
kommen — die Belgier hatten sich anstandigerweise 
nicht wehren durfen, etc.) braucht. 



Da mag es denn nicht unniitz sein, wenn ich an 
meinem bescheidenen Teile etwas zur Steuer der 
Wahrheit beitrage. Was ich jedem Bekannten 
miindlich gesagt habe, wirkt vielleicht mehr, wenn ich 
es den Unbekannten offentlich unterbreite. Und 
wenn es nichts nutzt, so sei es wenigstens ein Trost fur 

[210] 



Up to the present time, indeed, no imperial chan- 
cellor has retracted the promise of August 4th ; there 
has only been reluctance to repeat it clearly. 

I have myself talked, in Germany, with many men 
qualified to form an opinion on the subject, but never 
with one who so much as attempted, with a single 
word, to hint at any fault on the part of Belgium. 
Nevertheless, thousands of hirelings were and are still 
permitted to circulate a constantly growing series of 
accusations, which are intended to cause that declara- 
tion of the imperial chancellor to be forgotten and to 
harden the hearts of the German people against 
Belgium. The German people, who, as it is, trouble 
their leaders with few questions about truth and 
justice in the war, who above all things desire to 
roll off upon others the inevitable burden of misery 
and, in the main, demand from their leaders one thing 
only — rthat they encounter no material reverse of 
fortune! The German people, who, as it is — no 
matter what the imperial chancellor may have said 
— are to a certain degree determined to believe that 
the Belgians got only their deserts when their coun- 
try was raided, and who do not need any addition to 
their old stock of fairy tales about Belgium: that the 
French were in Belgium first; that the English would 
have come to Belgium anyway; that the Belgians 
should have behaved themselves and offered no re- 
sistance, etc. 

It may therefore be not altogether useless, if I con- 
tribute my modest share towards the establishment of 
the truth. What I have told every acquaintance of 
mine orally, may perhaps be more effective if I 
submit it publicly to those with whom I am unac- 
quainted. And if it does not help, may it at least be 

[211] 



die Freunde der Wahrheit und fur die Belgier im be- 
sonderen. Jedenfalls haben meine Angaben den Vor- 
teil, dass sie bei einigem guten Willen nachgepriift 
werden konnen und dass man in Deutschland Tau- 
sende von Zeugen und reichliche schriftliche Belege 
finden kann. 

Belgien hatte vor dem Kriege bei der Firma Krupp 
in Essen vier grosse, moderne Geschutze (28 Centi- 
meter) fur die Befestigung von Antwerpen bestellt. 
Die Geschutze waren Anfang 19 14 fertig, abgenommen 
und vollig bezahlt und versandbereit, aber die Ar- 
beiten an der Befestigung von Antwerpen waren noch 
nicht soweit fortgeschritten, dass die Geschutze aufge- 
stellt werden konnten. Man erinnert sich vielleicht der 
belgischen Kammerdebatten iiber diesen Gegenstand. 
Nun richtete die belgische Regierung an Krupp das 
Ersuchen, die Geschutze einstweilen selbst noch aufzu- 
bewahren. Krupp willfahrte, aber ungern.*, Eine 
solche Aufbewahrung kommt selten vor und hat 
mancherlei Unannehmlichkeiten. Krupp tat wider- 
holte mundliche und schriftliche Schritte, um die 
Geschutze loszubekommen, die belgische Regierung 
erneuerte stets ihr Ersuchen um die Gefalligkeit der 
Aufbewahrung und war sogar bereit, eine Entschadi- 
gung dafur zu zahlen. Es wurde immer wieder ein 
modus vivendi gefunden, der beiderseitige Standpunkt 
blieb unverandert, bis der Krieg ausbrach und das 
preussische Kriegsministerium diese Geschutze sofort 
als Beute (Wert vier Millionen) in Essen beschlag- 
nahmte. 

Daraus folgere ich: Hatte die belgische Regierung 
irgendwelche bosen Absichten gegen Deutschland 
gehabt, oder sich eines deutschen Uberfalls versehen, 
so wurde sie, spatestens als der Krieg drohte, ihre 

[212] 



a consolation to the friends of truth and, especially, 
to the Belgians. In any case, my testimony has the 
advantage that, with a little good will, it may be sub- 
stantiated and that thousands of witnesses and ample 
written evidence may be found in Germany. 

Before the war Belgium had ordered from the 
Krupp Company in Essen four large modern guns 
(twenty-eight centimeters) 3 for the fortifications of 
Antwerp. At the beginning of 19 14 the guns were 
completed, accepted, paid in full, and ready for ship- 
ment; but the work on the fortifications of Antwerp 
had not yet been carried so far that the guns could be 
set up. The debates on this subject in the Belgian 
Chamber of Deputies will perhaps be recalled. At 
this point the Belgian government requested Krupp 
to keep the guns in storage for the time being. Krupp 
agreed, but not willingly. Such storage is unusual, 
and it entails many inconveniences. Krupp repeatedly 
took steps, both by word of mouth and in writing, to 
get rid of the guns; the Belgian government con- 
tinually repeated its request that Krupp be kind 
enough to keep them, and was even ready to pay for 
the accommodation. A modus vivendi was repeatedly 
found, but the attitude of both parties remained un- 
changed until the war broke out, when the Prussian 
Ministry of War at once seized these guns in Essen 
as booty (value four million marks). 



From this I draw the following conclusion: Had 
the Belgian government had any evil intentions 
whatsoever against Germany, or had it expected a 

1 A little more than eleven inches. 

[213] 



kostbaren Geschiitze an sich genommen haben, 
statt darauf zu beharren, dass sie Krupp anvertraut 
blieben. 

Aber ich bin nicht auf dieses eine Beispiel ange- 
wiesen. Belgien unterhielt seit langem. rege Verbin- 
dungen mit Deutschland hinsichtlich seines Kriegs- 
materials. Soweit Krupp nicht selbst an die belgische 
Regierung lieferte, arbeitete die belgische Firma 
Cockerill in Seraing und viele Staatswerkstatten in 
enger Fiihlung mit Krupp (nach seinen Konstruk- 
tionen, Pa ten ten, etc.; Kruppsche Teillieferungen, 
etc.). Diese Beziehungen sind in alien Landern ein 
ziemlich zuverlassiges Barometer politischer Natur, 
was ich hier nicht weiter ausfiihren will. Es liegt auf 
der Hand, dass ein Land umso mehr abhangig wird 
(nicht nur im Kriegsfall, aber besonders in diesem) 
und umso schwerer sich umschalten lasst, je mehr es 
sich auf eine bestimmte auslandische Lieferungsquelle 
fiir Kriegsmaterial eingerichtet hat. Es lag fur 
Belgien auch keinerlei technische Notwendigkeit vor, 
sich an Krupp zu wenden, der z. B. Frankreich gegen- 
iiber in seinen Konstruktionen von jeher weit unter- 
legen war und nur muhsam nachhinkte, wie jeder 
Fachmann, auch in Deutschland, weiss. Krupps 
Qualitaten liegen auf einem ganz anderen Gebiet als 
dem der besseren Konstruktionen und Erfindungen. 
Kurz, Belgiens Beziehungen zu Krupp waren der Aus- 
druck eines freundschaftlichen Bestrebens gegeniiber 
Deutschland. Ich habe immer den Eindruck gehabt, 
dass Belgien das geschaftsgierige, empfindliche, scharf 
nachdrangende Deutschland durch reichliche Auf- 
trage bei guter Laune erhalten zu konnen glaubte, 
wahrend es von Frankreich, dessen Industrie wenig 

[214] 



German attack, it would, at the very latest when war 
threatened, have secured possession of its expensive 
guns, instead of insisting that they should remain in 
Krupp's care. 

My evidence, however, is not confined to this single 
instance. For many years Belgium kept up active 
connections with Germany in the matter of its war 
materials. In those instances in which the Krupp 
Company did not itself fill the orders of the Belgian 
government, the Belgian firm of Cockerill in Seraing 
and many government shops worked in close touch 
with the Krupp Company (using its designs, patents, 
etc.; receiving part-shipments from Krupp, etc.). 
These relations are in all countries a pretty trust- 
worthy sort of political barometer. This is a point on 
which I shall not at present enlarge. It is obvious 
that a country becomes increasingly dependent (not 
solely in case of war, but especially in that event) and 
finds it increasingly difficult to wheel round, in propor- 
tion to the extent to which it has arranged to obtain 
its war materials from a definite foreign source. 4 
For Belgium, moreover, there was no sort of technical 
necessity to turn to the Krupp Company, which has 
always been far inferior to France, for example, in its 
designs and has only with difficulty limped along after 
that country, as every expert, even in Germany, is 
well aware. Krupp's advantages are found in quite 
another field than that of better designs and inven- 
tions. In short, Belgium's relations with Krupp were 
the expression of an effort to keep on a friendly footing 
with Germany. I have always had the impression 
that by giving large orders to Germany, which is 
greedy for business, keen in its pursuit, and quick to 

4 See Appendix, note ii. • • 

[215] 



Regierungsunterstiitzung genoss und zudem sorgloser 
war, Verstandnis fiir die Griinde der Bevorzugung 
Deutschlands und Begnugung mit den menschlichen 
Sympathien erwartete. 



Wenige Monate nun vor dem Kriege kniipfte Bel- 
gien ein weiteres und besonders wichtiges Band 
zwischen sich und Krupp. Es iiberliess sich hinsicht- 
lich einer neuen (kaum erprobten) Munition fiir 
Feldartillerie ganz dieser Firma. Krupp, der sich 
bedeutende direkte Bestellungen zusicherte, iibertrug 
die Berechtigung zur Fabrikation dieser Munition an 
Cockerill unter Mitwirkung, natiirlich, der zustandigen 
Behorden, die sich fiir ihre eigenen Werkstatten das 
gleiche sicherten. Das hiess fiir Cockerill und das 
belgische Kriegsministerium rege und andauernde 
Zusammenarbeit mit Kruppschen Vertretern, In- 
genieuren, etc., und entsprechende Abhangigkeit vom 
Lizenzgeber. Ich hatte damals haufig den Besuch 
eines Cockerillschen Direktors und halte es nicht fiir 
iiberfliissig zu bemerken, dass mir noch bei Kriegs- 
ausbruch ein Schreiben von Cockerill vorlag, dass er 
eine Lizenzanzahlung von einer Million Franken 
soeben iiberweise. 



Man bedenke, die enge Abhangigkeit des Kriegs- 
materialgeschafts von Regierungsintentionen und 
beurteile dann auf Grund der hier erwahnten und 
offenkundigen Vorgange die mala fides der belgischen 
Regierung gegeniiber Deutschland. 

[216] 



take offense, Belgium believed that it could keep that 
country in good humor, whereas she expected France, 
whose industry enjoyed little support from the gov- 
ernment and was, moreover, less keen as regarded its 
own development, to understand her reasons for 
favoring Germany and to be content with general 
indications of sympathy. 

A few months before the war Belgium established 
another and particularly important connection be- 
tween itself and Krupp. For its supply of a new 
(scarcely tested) ammunition for field artillery it 
placed itself entirely in the hands of this company. 
After securing large direct orders, Krupp con- 
ceded the privilege of manufacturing this ammuni- 
tion to Cockerill, with the cooperation, of course, of 
the competent [Belgian] authorities, who saw to it 
that their own works also secured the same privilege. 
For Cockerill and the Belgian Ministry of War this 
arrangement meant active and sustained cooperation 
with Krupp's representatives, engineers, etc., and a 
corresponding dependence on the grantor of the li- 
censes. At that time one of Cockerill's directors paid 
me frequent visits; and I do not consider it super- 
fluous to note that, at the moment of the outbreak of 
the war, a letter from Cockerill lay before me, informing 
me that he was just sending a payment on the license 
amounting to one million francs. 

Consider the close dependency of the war-material 
business on governmental intentions, and then, on the 
basis of the occurrences I have here recounted, which 
are matters of public knowledge, pass judgment on 
the alleged mala fides of the Belgian government 
towards Germany. 

[217] 



True translation filed with the Postmaster at New York, N. Y., 
on August 28, 1918, as required by the Act of October 6, 1917. 

IV 
BRIEF AN BETHMANN-HOLLWEG 4 

Bern, den 7. Mai 191 7 

Seiner Exzellenz dem Herrn Reichskanzler von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg, Berlin. 

Euer Exzellenz! 

So zahlreich und schwer auch die Irrtumer und 
Verfehlungen auf deutscher Seite von Kriegsbeginn an 
waren, so glaubte ich doch lange Zeit hoffen zu konnen, 
dass eine bessere Einsicht und Gesinnung bei unsern 
massgebenden Personlichkeiten allmahlich durch- 
dringen werde. In dieser Hoffnung hatte ich wahrend 
des Krieges meine Arbeit in Rumanien in gewissem 
Masse zur Verfiigung gestellt, und war ich bereit, 
auch in meinem jetzigen Aufenthaltslande, der 
Schweiz, mitzuhelfen, soweit das Ziel der Bemuhungen 
Annaherung der feindlichen Parteien sein sollte. Dass 
ich jeder andern Tatigkeit, die nicht auf Versohnung 
und Wiederherstellung unmittelbar sich richtete, 
abgeneigt war, habe ich schon kurz nach Kriegsaus- 
bruch dadurch gezeigt, dass ich meine Stellung als 
Mitglied des Kruppschen Direktoriums niedergelegt 
habe. 

Seit Anfang dieses Jahres ist mir nun jede Hoffnung 
hinsichtlich der heutigen Leiter Deutschlands ge- 
schwunden. Das Friedensangebot ohne Angabe der 
Kriegsziele, der verscharfte Unterseebootskrieg, die 
Deportationen der Belgier, die Verwustungen in 

4 Die Freie Zeitung (Bern), May 4, 1918. 

[218] 



IV 
LETTER TO BETHMANN-HOLLWEG 

To His Excellency the German Imperial Chancellor 
von Bethmann-Hollweg, Berlin. 

Your Excellency: 

Many and grave as were the mistakes and failures 
on the German side from the beginning of the war, I 
still believed for a long time that there was room for 
the hope that a clearer view and a better frame of 
mind would gradually come to prevail among the 
personages in control of our affairs. It was in this 
hope that, during the war, I placed my services in 
Rumania to a certain extent at the disposal of the 
government, 5 and was ready to cooperate also in 
my present country of residence, Switzerland, in so 
far as the object of my efforts was to be a rapprochement 
of the hostile parties. That I was averse to any activ- 
ity of a different character, not immediately directed 
toward reconciliation and restoration, I showed 
shortly after the outbreak of the war, by resigning my 
position as a member of the Krupp Board of Directors. 

Since the beginning of this year [19 17] all my hopes 
have disappeared as regards the present leaders of 
Germany. The offer of peace without any statement 
of our war aims, the more trenchant conduct of sub- 
marine warfare, the deportations of Belgians, the de- 

5 Before Rumania entered the war, Dr. Muehlon, acting for Ger- 
many, had concluded agreements with Minister Bratiano concerning 
the delivery of wheat. L'Humanite, March 31, 1918. 

[219] 



Frankreich, die Versenkung englischer Hospital- 
schiffe sind Beispiele der Handlungen, die immer 
wieder von neuem unsere verantwortlichen Personlich- 
keiten derartig disqualifiziert haben, dass sie nach 
meiner Uberzeugung fiir eine gutwillige, gerechte 
Verstandigung iiberhaupt nicht mehr in Betracht 
kommen diirfen. Sie mogen fiir ihre Person sich noch 
andern, aber sie konnen nicht Reprasentanten der 
deutschen Sache bleiben. Als solche verdienen sie 
weder Langmut noch Nachsicht mehr. Das deutsche 
Volk kann die geschehenen schweren Versiindigungen 
an seiner, Europas und der Menschheit Gegenwart 
und Zukunft erst dann wieder gutzumachen beginnen, 
wenn es sich durch andere Manner von anderer Art 
vertreten lasst. Es ist keine Ungerechtigkeit, dass es 
heute dem Odium der ganzen Welt verfallen ist, so 
fehlerhaft und unvollkommen diese auch sein und 
bleiben moge: Der Triumph unserer bisherigen mili- 
tarischen und politischen Kriegfiihrung wtirde eine 
Niederlage der hochsten Gedanken und Hoffnungen 
der Menschheit sein. Man braucht nur den Fall zu 
setzen, ein erschopftes, demoralisiertes oder die 
Gewalt verabscheuendes Volk werde den Fried en aus 
der Hand dieser selben Regierung annehmen, die den 
Krieg gefiihrt hat, um zu erkennen, wie triigerisch und 
triib es um das Niveau und die Aussichten des 
Volkerlebens bestellt bliebe. 

Als Mensch und als Deutscher, der es gut meint mit 
dem irregefuhrten und gequalten deutschen Volke, 
wende ich mich endgiltig von den Mannern des 
heutigen deutschen Regimes ab. Moge jeder, der 
dazu in der Lage ist, ebenso handeln. Mogen bald 
viele Deutsche so weit sein. 

[220] 



vastations in France, the sinking of English hospital 
ships — these are samples of the constantly recurring 
acts which have so disqualified our responsible authori- 
ties that, in my judgment, they can no longer be 
taken into account in any effort to attain an honestly 
meant and just understanding. They may change 
their personal attitude, but they cannot remain repre- 
sentatives of the German cause. As such they no 
longer deserve either patience or indulgence. The 
German nation cannot begin to repair the grievous 
offenses committed against its own as well as Europe's 
present and future until it gets itself represented 
by other men of a different stamp. It suffers no 
injustice in being exposed today to odium throughout 
the world. However faulty and imperfect this world 
may be and may remain, the triumph of our military 
and political warfare, as it has thus far been conducted, 
would be a defeat of the highest ideals and hopes of 
mankind. We need only imagine that a nation that is 
exhausted or demoralized, or that abhors violence, 
should accept a peace granted by this same govern- 
ment that has conducted the war, and we shall recog- 
nize how deceptive and dark the situation would be as 
regards the level of international life and, the prospects 
of national existence. 6 

As a human being and as a German who desires the 
welfare of the misled and maltreated German people, 
I turn away, once for all, from the men of the present 
German regime. May everyone, who is in a position 
to do so, act in the same way. May many Germans 
soon reach such a position. 

6 The character of the peace which Germany imposed upon Russia 
at Brest-Litovsk, in February, 191 8, shows how clearsighted a prophet 
Dr. Muehlon was in May, 1917. L'Humanite, March 31, 1918. 

[221] 



Da mir eine Kundgebung in der deutschen Offent- 
lichkeit nicht moglich ist, habe ich es fur den ge- 
gebenen Weg gehalten, Euer Exzellenz von diesem 
meinem Standpunkt zu unterrichten. 

Dr. W. Muehlon 



[222 



Since it is not possible for me to make a statement 
in the German press, I have regarded it as the suitable 
course to inform your Excellency of the position I 
occupy. 

Dr. W. Muehlon 



1 223] 



APPENDIX 

I. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA 

The documents published by the French govern- 
ment shortly after the outbreak of the war show that 
the text of the ultimatum was known at Munich before 
it was delivered to the Serbian government; also that 
the French ambassador at Berlin found it difficult to 
believe that it was not known to the German Foreign 
Office. 

M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin 
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris. 

Munich, July 23, 1914 

The Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution 
of the Austro-Serbian incident is not only possible but even 
probable; on the other hand, official circles have for some time 
been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism. 

In particular the President of the Council said to me today that 
the Austrian note, the contents of which were known to him 
(dont il avait connaissance) , was in his opinion drawn up in terms 
which could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the 
existing situation appeared to him to be very serious. 1 

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, July 24, 1914 

I asked the Secretary of State today, in the interview which I 
had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, 
that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute 

1 French Yellow Book, No. 21; Collected Diplomatic Documents, 
P- 153. 

[224] 



with Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it. 

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that 
the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Serbian 
government having for a long time past wearied the patience of 
Austria. Moreover, he considers this question to be a domestic 
one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localized. 

I then said to him that, not having as yet received any instruc- 
tions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were 
strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet 
had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before 
they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that 
was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to 
support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant. 

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said: "It is only because 
we are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say 
that to me." 

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself, 
domestic trouble will probably break out in Serbia; that will open 
the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be 
led by Vienna?" I added that the language of the German 
newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent 
to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active 
support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time limit 
given to Serbia for submission would make an unpleasant im- 
pression in Europe. 

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support 
Austria's attitude with unusual energy. . . 

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von 
Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to 
every one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent 
by Austria to Serbia. 2 

II. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT 
AND THE KRUPP COMPANY 

Dr. Muehlon corroborates the assertions previously 
made by M. Emile Waxweiler, director of the Solvay 
Institute of Sociology, University of Brussels. M. 

2 French Yellow Book, No. 30; Collected Diplomatic Documents, 
pp. 161, 162. 

I 225] 



Waxweiler's statements, however, are somewhat 
fuller. 

There is one typical fact which may be set against the imputa- 
tions that aim at representing Belgium as having been in military 
accord with France before the present war. Why has the German 
press never indicated that all Belgium's supply of cannons and 
artillery ammunition, as well as part of her other war material, 
comes from Germany? At the most, the Krupp Company per- 
mitted some Belgian factories to cooperate in the manufacture 
of certain guns and projectiles. At the moment of the outbreak 
of war, a considerable part of the following orders, which had 
been entrusted to the Krupp Company with the cooperation of 
Belgian firms, was not yet delivered: 

30,000 universal shells (7.5 cm.) 

18,000 fuses with detonators 

70,000 double-acting fuses 

4 eclipse guns (28 cm.) 

4 embrasure guns (28 cm.) 

In addition, various orders had been placed with other German 
firms, such as Werner, Siemens and Halske, Siemens and Schiick- 
ert, Erhardt, etc. 

If Belgium had contemplated military cooperation with 
France, would she not have placed her orders in French factories? 
Moreover, during the course of the war, a highly critical situation 
arose for the Belgian army. Not having received from Germany 
all the expected deliveries, and, on the other hand, having been 
obliged to transfer into France its base of operations together with 
all its elements of production, it found itself dependent on material 
and supplies of quite a different type from its own. And it was 
only after serious study of the matter by Belgian and French engi- 
neers that a way was found of solving the complicated problem of 
supplying the Belgian army, equipped with German material, 
with munitions of a slightly modified French type. 

A similar difficulty presented itself as regards rifle equipment. 
Taken by surprise, in the midst of a complete army reorganization, 
Belgium did not possess at the moment of the outbreak of hos- 
tilities a sufficient number of rifles. This shortage led her, after 
the war had begun, to ask France, in particular, for 10,000 Lebel 
rifles and 1 ,000 rounds of ammunition per rifle. These rifles were 
distributed among the soldiers of the fortress of Antwerp. This 

1 226] 



circumstance affords a very simple explanation of a fact that has 
been construed against Belgium by the Tagliche Rundschau of 
October 15. The Germans had found a French rifle in the hands 
of a Belgian soldier; they alleged, moreover, that the "Belgian 
cartridges," carried by the soldier, corresponded with the caliber 
of the "French rifle," and from all this they drew the conclusion 
that an arrangement existed between Belgium and France. 
The Belgian Government issued in November, in a communica- 
tion made by their Minister at The Hague, a formal denial: all 
the cartridges with which the Belgian troops were armed at the 
time of the outbreak of the war were of Belgian manufacture, and 
none of them corresponded with the caliber of the French Lebel 
rifle, which they obviously did not fit. 3 

3 Waxweiler, La Belgique neutrale et loyale (Paris, Payot, 1915), 
PP- 155-157; Belgium Neutral and Loyal (New York, Putnam, 
1915). PP- 161-164. 



[227] 



Ill 

The Dawn in Germany ? 

The Lichnowsky and Other Disclosures 
by James Brown Scott 



Reprint of International Conciliation, Special Bulletin, November, 1 91 8 



THE DAWN IN GERMANY? 

The Lichnowsky and Other Disclosures 

By James Brown Scott 

(Reprinted from The A merican Journal of InternationalLaw, April, 1918) 

In the earlier part of March extracts appeared in 
the German press of a Memorandum written by Prince 
Lichnowsky, Imperial German Ambassador to Great 
Britain at the outbreak of the war of 19 14, and more 
of this Memorandum is said to have been published 
in the Stockholm Politiken. In the account given in 
the London Times for March 15, 191 8, it is said that: 

The Memorandum was written by Prince Lichnowsky about 
eighteen months ago, for the purpose of explaining and justifying 
his position to his personal friends, and only half-a-dozen type- 
written copies were made. One of these copies, through a be- 
trayal, reached the Wilhelmstrasse, and caused a great scandal, 
and another was communicated to some members of the Minority 
Socialist Party; but how it happened that a copy got across the 
German frontier forms a mystery to which Politiken declines to 
give any clue. Internal evidence, however, leaves no doubt in 
regard to the authenticity of the document. It is entitled "My 
London Mission, 1912-1914," and is dated Kuchelna (Prince 
Lichnowsky's country seat), August, 1916. 

The most casual reading of the Memorandum will 
disclose why the Prince's Memorandum has created a 
sensation in Germany, where the views expressed by 
the former Ambassador to Great Britain have not 
been avowed by the authorities. Naturally, they have 
been discussed in the Reichstag, and statements have 

[231 1 



appeared from time to time in the press that the 
Prince would be tried and punished for treason, or 
sedition, or for some other heinous offense. 

As regards the Reichstag, the London Times, in its 
issue of March 21, 191 8, says in a dispatch from 
Amsterdam, dated the 19th: 

In the Main Committee of the Reichstag the subject of Prince 
Lichnowsky's Memorandum was discussed. Herr von Payer, the 
Vice-Chancellor, read a letter from the Prince, in which he stated 
that the Memorandum had been written with a view to his future 
justification. These notes were intended for the family archives. 
They have found their way into wider circles by an "unprece- 
dented breach of confidence." The Prince expressed regret for 
the incident. 

Herr von Payer stated that the Prince had tendered his resigna- 
tion, which had been accepted, but as he had been simply guilty 
of imprudence, no further steps would be taken against him. 

A few of the more significant passages of the Memo- 
randum are quoted, with summaries of omitted por- 
tions. 

The Prince arrived in London in November, 1912, 
and found that "people had quieted down about 
Morocco," as an agreement had been reached con- 
cerning this question between France and Germany. 
The Haldane Mission had, he said; failed because 
Germany insisted upon a promise of neutrality, in- 
stead of contenting itself with a treaty with Great 
Britain insuring it against attacks from that country. 
However, Sir Edward Grey, then British Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, had, to quote the Prince's 
exact language, "not given up the idea of reaching an 
understanding with us and he tried it first in colonial 
and economic matters." The purpose of Sir Edward 
Grey as stated by the German Ambassador was to 
settle outstanding controversies with France and 

[232] 



Great Britain, and thereafter reach similar agreements 
with Germany, "not to isolate us," to quote the Prince, 
"but as far as possible to make us partners in the exist- 
ing union. As British-French and British-Russian 
differences had been bridged over, he wished also the 
British-German differences to be settled as far as 
possible and to insure world peace by means of a net- 
work of treaties," which the Prince said would prob- 
ably have included an agreement on the naval question 
after an understanding had been reached obviating 
the dangers of war. Such was Grey's program in his 
own words, the Prince says, apparently quoting Sir 
Edward Grey, upon which the Prince comments that 
it had "'no aggressive aims, and involved 
for England no binding obligations, to reach a friendly 
rapprochement and understanding with Germany*. In 
short, to bring the two groups nearer together." 

Prince Lichnowsky's disclosures concerning the atti- 
tude on the Balkan situation of Austria-Hungary and 
Germany, on the one hand, and Great Britain, on the 
other, are of the utmost importance, as they show an 
agreement of the Central European Powers to exclude 
Russia from Balkan affairs, to substitute their own 
influence for that of Russia, and to make of those 
states dependencies instead of making them inde- 
pendent, inasmuch as the Prince shows that Russian 
influence had really ceased in each instance with the 
independence of each of the Balkan States. 

It will be recalled that Bulgaria, Greece, Monte- 
negro and Serbia, after having beaten Turkey in what 
is known as the First Balkan war, fell out about the 
distribution of the spoils of victory, and that in a 
conference by their plenipotentiaries held in London 
they failed to agree. The consequence was the 

1 233] 



Second Balkan war, of Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, 
in which Rumania joined, against Bulgaria, which 
had insisted upon the lion's share of the common 
victory. In this second war Bulgaria was badly 
beaten, and the Treaty of Bucharest was concluded 
in 1 913. In these various negotiations, Austria was 
an interested party, insisting that the principality of 
Albania should be created out of the spoils claimed by 
Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, and that Serbia be 
denied an outlet to the seas. The attitude of the 
Central German Powers and of Great Britain is thus 
stated by Prince Lichnowsky, who was then German 
Ambassador to London: 

Soon after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, Sir Edward 
Grey suggested an informal conversation in order to prevent a 
European war developing out of the Balkan war. The British 
statesman from the beginning took the stand that England had no 
interest in Albania on account of this question and was therefore 
not willing to let it come to a war. He wished simply as an honest 
broker to mediate between the two groups and settle difficulties. 
He therefore by no means placed himself on the side of the mem- 
bers of the alliance, and during the negotiations, which lasted 
about eight months, he contributed not a little by his good will 
and effectual influence toward bringing about concord and agree- 
ment. Instead of assuming an attitude similar to that of the 
English, we without exception took the position prescribed to us 
from Vienna. Count Mensdorff represented the Triple Alliance 
in London. I was his second. My mission consisted in support- 
ing his propositions. 

So much for the attitude of the different Powers. 
Next as to the conduct of Sir Edward Grey and the 
consequences of the Balkan settlement conducted by 
Austria-Hungary and Germany. On these points the 
Prince said in his Memorandum: 

Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calm- 
ness, and tact. Whenever a question threatened to become com- 

[234] 



plicated, he would draft a form of agreement which hit the matter 
right and always met approval. His personality enjoyed equal 
confidence from all members of the conference. We really again 
successfully stood one of the many tests of strength which char- 
acterize our politics. Russia had had to yield to us everywhere, 
so that she was never in a position to insure success of the Serbian 
wishes. Albania was created as an Austrian vassal state and 
Serbia was driven from the sea. The result of the conference was 
therefore a fresh humiliation for the Russian self-consciousness. 
As in 1878 and 1908, we had taken a stand against the Russian 
program without German interests being at stake. Bismarck 
knew how to mitigate the error of the Congress by secret treaty 
and by his attitude in the Battenberg question. The downward 
path again taken in the Bosnian question was continued in Lon- 
don, and when it led into the abyss it was not opportunely 
abandoned. 

It is common knowledge that Austria-Hungary had 
picked Bulgaria as the winner in the Second Balkan 
war, and that its defeat was a blow to what it con- 
sidered its prestige. The Prince calls attention to this 
in the following passage, and the absence of a specious 
pretext evidently was the reason in the Prince's mind, 
although he does not say so, for the outbreak of the 
war a year earlier than it actually occurred: 

The idea of wiping it out by a campaign against Serbia seems 
soon to have gained ground in Vienna. The Italian revelations 
prove this and it is to be supposed that the Marquis San Giuliano, 
who very appropriately characterized the plan as a most danger- 
ous adventure, preserved us from becoming involved in a world 
war as early as the summer of 1913. 

But however interesting these passages may be, they 
are merely episodes in a memoir whose great value 
consists in the disclosure that before the outbreak of 
the war of 19 14, Great Britain had not only, as is well 
known, settled its differences with France and Russia, 
but also that Sir Edward Grey, representing Great 
Britain, had peaceably settled its controversies with 

[235] 



Germany; that the terms of the treaty adjusting their 
conflicting claims to the satisfaction of Germany had 
not only been substantially agreed upon, but that the 
treaty itself had been drafted and initialed by Sir 
Edward Grey on behalf of Great Britain, and by Prince 
Lichnowsky on behalf of Germany. 

It appears that the agreement between the two 
countries extended to colonial matters in Africa, as 
well as economic questions in Asia. In regard to the 
former, the Prince says, speaking of the treaty of 1 898 : 

Thanks to the obliging attitude of the British Government, I 
succeeded in giving the new treaty a form which fully coincided 
with our wishes and interests. All of Angola up to the 20th degree 
of longitude was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo 
region from the south ; besides this there were the valuable islands 
of San Thome and Principe. . . . Furthermore, we received the 
northern part of Mozambique. . . . 

"The British Government," the Prince says again, 
"showed the greatest obligingness in behalf of our 
interests. Grey purposed proving to us his good will 
and also furthering our colonial development in gen- 
eral, as England hoped to divert German development 
of strength from the North Sea and from Europe to 
the ocean. 'We do not begrudge Germany her colonial 
development', said a member of the Cabinet to me." 
Of the Asiatic situation, and especially of the Bag- 
dad Railway, the Prince has much to say, and the 
purpose of the two governments appears to have been 
to divide Asia Minor into two spheres of influence. 
The economic enterprises were adjusted essentially 
in accordance with the wishes of the German Bank, 
and the railroad itself was prolonged to Basra, so that 
Bagdad was no longer constituted the terminal point 
of the road. An international commission was to 

[236] 



attend to the navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. Ger- 
many was to have a part in the construction of the 
harbor at Basra, and obtain rights in the navigation 
of the Tigris. 

The success of these negotiations and their con- 
sequences not merely to the contracting Powers, but 
to the world at large, are thus stated by the German 
negotiator : 

Under this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra 
became our interest zone, without prejudice to more ancient 
British rights in the Tigris navigation and the Wilcox irrigation 
establishments. Furthermore, we received the whole territory 
of the Bagdad and Anatolian railroad. 

The coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railroad 
were considered as British economic territory, Syria as French, 
and Armenia as Russian. If both treaties had been concluded 
and published, an understanding would thereby have been reached 
with England which would forever have dispelled all doubts as 
to the possibility of an Anglo-German cooperation. 

In connection with Prince Lichnowsky's Memoran- 
dum, the following three documents are to be con- 
sidered. 

The first is entitled "Terms of the Anglo-German 
Agreement of 1914," as corrected by Dr. Zimmermann, 
Under-Secretary at the outbreak of the war, and later 
Imperial German Secretary of State, and handed in 
1916 to Mr. S. S. McClure. 1 It is thus worded: 

1. The Bagdad Railway from Constantinople to Basra is 
definitely left to German capital in cooperation with Turkey. In 
the territory of the Bagdad Railway German economical working 
will not be hindered by England. 

2. Basra becomes a sea harbor in the building of which Ger- 
man capital is concerned with 60 per cent, and English capital 
with 40 per cent. For the navigation from Basra to the Persian 
Gulf the independence of the open sea is agreed to. 

1 Mr. S. S. McClure's Obstacles to Peace, 191 7, pages 40-42. 

[237] 



3. Kuweit is excluded from the agreement between Germany 
and England. 

4. In the navigation of the Tigris, English capital is interested 
with 50 per cent., German capital with 25 per cent., and Turkish 
with 25 per cent. 

5. The oil-wells of the whole of Mesopotamia shall be devel- 
oped by a British company, the capital of which shall be given at 
50 per cent, by England, at 25 per cent, by the German Bank, at 
25 per cent, by the "Royal Dutch Company" (a company which 
is Dutch, but closely connected with England). For the irriga- 
tion works there had been intended a similar understanding. The 
rights of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which, as is known, 
the English Government is concerned, remained unaffected. 
This society exercises south of Basra, on the Schatel-Arabia, as 
well as in all south and central Persia, a monopoly on the pro- 
duction and transport of oil. 

6. A simultaneous German-French agreement leaves free hand 
to French capital for the construction of railways in southern 
Syria and Palestine. 

Besides this, there is an agreement, already made before, 
between Germany and England, concerning Africa, with a 
repartition of their spheres of influence in Angola and Mozam- 
bique. 

Finally there is to be mentioned the Morocco agreement, which 
established the political predominance of France in Morocco, 
but, on the other hand, stated the principle of "open door" to 
the trade of all nations. 

The second is the dispatch of the Belgian Minister 
at Berlin to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
dated February 20, 1914, as officially published by 
the German Government in its collection of Belgian 
documents found in the Foreign Office at Brussels, 
upon the occupation of that city by German troops. 2 

2 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, February 20, 1914. (Reports of the Belgian 
Representatives in Berlin, London and Paris to the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in Brussels, 1905-1914.) Issued by the Imperial 
German Foreign Office, 191 5, under the title "Belgian Diplomatists". 
No. in, pages 131-132. 

[238] 



The material portion of this document, confirming 
Prince Lichnowsky's statements regarding the French 
agreement, is as follows: 

The Franco-German agreement concerning Asia Minor, con- 
cluded very recently at Berlin after difficult negotiations and 
thanks to the personal intervention of the Chancellor, assures to 
France a large sphere of action and influence in Syria. She will 
be able to build a railway line starting from Beirut along the 
valley of the Orontes, back of the Antilebanon as far as Aleppo, 
the point of junction with the German lines. Another French 
line, also starting from Beirut, passing through Horns, will reach 
the Euphrates in the direction of the 35th parallel. M. Cambon 
showed me on the map these lines which are not yet known to the 
public. The coast of the Mediterranean between Alexandretta 
and Beirut will be neutralized; no railway can be built there 
either by Germany, or by France, be it along the coast or across 
the Antilebanon. A line of this sort was not considered necessary. 
It would arouse the hostility of the fanatic tribes of the Anti- 
lebanon, who close their country to Europeans and carry the 
products of the soil, the chief one of which is tobacco, to the har- 
bor of Latakia themselves. The difficulty of the negotiations 
consisted principally in the exact delimitation of the French and 
German zones of influence (60 kilometers on each side of the rail- 
way), so as to prevent them from overlapping. In addition to 
this, France retains the railway concessions which she obtained 
from Turkey in the rich mineral district of ancient Cappadocia, 
along the Black Sea, and the very profitable railway of Smyrna 
and Casaba. 

The third document is entitled "The Bagdad Rail- 
way. Complete Anglo-German Agreement," and, as 
contained in the London Times for June 16, 19 14, is 
as follows: 

Berlin, June 15 (Through Reuter's Agency) 

The Anglo-German Agreement regarding the Bagdad Rail- 
way and Mesopotamia has been initialed in London by Sir Edward 
Grey and Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador. A com- 
plete understanding has been reached on all questions at issue. 

The agreement will not come into force until after the con- 
clusion of the negotiations with Turkey, as on some material 

1 239 J 



points the assent of the Porte will be necessary. The contents of 
the agreement can therefore not be divulged at present. 

In another portion of the Memorandum the German 
Ambassador writes of the Serbian crisis that led to the 
war of 1914, and this section of his revelations is a 
damaging indictment of the policy which his country 
pursued. "On board the Meteor [the Kaiser's yacht], 
we heard," he says, "of the death of the Archduke, 
the heir to the Austrian Throne. His Majesty ex- 
pressed regret that his efforts to win the Archduke 
over to his ideas had thus been rendered vain." What 
these views were, the Ambassador evidently did not 
know. 

Going to Berlin, he found von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
then Imperial Chancellor, much troubled at the out- 
look, and he complained of Russian armaments. The 
distrust and dislike of Russia appeared to pervade the 
Foreign Office. Dr. Zimmermann, the Under-Secre- 
tary for Foreign Affairs, stated that Russia was about 
to raise nine hundred thousand fresh troops, and "his 
words showed an unmistakable animosity against 
Russia, who, he said, was everywhere in our way." 

The Prince refers to the Potsdam council on July 5, 
1914, of which he was not informed at the time, and 
about which he contents himself with saying: "Sub- 
sequently I learned that at the decisive conversation 
at Potsdam on July 5 the inquiry addressed to us by 
Vienna found absolute assent among all the person- 
ages in authority; indeed, they added that there 
would be no harm if a war with Russia were to result." 
Apparently the die had been cast; Austria-Hungary 
was to take action against Serbia, and the attempt was 
to be made to localize the trouble. That is to say, the 
whole affair was to be looked upon as a bout between 

[240] 



Austria-Hungary and Serbia, to which the European 
Powers might be spectators, but not participants. 
This is indicated by the Prince, who says: "I then 
received instructions that I was to induce the English 
press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the 
'death-blow' to the Great Serbian movement, and as 
far as possible I was by my influence to prevent public 
opinion from opposing Austria." 

The Prince believed that England could not be 
counted upon and he warned his government against 
the projected punitive expedition against the little 
country; indeed, he says that he gave a warning 
against the whole project, which he described as 
"adventurous and dangerous," and he advised that 
moderation be recommended to the Austrians because 
he did not believe in the localization of the conflict. 
To this warning Herr von Jagow is reported to have 
answered that Russia was not "ready," that there 
would doubtless be a certain amount of "bluster," 
but that the firmer Germany stood by Austria, "the 
more would Russia draw back." The Prince states 
that the then German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, 
had informed his government "that Russia would not 
move in any circumstance," and that these reports 
caused Germany to "stimulate" Austria-Hungary "to 
the greatest possible energy." Sir Edward Grey's 
influence with Russia was the only hope of maintain- 
ing peace, and the Prince therefore begged him to 
urge moderation in Russia if Austria should demand 
satisfaction from Serbia. The Prince was not success- 
ful with the English press, which felt that exploitation 
of the assassination of the Austrian heir for political 
purposes could not be justified, and the English press 
urged moderation on Austria's part. 

[241] 



Upon the appearance of the ultimatum on July 24, 
giving Serbia twenty-four hours in which to accept the 
conditions, "the whole world," the Prince says, "except 
in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it meant war, 
and indeed world-war. The British fleet, which 
chanced to be assembled for a review, was not de- 
mobilized." 

In order to prevent this catastrophe, the Prince ap- 
parently urged Sir Edward Grey to press for a con- 
ciliatory reply from Serbia, as the attitude of the 
Russian Government showed that the situation was 
very serious. Sir Edward Grey complied, and to 
quote the Prince's language, on the attitude of the 
British Government at this time, "the Serbian reply 
was in accordance with British efforts; M. Pashitch 
[the Serbian Premier] had actually accepted every- 
thing except two points, about which he declared his 
readiness to negotiate." The action of Sir Edward 
Grey and of Russia, which had already suggested 
modification, was indeed very important, so important 
that the Prince felt himself justified in saying: "If 
Russia and England wanted war, in order to fall upon 
us, a hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and 
the unheard-of note would have remained unanswered." 

Sir Edward went over the Serbian reply with the 
German Ambassador, and they discussed Sir Edward's 
mediation proposal, "to arrange an interpretation of 
the two points acceptable to both parties." The 
French, the Italian, and the German Ambassadors 
were to have met under Sir Edward's presidency, and 
the whole difficulty could have been adjusted, the 
Prince saying, "It would have been easy to find an 
acceptable form for the disputed points which in the 
main concerned the participation of the Austrian 

[ 242 ] 



officials in the investigation at Belgrade. Given good 
will, everything could have been settled in one or two 
sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British pro- 
posal would have relieved the tension and would have 
improved our relations to England." The Prince was 
so convinced of this that he urged it upon his govern- 
ment, saying that "otherwise a world-war was immi- 
nent, in which we had everything to lose and nothing 
to gain." The advice, however, was rejected, as it 
was against the dignity of Austria, and Germany did 
not want to interfere in the Serbian affair which was 
the affair of its ally, and the Prince was directed to 
work for "localization of the conflict." 

The Prince had no illusions as to the attitude of his 
government, or misgivings as to the result of Sir 
Edward's policy, for he says: "Of course it would 
only have needed a hint from Berlin to make Count 
Berchtold [Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs] 
satisfy himself with a diplomatic success and put up 
with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. 
On the contrary, we pressed for war." 

Germany not only refused Sir Edward's proposal, 
but had none of its own to make. The impression, the 
Prince said, became stronger that his country desired 
war, and after calling attention to the Russian appeals 
and declarations of the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, the Czar's humble telegrams. Sir Edward's 
repeated proposals, the warning of the Italian Foreign 
Minister, of the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, and 
his own urgent advice, the Prince concludes, "It was 
all of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia 
must be massacred." 

"After that," the Prince says, "events moved rapidly. 
When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the 

[243] 



strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided 
to change his course, we answered the Russian 
mobilization — after Russia had for a whole week 
negotiated and waited in vain — with our ultimatum 
and declaration of war." 

With England's entry into the conflict the Prince's 
mission was at an end. "It was wrecked," he says, 
"not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy 
of our policy." 

Under the next section of the Memorandum the 
Prince has some reflections under the title of "Retro- 
spect," written two years later, in which he ruefully 
comments that there was no place for him in a system 
which "tolerates only representatives who report what 
one wants to read," and he might have added in this 
connection what he says elsewhere, under a system 
which keeps an Ambassador uninformed of negotia- 
tions taking place elsewhere, and even has the coun- 
selor of the Embassy spy upon the Ambassador, report 
his conduct to the Foreign Office, and conduct negotia- 
tions behind his back. 

After some observations that might be considered 
of a personal character, he says: 

In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in 
July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We 
should have had to send to Petersburg a representative who at 
any rate reached the average standard of political ability, and 
we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired 
neither to dominate the Straits nor to throttle the Serbs. 

Germany, he insists, "needed neither alliances nor 
wars, but merely treaties which would protect us and 
others, and which would guarantee us an economic 
development for which there had been no precedent 
in history." The Prince even believes that his country 

1 244] 



could have taken up the question of the limitation of 
armaments, without needing to think of Austria, much 
less to follow whithersoever it cared to go, but, "I had 
to support in London a policy which I knew to be fal- 
lacious. I was punished for it, for it was a sin against 
the Holy Ghost." 

There are passages from two sections which should 
be quoted in the Prince's own words, as the interven- 
tion of a third hand might convey the impression that 
they had been tampered with. They are the "Question 
of Guilt," and "The Enemy Point of View." 

Under the first caption the Prince writes : 

As appears from all official publications, without the facts being 
controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty 
and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation; 

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although 
no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world- war 
must have been known to us — whether we knew the text of the 
ultimatum is a question of complete indifference; 

2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when 
M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate 
an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of media- 
tion, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had 
accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement 
about the two points in question could easily have been reached, 
and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the 
Serbian reply; 

3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, 
without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere 
mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg, and on 
July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Tsar had 
pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man 
should march — so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility 
of a peaceful settlement. 

In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the 
whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole 
guilt for the world-war. 

[245] 



Under the second caption he says: 

Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not 
rest until a system is destroyed which constitutes a permanent 
threatening of our neighbors? Must they not otherwise fear that 
in a few years they will again have to take up arms, and again see 
their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? 
Were those people not right who declared that it was the spirit 
of Treitschke and Bernhardi which dominated the German 
people — the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does 
not abhor it as an evil? Were those people not right who said 
that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers and the 
caste of warriors who rule and who fix our ideals and our values 
— not the civilian gentlemen? Were they not right who said 
that the love of duelling, which inspires our youth at the univer- 
sities, lives on in those who guide the fortunes of the people? Had 
not the events at Zabern and the parliamentary debates on that 
case shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedoms are 
valued among us, when questions of military power are on the 
other side? . . . 

That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are 
bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capitalistic indus- 
trialization, and in spite of socialistic organization, the living, as 
Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still governed by the dead. The 
principal war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Ger- 
many, will be achieved. 

In the same issue of the London Times of March 28, 
1 91 8, from which this account of Lichnowsky's revela- 
tions have been summarized, there is a translation of 
a very interesting, and what the Times calls "astonish- 
ing memorandum" by one Dr. Wilhelm Muehlon, a 
Director of the Krupp Works at Essen at the time of 
the outbreak of the war, and for some time thereafter. 
Muehlon's memorandum figured in the debate in the 
Reichstag committee on March 16, and it is stated by 
the Times to have appeared in the Berliner Tageblatt, 
from which it is reproduced in translated form. It 
should be stated, before proceeding to the analysis of 

1 246] 



the memorandum, that Dr. Muehlon is now a resident 
of Switzerland. 

It is natural that this memorandum should be con- 
sidered in connection with that of the late German 
Ambassador to Great Britain, as it confirms some of 
his statements and furnishes precious information 
hitherto withheld from the public, as it apparently 
was from the Imperial Ambassador at London. Dr. 
Muehlon records conversations which he had about the 
middle of July, 1914, with Dr. Helfferich, then 
Director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and later 
Vice-Chancellor of the Empire, and with Herr Krupp 
von Bohlen and Halbach, head of the Krupp firm, of 
which Dr. Muehlon was a Director. 

The Krupp people were interested in some large 
transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey, and apparently 
Dr. Muehlon saw Helfferich in regard to them. The 
Deutsche Bank was evidently unwilling to meet Dr. 
Muehlon's advances. Dr. Helfferich stated the reasons 
in a peculiarly frank and interesting manner : 

The political situation has become very menacing. The 
Deutsche Bank must in any case wait before entering into any 
further engagements abroad. The Austrians have just been with 
the Kaiser. In a week's time Vienna will send a very severe 
ultimatum to Serbia, with a very short interval for the answer. 
The ultimatum will contain demands such as punishment of a 
number of officers, dissolution of political associations, criminal 
investigations in Serbia by Austrian officials, and, in fact, a whole 
series of definite satisfactions will be demanded at once; other- 
wise Austria-Hungary will declare war on Serbia. 

This implied a very considerable familiarity with 
the future as well as with the past, and it is not sur- 
prising, as German finance and German diplomacy are 
so interrelated, that one involves the other. 

The future Vice-Chancellor had evidently and prop- 

[247] 



erly enough been taken into the secret, for Dr.Muehlon 
continues that Dr. Helfferich added: 

The Kaiser had expressed his decided approval of this pro- 
cedure on the part of Austria-Hungary. He had said that he 
regarded a conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between these 
two countries, in which he would permit no other state to inter- 
fere. If Russia mobilized, he would mobilize also. But in his 
case mobilization meant immediate war. This time there would 
be no oscillation. 

This was probably a reference to the Moroccan 
question, in which war trembled in the balance, but 
peace eventually tipped the scales. 

According to Helfferich, "the Austrians were ex- 
tremely well satisfied at this determined attitude on 
the part of the Kaiser." 

This disclosure made a very great impression upon 
Dr. Muehlon, who had feared a world-war, and ap- 
parently felt that it could not be avoided unless France 
and Russia reconsidered their attitude. Upon his 
return from Berlin to Essen it was natural that Dr. 
Muehlon should communicate this bit of news to Herr 
Krupp von Bohlen, and Dr. Helfferich had given him 
permission to do so, but it was not news to Herr von 
Bohlen, who had recently been with the Kaiser and 
who, according to Dr. Muehlon, "had spoken to him 
also of his conversation with the Austrians, and of its 
result, but he [evidently meaning the Kaiser] had 
described the matter as so secret that he [Krupp] 
would not even have dared to inform his own direc- 
tors." Krupp confirmed Helfferich 's statements, say- 
ing that the situation was very serious, and that "the 
Kaiser had told him that he would declare war im- 
mediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time 
people would see that he did not turn about." The 

1 248] 



subsequent events have shown that these two gentle- 
men were only too well informed, as on the very day 
indicated by Helfferich, the Austrian ultimatum ap- 
peared. 

Meeting Dr. Helfferich after the ultimatum had 
been sent, that gentleman is reported by Dr. Muehlon 
to have said "that the Kaiser had gone on his northern 
cruise only as a 'blind' ; he had not arranged the cruise 
on the usual extensive scale but was remaining close 
at hand and keeping in constant touch;" there was 
nothing to do but to wait and to see what would 
happen, and according to Dr. Helfferich, as recorded 
by Dr. Muehlon, the Austrians did not expect the 
ultimatum to be accepted, and they were "acting 
rapidly, before the other Powers could find time to 
interfere." 

In a subsequent conversation had with Herr Krupp 
von Bohlen, the statement of the German Government 
that Austria-Hungary had acted alone, without Ger- 
many's previous knowledge, was the subject of dis- 
cussion, and such conduct on the part of Germany 
appeared to them inexplicable, as it has to many 
others, inasmuch as by so doing Germany apparently 
gave Austria a free hand, without informing itself as 
to what that hand would do. Herr von Bohlen, there- 
fore, asked his friend, von Jagow, then Imperial Secre- 
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, with whom he was 
very intimate, who informed him that "he had nothing 
to do with the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultima- 
tum, and that Germany had never made any such 
demands." Herr von Bohlen remarked that such ac- 
tion was inconceivable, and Herr von Jagow is stated 
to have replied that he, as a diplomatist, had naturally 
thought of inquiring as to the extent to which Austria 

1249] 



had intended to go, but when called in "the Kaiser 
had," to quote Dr. Muehlon's memorandum, "so com- 
mitted himself that it was too late for any procedure 
according to diplomatic custom, and there was nothing 
more to be done." 

It was not to be expected that Lichnowsky's Memo- 
randum would be allowed to pass without notice on 
the part of the Imperial officials whom the Prince had 
implicated in the misconduct of German affairs. On 
March 20, 191 8, Herr von Jagow made some observa- 
tions on the Memorandum in the North German 
Gazette. Certain minor matters are questioned, and 
some errors of detail corrected, but the former Im- 
perial Secretary of State proceeds with the care and 
caution becoming one who was apparently writing 
from memory. Certain statements which von Jagow 
advances on his own account are of more than ordinary 
interest, and seem to be admissions of the general 
correctness of Lichnowsky's Memorandum, and in 
any event are to be considered as evidence coming from 
German sources that Great Britain had by negotiation 
removed great and outstanding differences which, but 
for other reasons, would and should have prevented 
the two nations from falling out. Thus Herr von 
Jagow says: 

When, in January, 19 13, I was appointed Secretary of State 
I regarded an Anglo-German rapprochement as desirable, and an 
agreement about the points at which our interests touched or 
crossed as obtainable. In any case, I wanted to try to work in 
this sense. A main point for us was the Mesopotamia- Asia Minor 
question — the so-called Bagdad policy — because it had become 
for us a question of prestige. If England wanted to push us out 
there, a conflict seemed, indeed, to me to be hardly avoidable. 
As soon as possible I took up in Berlin the settlement about the 
Bagdad Railway. We found the English Government ready to 

1 250] 



meet us, and the result was the agreement which had almost been 
completed when the world-war broke out. 

At the same time the negotiations about the Portuguese col- 
onies, which had been begun by Count Metternich and continued 
by Baron Marschall, were resumed by Prince Lichnowsky. I 
intended to begin later on — when the Bagdad Railway question, 
in my opinion the most important question, had been settled — 
further agreements about other questions, in the Far East, for 
example. 3 

This would seem to be an admission that agreement 
was reached with Great Britain concerning the Bagdad 
policy and the Portuguese colonies, and of the correct- 
ness of Lichnowsky's account of these transactions. 
The reason for the refusal to complete and to publish 
these treaties at that time is thus stated by the former 
Imperial Secretary: 

With well- justified prudence we intended to postpone publica- 
tion until an appropriate moment, when the danger of adverse 
criticism was no longer so acute — if possible simultaneously with 
the publication of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was on the eve 
of conclusion. The fact that two great agreements had been con- 
cluded between England and us would have made the reception 
considerably more favorable, and would have helped us over the 
defects of the Portuguese agreement. Our hesitation was due to 
respect for the effect of the agreement, with which we desired to 
achieve an improvement of our relations to England and not a 
fresh disturbance of them. It is true — although this was a 
secondary consideration — that we were also influenced by the aims 
which we were then making to secure economic interests in the 
Portuguese colonies; these interests would, of course, have been 
more difficult to secure if the agreement had been published. 

Herr von Jagow, like Prince Lichnowsky, pays his 
tribute to Sir Edward Grey, but reproaches him with 
not preventing the war. This would indeed be a 
serious charge, if Sir Edward could have prevented it, 

8 Reproduced in part, in English translation, in the London Times t 
April i, 191 8. 

I 251] 



but it is at any rate less serious than that he had begun 
it. On this point and the apparent disinclination of 
the English people to go to war, Herr von Jagow 
remarks : 

I am by no means willing to adopt the opinion, which is at 
present widely held in Germany, that England laid all the mines 
which caused the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward 
Grey's love of peace and in his serious wish to reach an agreement 
with us. But he had involved himself too deeply in the net of 
Franco- Russian policy. He could no longer find the way out, 
and he did not prevent the world-war — as he could have done. 
Among the English people also the war was not popular, and 
Belgium had to serve as a battlefield. 

It is with difficulty that the undersigned has resisted 
the temptation of an observation here and there of his 
own, but as a citizen of a belligerent country, he has 
endeavored to refrain from comment, and to allow the 
views of the various personages quoted or summarized 
to speak for themselves. But what would seem preju- 
dice on the part of a citizen of a country at war with 
the Imperial German Government may not seem to 
be so on the part of a German subject. Therefore, a 
portion of a letter is quoted in conclusion, written from 
Bern, to the then Imperial Chancellor, Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, under date of May 7, 191 7, by 
Dr. Wilhelm Muehlon, who, after the outbreak of the 
war, had, in 1916, negotiated treaties on behalf of 
Germany with Rumania before its entry into the war. 
This letter is printed in the London Times of April 4, 
19 1 8, and is said to have been given to the corre- 
spondent of the Parisian Socialist journal VHumanite 
and published by him with the writer's consent: 

However great the number and weight of the mistakes accumu- 
lated on the German side since the beginning of the war, I never- 

[ 252 ] 



theless persisted for a long time in the belief that a belated 
foresight would at last dawn upon the minds of our directors. . . . 

But since the first days of 19 17 I have abandoned all hope as 
regards the present directors of Germany. Our offer of peace 
without indication of our war aims, the accentuation of the sub- 
marine war, the deportation of Belgians, the systematic destruc- 
tion in France, and the torpedoing of English hospital ships have 
so degraded the governors of the German Empire that I am 
profoundly convinced that they are disqualified forever from the 
elaboration and conclusion of a sincere and just agreement. The 
personalities may change, but they cannot remain the repre- 
sentatives of the German cause. 

The German people will not be able to repair the grievous 
crimes committed against its own present and future, and against 
that of Europe and the whole human race until it is represented 
by different men with a different mentality. To tell the truth, it 
is mere justice that its reputation throughout the whole world is 
as bad as it is. The triumph of its methods — the methods by 
which it has hitherto conducted the war both militarily and 
politically — would constitute a defeat for the ideas and the 
supreme hopes of mankind. One has only to imagine that a 
people exhausted, demoralized, or hating violence, should consent 
to a peace with a government which has conducted such a war, 
in order to understand how the general level and the changes of 
life of the peoples would remain black and deceptive. 

As a man and as a German who desires nothing but the welfare 
of the deceived and tortured German people, I turn away defi- 
nitely from the present representatives of the German regime. 
And I have only one wish — that all independent men may do the 
same, and that many Germans may understand and act. 

That the soul of Germany, as its friends in other 
days have seen it or felt it to be, may regain the 
ascendancy, and that the ideals of Kant may prevail 
over the practices of Clausewitz and his successors, 
is the hope and prayer of the undersigned. 

James Brown Scott 



[253] 



LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 

i. Program of the Association, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. April, 
1907. 

2. Results of the National Arbitration and Peace Congress, by Andrew Car- 

negie. April, 1907.* 

3. A League of Peace, by Andrew Carnegie. November, 1907.* 

4. The results of the Second Hague Conference, by Baron d'Estournelles de 

Constant and Hon. David Jayne Hill. December, 1907.* 

5. The Work of the Second Hague Conference, by James Brown Scott. 

January, 1908.* 

6. Possibilities of Intellectual Cooperation Between North and South America, 

by L. S. Rowe. April, 1908.* 

7. America and Japan, by George Trumbull Ladd. June, 1908.* 

8. The Sanction of International Law, by Elihu Root. July, 1908.* 

9. The United States and France, by Barrett Wendell. August, 1908. 

10. The Approach of the Two Americas, by Joaquim Nabuco. September, 

1908.* 

11. The United States and Canada, by J. S. Willison. October, 1908.* 

12. The Policy of the United States and Japan in the Far East. November, 

1908.* 

13. European Sobriety in the Presence of the Balkan Crisis, by Charles Austin 

Beard. December, 1908.* 

14. The Logic of International Cooperation, by F. W. Hirst. January, 1909.* 

15. American Ignorance of Oriental Languages, by J. H, DeForest. February, 

1909.* 

16. America and the New Diplomacy, by James Brown Scott. March, 1909.* 

17. The Delusion of Militarism, by Charles E. Jefferson. April, 1909. 

18. The Causes of War, by Elihu Root. May, 1909.* 

19. The United States and China, by Wei-ching Yen. June, 1909.* 

20. Opening Address at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbi- 

tration, by Nicholas Murray Butler. July, 1909.* 

I 255] 



21. Journalism and International Affairs, by Edward Cary. August, 1909.* 

22. Influence of Commerce in the Promotion of International Peace, by John 

Ball Osborne. September, 1909.* 

23. The United States and Spain, by Martin Hume. October, 1909.* 

24. The American Public School as a Factor in International Conciliation, by 

Myra Kelly. November, 1909.* 

25. Cecil Rhodes and His Scholars as Factors in International Conciliation, 

by F. J. Wylie. December, 1909.* 

26. The East and the West, by Seth Low. January, 1910.* 

27. The Moral Equivalent of War, by William James. February, 1910. 

28. International Unity, by Philander C. Knox. March, 1910.* 

29. The United States and Germany, by Karl Von Lewinski. April, 1910.* 

30. The United States and Mexico, by James Douglas. May, 1910.* 

31. The International Duty of the United States and Great Britain, by Edwin 

D. Mead. June, 1910.* 

32. An Economic View of War and Arbitration, by John B Clark, LL.D. 

July, 1910.* 

33. Peace Versus War: The President's Solution, by Andrew Carnegie. 

August. 1910.* 

34. Conciliation through Commerce and Industry in South America, by 

Charles M. Pepper. September, 1910.* 

35. International Conciliation in the Far East: A Collection of Papers Upon 

Various Topics, by Rt. Rev. L. H. Roots, Rev. Dr. J. H. DeForest, 
Prof. E. D. Burton, Rev. Dr. Gilbert Reid and Hon. John W. Foster. 
October, 19 10.* 

36. The Capture and Destruction of Commerce at Sea, and Taxation and 

Armaments, by F. W. Hirst. November, 1910.* 

37. Selections from Speeches Delivered in Congress on the Naval Appropria- 

tion Bills, by Hon. Theodore E. Burton. December. 1910.* 

38. School Books and International Prejudices, by Albert Bushnell Hart. 

January, 191 1.* 

39. Peace and the Professor, by Grant Showerman. February, 1911.* 

40. Woman and the Cause of Peace, by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. 

March, 1911.* 

41. The Expansion of Military Expenditures, by Alvin S. Johnson. April, 

1911.* 

42. The First Universal Races Congress, by the Rt. Hon. Lord Weardale. 

May, 1911.* 

43. Opening Address at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbi- 

tration, by Nicholas Murray Butler. June, 191 1.* 

[256] 



44- The United States and Latin America at the Hague, by William I. Hull. 
July, I9H-* 

45. The Emotional Price of Peace, by Professor Edward L. Thorndike. Au- 

gust, 191 1.* 

46. Letter to the Apostolic Delegate to the United States of America, by His 

Holiness Pope Pius X. September, 191 1.* 

47. The Existing Elements of a Constitution of the United States of the World, 

by H. La Fontaine. October, 191 1.* 

48. The General Arbitration Treaties of 1911. November, 1911.* 

49. The Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, by Heinrich Lammasch; and 

Forces Making for International Conciliation and Peace, by Jackson H. 
Ralston. December, 191 1.* 

50. Finance and Commerce: Their Relation to International Good Will; A 

Collection of Papers by Sereno S. Pratt, Isaac N. Seligman, E. H. Outer- 
bridge, Thomas F. Woodlock, and George Paish. January, 1912.* 

Do the Arts Make for Peace? by Frank Jewett Mather, Jr. February, 
1912.* 

52. An Anthropologist's View of War, by Franz Boas. March, 1912.* 

53. The Mirage of the Map, by Norman Angell. April, 1912.* 

54. Philosophy of the Third American Peace Congress, by Theodore Marburg. 

May, 1912.* 

55. The International Mind, by Nicholas Murray Butler. June, 1912.* 

56. Science as an Element in the Developing of International Good Will, by 

Sir Oliver Lodge. July, 1912.* 

57. The Interest of the Wage-earner in the Present Status of the Peace Move- 

ment, by Charles Patrick Neill. August, 1912.* 

58. The Relation of Social Theory to Public Policy, by Franklin H. Giddings. 

September, 19 12.* 

59. The Double Standard, in Regard to Fighting, by George M. Stratton. 

October, 1912.* 

60. As to Two Battleships. Debate upon the Naval Appropriation Bill, House 

of Representatives. November, 1912.* 

61. The Cosmopolitan Club Movement, by Louis P. Lochner. December, 

1912.* 

62. The Spirit of Self-Government, by Elihu Root. January, 1913.* 

63. The Panama Canal Tolls, by William Howard Taft and Amos S. Hershey. 

February, 1913.* 

64. Internationalism; A Selected List of Books, Pamphlets and Periodicals, by 

Frederick C. Hicks. March, 1913.* 

65. The Interparliamentary Union, by Christian L. Lange. April, 1913** 

[257] 



66. The Press and World Peace, by W. C. Deming. May, 1913.* 

67. Music as an International Language, by Daniel Gregory Mason. June, 

IQI3-* 

68. American Love of Peace and European Skepticism, by Paul S. Reinsch. 

July, 1913.* 

69. The Relations of Brazil with the United States, by Manoel de Oliveira 

Lima. August, 1913-* 

70. Arbitration and International Politics, by Randolph S. Bourne. Septem- 

ber, 1913-* 

71. Japanese Characteristics, by Charles William Eliot. October, 1913.* 

72. Higher Nationality; A Study in Law and Ethics, by Lord Haldane. No- 

vember, 1913.* 

73. The Control of the Fighting Instinct, by George M. Stratton. December, 

1913.* 

74. A Few Lessons Taught by the Balkan War, by Alfred H. Fried. January, 

1914.* 

75. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Nicholas Murray 

Butler. February, 1914.* 

76. Our Relations with South America and How to Improve Them, by George 

H. Blakeslee. March, 1914.* 

77. Commerce and War, by Alvin Saunders Johnson. April, 1914-* 

78. A Defense of Cannibalism, by B. Beau. Translated from La Revue of 

February 15, 1909, by Preston William Slosson. May, 1914.* 

79. The Tradition of War, by Randolph S. Bourne. June, 1914-* 

80. War and the Interests of Labor, by Alvin S. Johnson. Reprinted from the 

Atlantic Monthly, March, 1914- July, 1914-* 

81. Fiat Pax, by George Allan England. August, 1914.* 

82. Three Men Behind the Guns, by Charles E. Jefferson, D.D. September, 

1914-* 

83. Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Series I. 

I. The Austro-Hungarian Note to Servia. 

II. The Servian Reply. 

III. The British White Paper. 

IV. The German White Book. October, 1914- 

84. Additional Official Documents Bearing upon the European War. Series II.* 

I. Speech of the Imperial Chancellor to Reichstag, August 4, 1914- 

II. Speech of the Prime Minister to House of Commons, August 6, 1914. 

III. The Russian Orange Book. 

IV. The Original Texts of the Austrian Note of July 23, 1914. and the 

Serbian Reply of July 25, 1914. with annotations. November, 1914. 

[258] 



8s. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. III. 
I. The Neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg. 
II. Address of the President of the Council to the French Senate, August 

4, 1914. 

III. Official Japanese Documents. 

IV. Address to the People by the German Emperor, December, 19 14. 

86. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. IV. 

I. Turkish Official Documents. November, 1914. 

II. Speech of the Imperial Chancellor to the Reichstag. December 2, 
1914- 
III. The Belgian Gray Book. (July 24, August 29, 1914.) January, 1915. 

87. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. V. 

The French Yellow Book, Translated and Prepared for Parliament by the 
British Government. February, 1915. 

88. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. V. 

The French Yellow Book, Translated and Prepared for Parliament by the 
British Government. March, 1915. 

89. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VI.* 

The Austrian Red Book, Official Translation Prepared by the Austrian 
Government. April, 1915. 

90. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VII. 
The Serbian Blue Book. May, 1915. 



91. \ The Fundamental Causes of the World War, by Alfred H. Fried. June, 



\rj 



1915. 



92. To the Citizens of the Belligerent States, by G. Heymans. July, 1915. 

93. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. VIII. 

Italy's Green Book. Translation approved by Royal Italian Embassy, 
Washington, D. C. August, 1915. 

94. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. IX. 
Official Correspondence Between the United States and Germany. 

I. Declaration of London, August 6, 1914 — October 24, 1914. 

II. Contraband of War, September 4, 1914 — April 26, 1915. 

III. Restraints of Commerce, February 6, 1915 — September 7, 1915. 

IV. Case of the William P. Frye, March 31, 1915 — July 30, 1915. Sep- 

tember, 1915. 

95. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. X. 

Official Correspondence Between the United States and Great Britain. 
I. Declaration of London, August 6, 1914 — October 22, 1914. 
II. Contraband of War, August 5. 1914 — April 10, 1915. 

III. Restraints of Commerce, December 26, 1914 — July 31, 1915. 

IV. Case of the Wilhelmina, February 15, 1915 — April 8, 1915. October, 

I9IS. 

96. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XI. 

I. Secretary Bryan's Letter to Senator Stone Regarding Charges of 
Partiality Shown to Great Britain, January 20, 1915. 

[259] 



II. The Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador 
Penfield, June 29, ioi5- 

III. The Secretary of State to Ambassador Penfield, August 12, 1915. 
November, 191 5. 

97. Referendum on the Report of the Special Committee on Economic Results 

of the War and American Business. Reprinted by permission of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States. December, 1915.* 

98. The Land Where Hatred Expires, by Albert Leon Guerard. January, 1916. 

99. America's Opinion of the World War, by Eduard Bernstein. Translated 

by John Mez. February, 1916. 

100. International Cooperation, by John Bassett Moore. The Outlook for 

International Law, by Elihu Root. March, 1916. 

101. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XII. 
Statement of Measures Adopted to Intercept the Sea-Borne Commerce of 

Germany. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of 
His Majesty. January, 1916. 
Great Britain's Measures Against German Trade. A Speech Delivered 
by the Rt. Hon. Sir E. Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in 
the House of Commons, on the 26th of January, 1916. April, 1916. 

102. Super-Resistance, by Harold C. Goddard. May, 1916. 

103. Official Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XIII. 
German White Book on Armed Merchantmen. June, 1916. 

104. Official Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XIV. 
Speech of Imperial German Chancellor before the Reichstag, on April 5, 

1916. July, 1916. 

105. Inter Arma Veritas, by William Allan Neilson. August, 1916. 

106. The Proposal for a League to Enforce Peace. Affirmative — William 

Howard Taft; Negative — William Jennings Bryan. September, 1916. 

107. Nationality and Beyond, by Nicholas Murray Butler. Do We Want 

Half the Hemisphere? by Brander Matthews. October, 1916. 



108. War and Human Progress, by James Bryce. November, 1916. 

109. The Principle of Nationality, by Theodore Ruyssen. Translated by 

John Mez. December, 19 16. 

110. Official Documents Looking Toward Peace. Series I. January, 1917. 
in. Official Documents Looking Toward Peace. Series II. February, 1917. 

112. What is a Nationality? Part II of The Principle of Nationality, by 

Theodore Ruyssen. March, 19 17. 

113. The Bases of an Enduring Peace, by Franklin H. Giddings. April, 191 7. 

114. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XV. 
The Entry of the United States. May, 1917. 

[260] 



US. The War and the Colleges, from an Address to Representatives of Colleges 
and Universities, delivered by the Hon. Newton D. Baker, May 5, 
1917. June, 1917. 

116. The Treaty Rights of Aliens, by William Howard Taft. July, 1917. 

117. The Effect of Democracy on International Law, by Elihu Root. August, 

1917. 

118. The Problem of Nationality. Part III of The Principle of Nationality, 

by Theodore Ruyssen. September, 191 7. 

119. Official Documents Looking Toward Peace, Series III. October, 1917. 

120. The United States and Great Britain, by Walter H. Page. The British 

Commonwealth of Nations, by Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts. Amer- 
ica and Freedom, by Viscount Grey. November, 191 7. 

121. The Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States, held at 

Long Beach. N. Y., May 28-June 1, 1917. An Experiment in Educa- 
tion, by Stephen Pierce Duggan. December, 19 17. 

122. The Aims of the War: Letter of Lord Lansdowne to the London Daily 

Telegraph, November 29, 191 7. Reply by Cosmos printed in the 
New York Times, December 1, 1917. The President's Address to the 
Congress, December 4, 1917. January, 1918. 

123. Victory or Defeat: No Half-way House, speech delivered by the Rt. 

Hon. David Lloyd George, December 14, 1917; British Labor's War 
Aims, statement adopted at the Special National Labor Conference 
at Central Hall, Westminster, December 28, 1917; Great Britain's 
War Aims, speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George at 
the Trade Union Conference on Man Power, January 5, 1918; Labor's 
After-War Economic Policy,. by Rt. Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P.; 
America's Terms of Settlement, address by President Wilson to the 
Congress, January 8, 1918. British Labor Party's Address to the 
Russian People, January 15, 1918. February, 1918. 

124. The United States and Japan: text of the Root-Takahira Understanding 

of November 30, 1908, and of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of Novem- 
ber 3, 1917; Japan and the United States, address by the Hon. Elihu 
Root, October 1, 1917; The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, address by the 
Hon. James L. Slayden, November 15, 1917; What of Our Fears of 
Japan? by Kenneth S. Latourette. March, 1918. 

125. The Awakening of the German People, by Otfried Nippold. April, 1918. 

126. The Anniversary of America's Entry into the War: An address delivered 

by President Wilson at Baltimore, Maryland, April 6, 1918; an article 
written for The Daily Chronicle of London by Professor Gilbert Murray. 
May, 1918. 

127. The Lichnowsky Memorandum: Introduction and translation by Munroe 

Smith, German text from the Berliner B or sen-Courier, Appendix by 
Munroe Smith and Henry F. Munro; Reply of Herr von Jagow. June, 
1918. 

[26l] 



128. America and the Russian Dilemma, by Jerome Landfield. The German 

Peace Treaties with the Ukraine, Russia, Finland and Rumania. The 
Constitution of Middle Europe, by Friedrich Naumann. July, 1918. 

129. A Voice from Germany: Why German Peace Declarations Fail to Con- 

vince, by Professor F. W. Foerster. Austria's Peace Proposals: The 
Letter to Prince Sixtus. August, 1918. 

130. Memoranda and Letters of Dr. Muehlon: Introduction and translation 

by Munroe Smith, German text and Appendix. September, 1918. 

131. The League of Nations, by Viscount Grey of Falloden and Nicholas 

Murray Butler; Labor and the League of Nations, by Ordway Tead; 
The European Commission of the Danube, by Edward Krehbiel. 
Address by President Wilson at the Metropolitan Opera House, New 
York, September 27, 1918. October, 1918. 

132. The "Lusitania": Opinion of Court, United States District Court, South- 

ern District of New York— In the the matter of the petition of the 
Cunard Steamship Company, limited, as owners of the Steamship 
"Lusitania," for limitation of its liability. November, 1918. 

Special Bulletins: 

The United States and Australia, by Percival R. Cole. March, 1910.* 

Opening Address at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International 
Arbitration, by Nicholas Murray Butler. June, 1910.* 

Mr. Carnegie's Letter to the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for 
the Advancement of Peace, and Resolutions adopted by the Trustees. 
January, 191 1.* 

Arbitration between Great Britain and the United States, by Cardinal 
Gibbons. May, 191 1. 



International Arbitration, by Sir Charles Fitzpatrick. August, 191 1.* 



s 



V 



The Dawn of World Peace, by William Howard Taft, President of the 
United States. November, 191 1.* 

Deutschland und Grossbritannien; eine Studie iiber Nationale Eigen- 
tiimlichkeiten, by Lord Haldane. (In German).* 

Address at Peace Dinner, December 30, by Andrew Carnegie. December, 
1911.* 

Great Britain and Germany; a Study in National Characteristics, by 
Lord Haldane. March, 1912.* 

War Practically Preventable and Arguments for Universal Peace, by 
Rev. Michael Clune. June, 1912.* 

Who Makes War? From the London Times. February, 1913.* 

On Naval Armaments, by Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill. April, 1913.* 

Profit and Patriotism, and Money-Making and War. Reprints. May, 
1913.* 

[262] 



A New Year's Letter from Baron d'Estournelles de Constant. Decem- 
ber, 1913. 

The A B C of the Panama Canal Controversy. Reprinted from the Con- 
gressional Record, October 29, 1913. December, 1913. 

Wanted — A Final Solution of the Japanese Problem, by Hamilton Holt. 
January, 1914.* 

The South American Point of View, by Charles Hitchcock Sherrill. 
January, 1914.* 

A Panama Primer. Reprinted from The Independent. March 30, 19 14. 
April, 1914.* 

The Causes Behind Mexico's Revolution, by Gilbert Reid. Reprint 
from the New York Times, April 27, 1914. June, 1914.* 

The Japanese in California. June, 1914.* 

The Changing Attitude toward War as Reflected in the American Press. 
September, 1914. 

The Great War and Its Lessons, by Nicholas Murray Butler. October, 



1914 



* 



Address of William H. Taft, May 17, 1914. October, 1914. 

Contemporary War Poems. December, 1914.* 

The War and Peace Problem, Material for the Study of International 
Polity, by John Mez. February, 191S. 

Syllabus of Lectures on the War and Peace Problem for the Study of 
International Polity, by John Mez. February, 1915. 

A Dozen Truths About Pacificism, by Alfred H. Fried, translated by John 
Mez. March, 1915.* 

Educational Factors Toward Peace, by Leon Fraser. April, 1915.* 

A Brief Outline of the Nature and Aims of Pacifism, by Alfred H. Fried. 
Translated by John Mez. April, 1915.* 

Internationalism. A list of Current Periodicals selected and annotated 
by Frederick C. Hicks. May, I9I5-* 

Spirit of Militarism and Non-Military Preparation for Defense, by John 
Lovejoy Elliott and R. Tait McKenzie. June, 1915.* 

Existing Alliances and a League of Peace, by John Bates Clark. July, 
I9IS-* 

Is Commerce War? by Henry Raymond Mussey. January, 1916,. 

Peace Literature of the War, by John Mez. January, 19 16. 

Is There a Substitute for Force in International Relations? by Suh Hu. 
Prize essay, International Polity Club Competition, awarded June, 
1916. 

[263] 



Labor's War Aims: Memorandum on War Aims, adopted by the Inter- 
Allied Labor and Socialist Conference, February 22, 1918; The Allied 
Cause is the Cause of Socialist Internationalism: Joint Manifesto of 
the Social Democratic League of America and the Jewish Socialist 
League. June, 1918. 

The Dawn in Germany? The Lichnowsky and other Disclosures, by 
James Brown Scott. November, 1918. 

* Edition exhausted. 

Copies of the above, so far as can be spared, will be sent to libraries and 
educational institutions for permanent preservation postpaid upon receipt of 
a request addressed to the Secretary of the American Association for Inter- 
national Conciliation. 

A charge of five cents will be made for copies sent to individuals. Regular 
subscription rate twenty-five cents for one year, or one dollar for five years. 



[264) 



AMERICAN ASSOCIATION 
FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 



Executive Committee 

Nicholas Murray Butler Stephen Henry Olin 
James Speyer Robert A. Franks 

James L. Slayden George Blumenthal 

Joseph P. Grace Gang Dunn 

Thomas W. Lamont 

Acting Secretary 
Henry S. Haskell 

Director of Inter -American Division 
Peter H. Goldsmith 

Correspondents 

Francis W. Hirst, London, England 
T. Miyaoka, Tokio, Japan 

Organizing Secretaries for South America 

Benjamin Garcia Victorica, American Legation, Buenos Aires 
A. G. Araujo Jorge, Foreign Office, Rio de Janeiro 
Juan Bautista de Lavalle, San Pedro, 88, Lima 



[265] 



COUNCIL OF DIRECTION OF THE 

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL 

CONCILIATION 



Lyman Abbott, New York 

Edwin A. Alderman, Charlottesville, 

Va. 
John R. Alpine, Chicago, III. 
Robert Bacon, New York 
Richard Bartholdt, St. Louis, Mo. 
George Blumenthal, New York 
Clifton R. Breckenridge, Eureka 

Springs, Arkansas 
William J. Bryan, Lincoln, Nebraska 
T. E. Burton, Cleveland, Ohio 
Nicholas Murray Butler, New York 
Andrew Carnegie, New York 
Richard H. Dana, Boston, Mass. 
Arthur L. Dasher, Macon, Ga. 
Horace E. Deming, New York 
Gano Dunn, New York 
Charles W. Eliot, Cambridge, Mass. 
Austen G. Fox, New York 
Robert A. Franks, Orange, N. J. 
John P. Frey, Cincinnati, Ohio 
Robert Garrett, Baltimore, Md. 
Joseph P. Grace, New York 
William Green, Indianapolis, Ind. 
William J. Holland, Pittsburgh, Pa. 
Hamilton Holt, New York 
David Starr Jordan, Stanford 

University, Cal. 
J. H. Kirkland, Nashville, Tenn: 
Mrs. James Lees Laidlaw, New York 
Thomas W. Lamont, New York 
Adolph Lewisohn, New York 
Clarence H. Mackay, New York 



Theodore Marburg, Baltimore, Md. 

Brander Matthews, New York 

Silas McBee, New York 

George B. McClellan, Princeton, N. J. 

Andrew J. Montague, Richmond, Va. 

Mrs. Philip N. Moore, Washington, D. C. 

W. W. Morrow, San Francisco, Cal. 

Levi P. Morton, New York 

Stephen H. Olin, New York 

Mrs. Percy V. Pennybacker, New York 

Henry S. Pritchett, New York 

A. V. V. Raymond, Buffalo, N. Y. 

Ira Remsen, Baltimore, Md. 

James Ford Rhodes, Boston, Mass. 

Elihu Root, New York 

J. G. Schurman, Ithaca, N. Y. 

James Brown Scott, Washington, D. C. 

Charles Hitchcock Sherrill, New York 

Mrs. Seward A. Simons, Los Angeles, Cal. 

F. J. V. Skiff, Chicago, III. 

James L. Slayden, Washington, D. C 

William M. Sloane, New York 

James Speyer, New York 

Oscar S. Straus, New York 

Mrs. Mary Wood Swift, Berkeley, Cal. 

George W. Taylor, Demopolis, Ala. 

O. H. Tittman, Washington, D. C. 

W. H. Tolman, New York 

Charlemagne Tower, Philadelphia, Pa. 

Edward Tuck, Paris, France 

George E. Vincent, New York 

William D. Wheelwright, Portland, Ore. 

Mary E. Woolley, South Hadley, Mass. 



[266] 



P% 8 8 









- » • 



* ^ 



- * *& <<* ° - 







.• £°+ 






*Cr> <v» 



J j>9" 



l0 












"*. 



^ 






• 4 5 



..-:.•■ 



«^t> 






^ *^^^^** ,> <»> O *fi%M*\* <S Deacidified using the Bookkeeper 

^<$» *«,o' <$>" O^ «■»,,• A Neutralizing agent: Magnesium 0> 

* *> <} *'•<>. %> JT .••!.' TreatmentDate: MAY ?f 






^ - 




.reatmentDate:^ m 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

111 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 



>v v v--»> v*#v v^v* 

^^\ 4 0°*..^fe>o jf&fcX C«*.i 













<^0 



«G V ^ "VST*' A 

"ov* :iSfI|»* ^ '^Pra: *bv* 













• « * 



-o/ 









v •* 



^^^^ ^: #*% \fSst 



* A. 



^* ^ 



